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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview
An economic analysis of patents could be summarized as follows:
We adore them, and we hate them! We adore the ability of the patent
system to encourage the creation of beneficial new products, and thereby
stimulate economic growth. Patents have played a role in the develop-
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ment and commercialization of the automobile,2 the radio,3 the tele-
phone,4 aspirin,5 the light bulb,6 and many other breakthrough
inventions. We praise the great inventors and their brilliant achieve-
ments.7 The patent system provides an important economic incentive to
inventors. Without the patent system (or some other incentive system),
inventions would be under-produced, resulting in slower economic
growth, and slowing the arrival of products and processes that improve
the quality of life.8
However, if a patent creates a monopoly (or an oligopoly or a
monopolistic competition situation), we hate the consequent economic
inefficiencies - the patented product will sell at a higher price, and the
quantity will be restricted, so that fewer consumers will be able to
purchase the product than in a truly competitive market.9 The ability to
sell at a higher price (above the marginal cost of producing the product)
is called "market power.'1°
Whether a patent allows the patent holder to exercise market power
2. George Selden, a patent lawyer and some-time inventor, obtained a patent for a prototype
automobile in 1895. Henry Ford began selling cars in 1903. Selden sued Ford for patent
infringement, and Ford prevailed on appeal in 1911. Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the
Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q. J. 369, 378 (1994). See also Robert P. Merges &
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 846-47
(1990) (discussing the Selden patent); Id. at 888-89.
3. See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1 (1943), reh'g denied,
320 U.S. 809 (1943); Merges & Nelson, supra note 2, at 891 ("The earliest radio patent was a
broad patent granted to the British inventor Marconi in the field of radio transmission. These
patents helped the Marconi Wireless and Telegraph Company establish an imposing presence in
the early radio industry ...").
4. See The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1887).
5. See A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents - The Not-Quite-Holy
Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 303-04 (1996).
6. Merges & Nelson, supra note 2, at 849 ("In 1895, Thomas Edison brought a Supreme
Court challenge to a very broad patent held by Sawyer and Mann for materials used in light bulb
filaments."). Id. at 885 ("In the field of incandescent lighting, Edison's early patent gave his
company, later General Electric, a dominant position. Most important, the history of the early
electrical industry supports the notion that broad pioneering patents can play a pivotal role in the
evolution of industry structure.").
7. See generally EDMUND FULLER, TINKERS & GENIUS, THE STORY OF YANKEE INVENTION
(1955); EGON LARSEN, THE PEGASUS BOOK OF INVENTORS (1965); EvAN I. SCHWARTZ, THE LAST
LONE INVENTOR: A TALE OF GENIUS, DECEIT AND THE BIRTH OF TELEVISION 2 (2002) ("[Philo
Farnsworth] was convinced that television would wipe out ignorance and misunderstanding, and
his resolve to get people to watch television was just as great as his will to create it in the first
place"); CATHERINE THIMMESH, GIRLS THINK OF EVERYTHING: STORIES OF INGENIOUS INVENTIONS
BY WOMEN (2000).
8. See infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
9. JOSEPH E. STIGLrrZ, ECONOMICS 388 (2d ed. 1997) ("In the minds of most Americans,
monopolies are not a good thing. They smell of income inequities and undemocratic
concentrations of political power. To economists, however, the concern is economic efficiency.").




is an empirical question. A patent holder's potential market power was
indicated by events involving the AIDS pandemic in Africa. On May
10, 2000, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13155,11 stating that
the United States would not impose trade sanctions against sub-Saharan
African countries for certain actions that otherwise would infringe the
patents on anti-AIDS drugs held by U.S. companies. The next day, five
major brand-name drug companies announced they would reduce the
prices of their patented anti-AIDS drugs by 80% or more for sales to
Africa. 2 Even with this 80%+ drop in price, analysts stated that the
brand-name drug companies would still make substantial profits, and the
anti-AIDS drugs would still be too expensive for most Africans. 13
Reports published in connection with the Executive Order indicate
that patent rights enable the brand-name drug companies to charge a
price to U.S. consumers that may be thirty times higher than the margi-
nal cost of producing the anti-AIDS drugs.14 If the market were truly
competitive, the market price for the drugs would be close to the margi-
nal cost of production. If the patent rights were ignored, presumably
generic drug companies would enter the market and create competition,
and prices would drop sharply (approaching marginal cost).15
Similarly, in connection with the anthrax threat in the Fall of 2001,
when the Bush administration threatened to ignore the patent rights for
11. Executive Order 13155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30521 (May 10, 2000).
12. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Companies to Cut Cost of AIDS Drugs for Poor Nations, N.Y.
TiEs, May 12, 2000, at Al. See infra notes 305-11 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 308.
14. See infra notes 315-25 and accompanying text (indicating that the price charged to U.S.
consumers can be $15,000 to $17,000 per year, while generic manufacturers in foreign countries
may charge as little as $245). In May of 2000, the brand-name drug companies were charging up
to $15,000 for a one-year supply of the three-drug AIDS cocktail. McNeil, supra note 12 ("Drug
treatments used in the United States, most commonly the triple-therapy 'cocktails' that suppress
the replication of H.I.V., can cost up to $15,000 a year."). See infra note 315. Brazilian and
Indian generic manufacturers are willing to sell a one-year supply of the three-drug cocktail for
$600 per year or less. See Huntley Collins, Pharmaceuticals to Cut Price of AIDS Drugs, PHILA.
INQ., Mar. 8, 2001 ("One of the Indian firms, Cipla, Ltd. has offered a combination of three anti-
AIDS medicines which don't include a protease inhibitor like Crixiuan - for $600 a year for
governments and $350 a year for Doctors Without Borders"); see also infra notes 319-21. In
2001, one brand-name drug company offered to sell a one-year supply of anti-AIDS drugs to
African governments for $730. Id. ("[A] spokeswoman for GlaxoSmithKline, the world's largest
manufacturer of AIDS medications, said her company's current offer of $2 a day for the drug AZT
is comparable to the price offered by the Indian generic drugmakers."); Merck: Lowers AIDS
Drug Prices for Africa, AM. HEALTH LINE, Mar. 8, 2001 ("In May, Glaxo offered to cut the price
of Combivir by 90% to $2 per day, but offered that price only to [African] governments.").
15. Emily Miao, TRIPS Agreement Impacts Pharmaceutical Sector, NAT'L L.J., July 24,
2000, at C 1I (Surveys have indicated that brand-name drug manufacturers sell at lower prices in
markets where generic drugs are available. "These results show that Glaxo Wellcome reduced the
price of AZT in markets where competition exists.").
10492004]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the only drug (Cipro) approved for the treatment of inhalation anthrax, 6
the brand-name drug manufacturer holding the patent (Bayer) agreed to
sell the drug to the U.S. government at an 80% discount (compared to
the price paid by U.S. individuals and their insurers for the same drug).,7
Again, the reports indicate that the patent allows the patent holder to
charge a price greatly in excess of marginal cost. In the absence of the
patent, the price would drop and more people could obtain the patented
product.
While the patent system leads to higher prices and fewer consumers
who can acquire the product (than in a competitive market), the patent
system provides important economic incentives to inventors. As a
result, the challenge is to preserve the incentive to invent, while improv-
ing economic efficiency. The potential economic inefficiency - higher
prices and reduced consumption - can be reduced if the patented prod-
uct is made by an efficient producer. An inventor - such as an R&D
firm - may not be capable of manufacturing, marketing, and selling the
product efficiently. As discussed below, it can be economically benefi-
cial if the inventor sells the patent to an efficient producer.18 However,
under current law, if a corporate inventor sells a patent, it will be subject
to an enormous tax liability - over forty percent of the total proceeds
on the sale of the patent may need to be paid promptly in income taxes. 9
As a result, current tax law encourages a corporate inventor to retain the
patent, and spend large amounts of time and capital on manufacturing,
marketing, and selling the patented product, even if the corporate inven-
tor will be an inefficient manufacturer, marketer, and seller of the pat-
ented product.
While a corporate inventor might license an efficient producer to
manufacture, market and sell the patented product, as explained below,
the royalties that the licensee will pay will increase the licensee's margi-
nal cost of production, which will tend to cause the licensee to charge a
higher price and produce a smaller quantity (than if no royalty was
paid). As a result, a license to an efficient producer may or may not
increase economic efficiency, depending on whether the cost savings
arising from the licensee's manufacturing, marketing and selling of the
patented product is greater than the royalty payments.2 ° In contrast, a
16. See infra note 267.
17. Keith Bradsher & Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Says Bayer Will Cut Cost of Its Anthrax
Drug, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2001, at B7 ("Bayer charges $4.67 a tablet in wholesale transactions
with pharmacies .... "). Id. (Bayer agreed to sell 100 million tablets to the U.S. government for
$0.95 per tablet). See infra note 270 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 502-03 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 449-51 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 523-27 and accompanying text.
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CHANGING INVENTION ECONOMICS
sale at a fixed price to an efficient producer should improve economic
efficiency in all cases - the quantity produced should increase and the
sale price should drop.2'
This Article recommends decreasing a corporate inventor's tax lia-
bility on the sale of a patent for a fixed sum, so that the corporate inven-
tor will be encouraged to sell the patent to an efficient producer.22 The
economic evils associated with a patent can be reduced if the patented
product is manufactured, marketed, and sold by an efficient producer.
B. The Economic Need for Patents (or an Alternative
Incentive System)
The United States' economy is generally a competitive market sys-
tem. In a competitive market system, many producers sell products,
consumers are free to choose what goods they buy, and producers are
free to choose what goods they produce. Thanks in large part to the
famous "invisible hand, ' 23 a competitive market system provides many
benefits to society. In a competitive market economy, profit-seeking
producers generally will produce the goods that consumers want, in the
quantity that consumers want, and at a price that many consumers are
willing to pay.
When considering the economic activity of one producer in a com-
petitive market with many producers, the individual producer will tend
to be a "price taker" - an individual producer will need to match the
price being charged by the competition (which is acceptable to the con-
sumers). The producer seeking to maximize profits will continue to pro-
duce goods until her marginal cost of producing a unit equals the selling
price per unit.24 In effect, the forces of demand and supply can lead to a
21. See infra notes 528-31 and accompanying text. As discussed below, quantity produced
will increase if the producer's marginal cost is lower, and if quantity increases, price will drop. In
comparison to the inventor as the producer of the patented product, an efficient licensee likely will
manufacture, market and sell the patented product at a lower cost, but the licensee will need to pay
a royalty based on each additional unit sold. Depending on the level of cost savings compared to
the royalty, the efficient licensee's total marginal cost of production may be lower than, equal to,
or greater than the inventor's marginal cost of production.
22. See infra notes 479-501 and accompanying text.
23. The famous economist Adam Smith wrote:
Every individual endeavors to employ his capital so that its produce may be of
greatest value. He generally neither intends to promote the public interest, nor
knows how much he is promoting it. He intends only his own security, only his
own gain. And he is in this led by an INVISIBLE HAND to promote an end which
was no part of his intention. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes
that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, BOOKS I
- HI (Penguin Classics 1986) (1776) (quoted in SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 41).
24. The producer's marginal cost (i.e., the cost to produce the next unit) will eventually rise
20041 1051
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balanced and efficient flow of goods and services - producers tend to
produce the "right" quantity, and they tend to sell at the "right" price."
However, the competitive market approach does not work for cer-
tain types of goods. In particular, inventions would be under-produced
in a purely competitive market economy. The inventor with a new idea
for a product faces an economic problem (often referred to as "Arrow's
Information Paradox").26 After incurring substantial research and devel-
opment costs, if the inventor simply publishes her breakthrough, or
begins producing and selling the product, potential competitors may
learn how to produce the product.27 Since these "latecomers" did not
bear the research and development costs incurred by the first inventor,
the latecomers will not need to recoup these cost when they sell the new
product.28 In a competitive market, the latecomers will establish the
price at which the product can be sold on the market. The first inventor
merely will be one of many producers, and therefore will be a "price
taker" - the first inventor will be forced to sell at the market price,2"
and the first inventor will be unable to recoup her research and develop-
ment costs. If no relief is provided, there will be little incentive for
anyone to incur significant research and development costs in the future,
as the quantity produced increases (under the law of diminishing returns). See infra notes 79-80
and accompanying text. The producer will stop producing once the marginal cost of producing
one more unit equals or exceeds the market price - otherwise the producer would lose money on
each additional unit produced.
25. The marginal cost of producing the last unit will equal the price that the consumer is
willing to pay for the unit because the producer will keep producing as long as the price she will
receive for producing the last unit will be greater than her marginal cost (the extra cost she incurs
to produce and sell that unit). Thus, in a competitive market, the price will equal the marginal cost
to society of producing that unit. As a result, the price is "right," and the quantity produced is
"right" - if a consumer can pay the marginal cost of producing the product, the consumer can
obtain the product. However, it should be noted that those consumers who want (or need) the
product but do not have enough money to buy it at the market price will not think that the market
price is the right price.
26. Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE Ac-rvrrY 609 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962)
(cited in DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 66 (2d ed. 2001)).
27. Competitors may be able to "reverse engineer" the product. In other words, a competitor
may be able to purchase the product, take it apart, and discover how to make it. See ROBERT P.
MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEw TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 57 (2d ed. 2000)
("Customers who buy a product on the open market are entitled to break it apart to see how it
works. This process is called 'reverse engineering' the product.").
28. This is often called the "free-rider" problem because the latecomers copy the invention
without incurring significant research and development costs - thus, getting a "free-ride" at the
expense of the first inventor.
29. In a competitive market, if the patent holder attempts to charge a price in excess of the
market price, consumers will not buy from the patent holder. Instead, the consumers will buy




and inventions will be under-produced.3"
Studies indicate that innovation is a key element to a nation's finan-
cial health,3' but as discussed above, in a purely competitive market
there would be little or no incentive to incur the significant research and
development costs necessary to invent. As a result, the United States
and many other countries 32 allow an inventor to obtain a patent if certain
conditions are satisfied.33 A patent basically provides the inventor with
a 20-year "exclusive" on the new product or process. 34 If anyone else
30. It should be noted that those who invent for non-economic rewards would still be
motivated to invent. For example, university research scientists who gain prestige, awards, and
tenure, based in part on their innovations would still be motivated to invent and disclose their
inventions. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. Rv. 697, 723 n. 118 (2001) ("scientists throughout .time have treated
reports of a scientist's work, such as through journal publication, and citation thereto, as valuable
currencies in the market for scientific kudos .... ").
31. See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J.
1, 10 (1992); CHisUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 59.
32. In August, 2003, the World Trade Organization had 146 member countries. Elizabeth
Becker, In Reversal, U.S. Nears Deal On Drugs for Poor Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003,
at A l; see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 36 (2000) (listing 134 members as of February 1999). Article 27.1 of the TRIPS
Agreement provides that subject to various exceptions "patents shall be available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new,
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application." TRIPS Agreement, Art. 27.1,
reprinted in GOLDSTEIN, supra, at 14 (emphasis added). As a result, subject to various exceptions,
WTO member countries grant patent protection to the extent required by the TRIPS Agreement.
33. In the United States, in order to obtain a patent, the invention must fall within the
statutory subject matter, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Namely, the invention must be a "process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof"),
and meet the requirements of utility, id. § 101, novelty, id. § 102, and nonobviousness, id. § 103
("a patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art .... ").
34. For patent applications filed after June 8, 1995, the duration of a patent ends twenty years
from the date of filing the application. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). However, it can take a
substantial amount of time to get a patent issued after the patent application is filed, so the actual
duration of patent protection is 20 years minus the time spent in prosecuting the patent application
(the period from the time of filing the patent application to the date the patent is issued is referred
to as the "patent prosecution"). A study concluded that the average patent prosecution takes
approximately 2 years and 4 months. Lemley, supra note 2, at 385 (showing the average length of
a patent prosecution was 864 days). This study was based on 2081 U.S. utility patents issued on
December 27, 1994, and did not include design or plant patents. Id. at 383. A study considering
only patents that eventually became the subject of litigation concluded that the average
prosecution time was approximately 3 years and 7 months. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley,
Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q. J. 185, 237 (1998) ("[T]he
average time in prosecution for litigated patents in the population is 3.6 years, although the lower
median (2.7 years) indicates that a few patents spent a great deal of time in prosecution, raising the
mean."). In some cases, patent prosecution can take decades. Lemley, supra note 2, at 379
(discussing several patents held by Jerome Lemelson which had prosecution histories in excess of
thirty years). Id. at 379 n.41 ("Further, data reported by the [Patent & Trademark Office] in 1994
indicate that at that time, there were 673 currently pending applications which were filed more
than twenty years before.").
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attempts to make, use, or sell the patented invention during the term of
the patent, the inventor can file a patent infringement action and stop the
competition." Thus, a patent is a right to stop others from doing some-
thing they normally would have every right to do in a free society, and
acts as a barrier to prevent others from entering the market to produce
the patented product.36
C. Monopolies, Oligopolies or Monopolistic Competition Markets,
and Resulting Economic Inefficiencies
As discussed above, in a competitive market, since there are many
producers, each producer is forced to be a "price taker" - each pro-
ducer can sell its product only by matching the price charged by the
competition.37 A "price taker" faces a demand curve that is a horizontal
line38 - the producer can sell the product at (or below) the market
price, but no one will "demand" the producer's product if she prices it
35. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention... infringes the patent."); Id.
§ 283 ("The several courts having jurisdiction of [patent] cases . . . may grant injunctions in
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on
such terms as the court deems reasonable.") (emphasis added). In order to obtain a preliminary
injunction, a patentee generally must demonstrate that (i) there is no reasonable doubt that the
patent is valid, infringed, and enforceable; and (ii) she would suffer irreparable harm (as a result
of the infringement). See Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1983). The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "where validity and continuing
infringement have been clearly established ... immediate irreparable harm is presumed." Id. at
1581. In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the court will also consider whether
(a) the patentee has demonstrated a "probability of success on the merits," id. at 1578; and (b)
what impact will the injunction have, if any, on the public interest. Id. at 1579.
A patentee can also obtain money damages, which may be based on lost profits. See infra
notes 345-61 and accompanying text. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) states that the damages will not be
less than a reasonable royalty. A patent holder can also recover pre-judgment interest. See
General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 657 (1983), and in "exceptional cases," the
patent holder may be awarded attorneys fees. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000). In the case of a finding of
willful infringement, the court may increase the damages up to three times. Id. § 284.
36. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2000) states that "Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority, makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the
patent." Independent creation is not a defense to patent infringement, except in the case of the
"first inventor." Id. § 273(b)(1) (The "first inventor defense" is only available if the party raising
the defense "acting in good faith, actually reduced the subject matter to practice at least 1 year
before the effective filing date of such patent, and commercially used the subject matter before the
effective filing date of such patent."). As a result, a patent prohibits a customer from "reverse
engineering" the product and employing the resulting knowledge to make, use, or sell a competing
product. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974) ("While trade secret law
does not forbid the discovery of the trade secret by fair and honest means, e.g., independent
creation or reverse engineering, patent law operates 'against the world,' forbidding any use of the
invention for whatever purpose for a significant length of time.").
37. If an individual producer attempts to charge a price above the amount charged by the
competition, presumably it will not be able to sell any of its products.
38. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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above the market price (instead, the consumers will buy from the pro-
ducers who are selling at the market price). In regard to quantity, each
producer (in attempting to maximize profits) will produce as long as her
marginal cost of producing one more unit is less than the market price.
Thus, each producer will sell the product at her marginal cost.
In contrast, if the market is not competitive, the producer will have
discretion in setting the price that she charges, and the quantity that she
produces. The producer will be a "price setter." A non-competitive
market may be a monopoly (in which there is only one producer), an
oligopoly (in which there are a few producers and there are some differ-
ences among the products sold),3 9 or a monopolistic competition situa-
tion (in which there are many producers, and there are real or imagined
differences in the products).4" In these markets, the producer is faced
with a "downward sloping" demand curve,'" and as a result the producer
can sell products even if she raises the price above her marginal cost.4 2
The ability to charge a price above marginal cost (and still sell substan-
tial amounts) is referred to as "market power. '4 3 If a producer has mar-
ket power, the quantity produced will be smaller and the price charged
will be higher than in a competitive market. Since economic efficiency
is defined as producing at maximum output and maximizing consumer
satisfaction," this is an economically inefficient arrangement.45 In addi-
tion, a monopoly, oligopoly, or monopolistic competition situation cre-
ates other economic inefficiencies.46
Whether a patent allows the patent holder to exercise market power
depends on several factors. There are at least five different scenarios.
First, the patent may give the patent holder a pure monopoly in the rele-
vant market - that would be the case if no other producer offers any
substitutes for consumers, so that consumers must purchase from the
patent holder (in order to satisfy the particular need or desire). In a pure
monopoly, the patent holder can exercise significant market power.4 7
39. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 512.
40. See STIGLrrz, supra note 9, at 355-56; SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 512.
41. See infra notes 134-35, 181-82, and 195, and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
43. STIGLrrz, supra note 9, at 403 ("[Mlarket power is the extent to which a firm can raise its
price without losing its customers.").
44. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 150-55. See also DONALD S. CHISUM, 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS: A
TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT, § 3.01 (2004) ("The
social cost is higher prices for and underutilization of the patented process or product during the
period of the monopoly.").
46. See infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text. One of the economic inefficiencies is a
"dead weight loss," which is the overall loss of consumer satisfaction in excess of the extra profit
enjoyed by the producer.
47. See infra notes 150 -55 and accompanying text.
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Commentators state that a patent seldom creates a "true monopoly."48
Second, if there are a few other producers who sell products that are
different from the particular patented product, and some consumers
might consider those products as substitutes for the patented product,
then the market can be described as an "oligopoly."49 Third, if there are
several other producers who sell products that are different from the par-
ticular patented product, and some consumers might consider those
products as possible substitutes for the patented product, then the market
can be described as a "monopolistic competition" situation.5 ° In the
case of an oligopoly or monopolistic competition situation, the patent
holder can exercise substantial market power.5' Fourth, the patent
holder may have no market power because a substantial number of other
producers may sell competing goods (without the benefit of the patent)
that many consumers can substitute for the patented product. If the pat-
ent holder charges a price above the market price, the patent holder will
be unable to sell any of her patented products. In that situation the mar-
ket remains competitive, and the patent provides the patent holder with
no market power. Fifth, there are many situations in which there is no
demand at all for the patented product. 2 Again, in this situation the
existence of the patent does not provide the patent holder with any mar-
ket power (and the patent will cause no economic inefficiency). The
five situations for a patent holder can be summarized as follows:
48. See Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1727, 1730 (2000) (The claim that a patent creates a
monopoly "is true only if the [patent] claims cover all of an economically relevant market, i.e.,
there is no alternative way for competitors to provide the same economic functionality to their
customers without infringing the claims . . . .patents that confer monopoly market power are
rare.") (emphasis added); see also Kirby W. Lee, Note, Permitted Use of Patented Inventions in
the United States: Why Prescription Drugs Do Not Merit Compulsory Licensing, 36 IND. L. REv.
175, 181 (2003); William Montgomery, Note, The Presumption of Economic Power for Patented
and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1140, 1150 (1985) ("The
mere existence of a patent or copyright does not create a demand for a product. Indeed, the
majority of all patents and copyrights confer little or no monopoly power.").
49. An example of an oligopoly market would be the market for airline travel between two
regions when there are only three or four airlines flying in and out of those regions. See infra
notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 191-98 and accompanying text.
51. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 514 ("[T]his oligopoly equilibrium looks much like the
single monopoly equilibrium."). See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text (regarding
oligopoly), and infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text (regarding monopolistic competition).
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Situation Extent of Other Producers Does the Patent Holder Enjoy
Selling Substitutes (or Extent Market Power (and Does the
of Demand for the Product) Patent Create Economic
Inefficiencies)?
"Pure" No Other Producer Selling a Yes
Monopoly Substitute
Oligopoly A Few Producers Selling Yes
Substitutes
Monopolistic Several Producers Selling Yes
Competition Substitutes
Competition Many Producers Selling No
Substitutes
No Market There Is No Demand for the No
Patented Product
52. If no consumers want to purchase the patented product, the patent provides no market








"Patented in the U.S. on October 4, 1870, by G. Hope of Kansas,
boomerang bullets were designed to fire in a curved line - the only
danger being that if they traveled in a complete circle, they could kill the
person who fired them." RUSSELL ASH, BOOK OF 1001 LISTS 134 (2003).
"Patented by Albert B. Pratt of Vermont in 1916, the gun and its sights
were attached to a helmet and the trigger fired by the wearer's mouth. A
powerful strap held it in place - but may not have been sufficient to
prevent the recoil from fatally injuring the wearer." Id.
"Patented on June 17, 1862, by C.M. French and W.H. Fancher of New
York, this unusual weapon was designed to be used by farmers who, if
they were attacked while plowing, could quickly turn their implement
into a powerful gun!" Id.
While a patent eventually issued for the invention (U.S. Patent No.
4,447,846), a reviewing court stated, "we do not hesitate to say we would
not consider using the claimed device for its intended purpose." Ex parte
Drulard, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 364, 366 (1983).
In addition, "many technologically important patents have been issued long before commercial
exploitation became possible." Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System,
20 J. L. & ECON. 265, 267 (1977). A chart provided by Professor Kitch includes the following:
Invention First Patentability Commercial Product
Automatic Transmission 1904 1937
Cellophane 1910 1925





Synthetic Detergents 1900 1930s
Id. at 272 (several examples have been excluded).
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D. Searching for Evidence of Market Power - The Anthrax Threat
and the AIDS Pandemic
A natural question is whether patent holders really exercise market
power, which leads to economic inefficiencies, in the real economy. As
one commentator has stated, "Whether a [patent] confers an economic
monopoly is an empirical question. 53 In other words, does a patent
holder charge a price for the patented product in excess of marginal cost,
and would the related economic inefficiencies be eliminated if the patent
were ignored?
In order to empirically determine whether a patent allows its holder
to exercise market power, one needs several items of information
regarding an actual market: (i) the price charged by the patent holder for
the patented product; (ii) the patent holder's "marginal" cost of produc-
ing the product; and (iii) the price that other producers would charge if
they could ignore the patent and produce and sell the product. While the
price charged by the patent holder would be readily available, informa-
tion about marginal cost likely would be difficult to compute and ver-
ify. 54 In addition, information about what other producers might charge
if the patent could be ignored would be pure speculation in most cases,
and one might question the thoroughness (and seriousness) of any esti-
mate provided by potential competitors.
However, both the anthrax threat in the Fall of 2001, and President
Clinton's Executive Order (issued May 10, 2000)"5 regarding anti-AIDS
drugs for Africa, focused great attention on the types of information nec-
essary to evaluate a patent holder's market power in those particular
markets. The reports indicate that in the case of the drug for inhaled
anthrax, the patent holder was charging approximately ten times more
than its marginal cost (before the anthrax threat); in the case of the anti-
AIDS drugs, the patent holders were charging almost thirty times more
than the marginal cost of production.56 Thus, in these markets, the pat-
ent holders exercised significant market power. This Article also con-
siders damage awards in patent cases as an indication of market power
in other markets.
53. Kitch, supra note 48, at 1731.
54. In order to determine "marginal cost," one would need to deduct fixed costs (such as
administration, overhead, and plant and equipment) from total costs. Also, one would need to
isolate the costs for the particular patented product from the costs relating to other products.
55. Executive Order 13155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30521 (May 10, 2000).
56. See infra notes 274-82 (Bayer generally charged U.S. consumers $4.67 per tablet for
Cipro, while selling Cipro to the U.S. Health & Human Services Dept. for 43 cents per tablet); see
infra notes 315-25 and accompanying text (regarding the anti-AIDS drugs, the brand-name drug
manufacturers charged U.S. individuals $15,000 to $17,000 for a one-year supply of anti-AIDS
drugs, but generic manufacturers in other countries were willing to sell the drugs in Africa for
approximately $365 per year).
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E. Current Income Tax Laws Encourage a Corporate Inventor to
Retain a Patent and Produce the Patented Product Itself Rather than
Sell the Patent to a More Efficient Producer
After obtaining a patent, a corporate inventor has at least four basic
options: (i) retain the patent, and produce, market, and sell the patented
product itself; (ii) retain the patent, and license the right to make and sell
the patented product to a producer in exchange for royalties based on the
economic success of the patented product; (iii) sell the patent to a pro-
ducer for a stream of payments contingent on the success of the patented
product; or (iv) sell the patent to a producer for a fixed amount of money
that is payable either in a lump sum or in installments over time.
Two current income tax rules will cause a corporate inventor to pay
a substantial income tax on the sale of a patent. First, a corporate inven-
tor can immediately deduct its research and experimental expenses,57
and as a result, a corporate inventor likely will have a zero "tax basis"58
in the patent. Second, a corporation's gain on the sale of a patent will be
taxed at ordinary income tax rates (in contrast, an individual inventor's
gain from the sale of a patent is taxed at the lower long-term capital gain
rates).5 9 As a result, on the sale of a patent, a corporate inventor may
pay 40% or more of the entire purchase price in taxes.6" This substantial
tax liability can discourage a corporate inventor from selling a patent,
even though other firms might be more efficient at manufacturing, mar-
57. I.R.C. § 174(a)(1). (Section 174 is discussed in infra notes 433-37 and accompanying
text).
58. In general, a taxpayer's "tax basis" in an asset is the taxpayer's cost for the item. I.R.C.
§ 1012. Upon a sale of an asset, the taxable gain generally is the amount received minus the tax
basis. I.R.C. § 1001(a). Thus, if the taxpayer has no tax basis in the asset sold, the entire amount
received on the sale will be taxable gain.
59. While I.R.C. § 1235(a) provides that a sale by an individual inventor will be considered
the sale of a long-term capital asset (and therefore, the gain on the sale will be taxed at the lower
long-term capital gain rates for individuals), this provision is not available to a corporation,
whether the corporation is taxed as a C corporation, or is taxed as an S corporation under I.R.C.
§§ 1361-1379. See Charles Edward Falk, Tax Planning for the Development and Licensing of
Patents and Know-How, 557 TAX MGM'T (BNA), at A-17 ("Corporations, including S
corporations, cannot qualify as holders under any circumstances."). In any event, a Subchapter C
corporation pays the same rate of income tax on ordinary income and long-term capital gains. See
I.R.C. § 1201. As a result, merely characterizing the gain on a sale by a corporation as a long-
term capital gain would not save taxes for a C corporation. See I.R.C. § II (providing that the
maximum corporate tax rate is 35%), and I.R.C. § 1201(a)(2) (providing for an "alternative tax"
rate on a corporation's net capital gain of 35%).
60. In regard to federal income taxes, a corporation is taxed at the 15% rate on its first
$50,000 of taxable income; on taxable income from $50,000 to $75,000, a corporation pays tax at
the rate of 25%; on taxable income from $75,000 to $10 million, a corporation pays tax at the rate
of 34%; and on taxable income in excess of $10 million, a corporation pays tax at the rate of 35%.
In addition to the federal income tax, states impose a tax on corporate income. State Tax Guide
- All States (CCH), 10,040, at page 2529 (for example, the maximum California corporate
income tax rate is 8.84%).
2004] 1059
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
keting, and selling the patented product. As discussed below, produc-
tion by an inefficient producer (such as a corporate inventor that
specializes in research and development) will cause the patented product
to be sold at an even higher price, and will cause even fewer units to be
supplied. Thus, these tax rules exacerbate the economic inefficiencies
that can be associated with a patent.
F. Recommendation to Encourage Corporate Inventors to Sell
Patents to Efficient Producers
This Article recommends that a corporate inventor be entitled to a
deduction (or exclusion) from gross income on the sale of a patent for a
fixed sum, so that the effective income tax rate would approximate the
applicable tax rate when an individual inventor sells a patent.6 1 This
change would significantly reduce a corporate inventor's income tax lia-
bility on the sale, and equalize the tax treatment of individual inventors
and corporate inventors.62 After May 6, 2003, the maximum federal tax
rate on the gain from the sale of a patent by an individual inventor is
15%.63
This recommendation would have three major benefits. First, if the
patent purchaser has a lower marginal cost of production than the inven-
tor,6 this would increase the number of units sold and reduce the price
- significant benefits to consumers. Second, this change could stimu-
late more invention by providing corporate inventors with additional
capital for research and development. The corporate inventor could sell
the patent and use the sale proceeds to engage in new research. Third,
this change could stimulate more invention by allowing corporate inven-
tors to focus on research, rather than being compelled to expand into
manufacturing and other functions merely to avoid a large tax bill.
While licensing can allow an efficient producer to exploit a patented
product, if the royalty paid by the licensee per unit exceeds the produc-
61. For sales after May 6, 2003, in general, the maximum long-term capital gain tax rate for
individuals is 15%. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(B). A "deduction" previously was available to individual
taxpayers on the sale of long-term capital gain property. I.R.C. § 1202 (repealed for sales
occurring in tax years ending after December 31, 1986). See infra notes 483-86 and
accompanying text.
62. I.R.C. § 1235(a) provides that an individual inventor's gain on the sale of a parent or a
patentable invention is taxed at long-term capital gain rates. See infra notes 462-65 and
accompanying text.
63. See supra note 46 (regarding the 15% rate). The rate is 25% for "unrecaptured section
1250 gain" (this is generally the gain from the sale of depreciable real estate, to the extent of
depreciation previously claimed). I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D). The gain from the sale of collectibles is
generally taxed at a 28% maximum rate. Id. § l(h)(5).
64. Presumably the most efficient producer will be the highest bidder, since the most efficient




tion cost savings per unit, licensing can cause greater economic
inefficiency.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF A COMPETITIVE MARKET
In order to analyze the economic inefficiencies associated with
market power, it is helpful to analyze a market in which there is no
market power - a competitive market. While no nation likely has ever
relied on an exclusively competitive market economy, 61 the benefits of a
competitive market economy are often praised.
66
Every economic system must answer three basic questions - What
will be produced? How much will be produced? Who will consume
it?67 The goal generally is to maximize output so that consumer satis-
faction is maximized. 68 As economists have stated, "The ultimate yard-
stick of a country's economic success is its ability to generate a high
level of production of economic goods and services. What could be
more important for an economy than to produce and consume large
quantities of housing, shelter, food, education and recreation?" 69
The basic economic questions - What will be produced? How
much will be produced? Who will consume it? - are answered through
the use of prices. Consumers will be willing to pay a higher price for the
goods they value most. In response, producers who wish to maximize
profits will produce the goods that consumers want. The famous econo-
mist Adam Smith described the functioning of a competitive market as
"every individual, in pursuing only his own selfish good, [is] led, as if
by an invisible hand, to achieve the best good for all .... -0
A. Supply and Demand
The basic economic principles are frequently described in terms of
"demand" and "supply." Assume that a market for some good - for
example, wheat - is completely competitive. In this market, we
assume there are no barriers to persons who wish to produce and sell
65. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 25 (13th ed. 1989) ("There
never has been a 100 percent market economy (although nineteenth-century England came
close).").
66. See SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 43; STIGL1TZ, supra note 9, at 150.
67. See RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., EcONOMICS 9 (12th ed. 1999); SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS,
supra note 65, at 24.
68. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 65, at 28 ("[T]he economy is producing efficiently
when it cannot produce more of one good without producing less of another.").
69. Id. at 77.
70. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 43 (emphasis added); STIGLrrz, supra note 9, at 150 ("The
modem economic faith in markets can be traced back to Adam Smith's 1776 masterpiece The
Wealth of Nations. Smith argued that workers and producers, interested only in helping
themselves and their families, were the basis of success of the economy."). See supra note 23.
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wheat,71 and no government regulations fix the price at which wheat can
be sold, or the amount of wheat that can be produced. In regard to con-
sumer "demand," if the price for wheat, is high, consumers as a group
will demand a smaller quantity; if the price is low, consumers will
demand more wheat.72 As a result, there is an inverse relationship
between (i) the price of wheat, and (ii) the quantity of wheat
demanded. 73 If we chart the demand for wheat, with price on the verti-
cal axis and quantity on the horizontal axis, the demand curve will be
"downward sloping." In general, in a competitive market, the demand
curve for any good will be downward sloping.74 A downward sloping
demand curve (D - D) is illustrated by the following chart:
FIGURE #1
THE DEMAND CURVE




Now that we have discussed consumer demand, we turn to produc-
ers' supply. In general, if the price of a good is low, fewer producers
will produce that good, and those who produce the good will produce
less, 75 so that a smaller quantity will be produced. But if the price of the
71. In the real world, there can be barriers for any one individual or entity that otherwise
might wish to produce wheat - for example, land is required to produce wheat, and various items
of farm equipment would be needed to efficiently produce wheat on a large scale. Thus, in the
short run, and for particular individuals and entities, there can be substantial barriers blocking
entry into the wheat market.
72. As the price of wheat drops, people who previously did not buy wheat will begin to buy
wheat. In addition, those people who previously bought wheat will now start to buy even more
wheat (and perhaps cut down on their rye and corn purchases). SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 61.
73. See LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 71 ("A basic economic hypothesis is that the price of a
product and the quantity demanded are related negatively, other things being equal. That is, the
lower the price, the higher the quantity demanded; and the higher the price, the lower the quantity
demanded.") (emphasis added).
74. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 61 ("This law is true of practically all commodities: wheat,
electric razors, cotton, Kellogg's comflakes, and theater tickets.").
75. LIPsEv, supra note 67, at 77 ("for many products, the price of the product and the quantity
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good is higher, greater amounts will be produced because as the price
increases, existing producers looking to maximize profits will produce
more, and new producers will enter the market.76 For example, if the
market price of wheat rises, farmers may shift acreage that previously
was used to grow rye or corn over to wheat production.77 Thus, in
regard to supply, all other things being held constant, price and quantity
move together - as price increases, quantity increases.78 If we chart
the supply of wheat, with price on the vertical axis and quantity on the
horizontal axis, the supply curve will be "upward sloping," as illustrated





In an actual market, as the quantity produced increases, the supply
curve eventually goes upward at a steeper slope because of the "law of
diminishing returns. 79 Under the law of diminishing returns, at some
supplied are related positively, other things being equal. That is to say, the higher the product's
own price, the more its producers will supply; and the lower the price, the less its producers will
supply.") (emphasis added).
76. STIGL-rz, supra note 9, at 83 ("In direct contrast to the demand curve, the typical supply
curve slopes upward from left to right; at higher prices, firms will supply more. This is because
higher prices yield suppliers higher profits - giving them an incentive to produce more.").
77. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 63.
78. STIGLrrz, supra note 9, at 83 ("The market supply curve slopes upward from left to right
for two reasons: at higher prices each firm in the market is willing to produce more, and at higher
prices, more firms are willing to enter the market to produce the good.").
79. LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 176 ("The law of diminishing returns states that if increasing
amounts of a variable factor are applied to a given quantity of a fixed factor, eventually each
additional unit of the variable factor adds less to total production than the previous unit did . .
As an example,
[W]hen Southern California Edison was required to modify its Mojave power plant
to reduce the amount of pollutants emitted into the atmosphere, it discovered that a
series of filters applied to the smokestacks could do the job. A single filter
eliminated one-half of the discharge. Five filters in a series reduced the discharge to
the 3 percent allowed by law. When a state senator proposed a new standard that
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point, in order to produce more and more wheat, a farmer must use
resources that are not as efficient in producing wheat.
Example #1
Assume that all farm workers are paid $10 per hour. However, some
workers are very productive, some are average, and some increase
production very little. If the farmer produces wheat on only five
acres, she may need to hire only five workers, so she hires the five
most productive workers. In order to increase production (by farm-
ing a sixth acre), she then hires the sixth most productive worker. In
this case the result from hiring the sixth farm worker is a diminishing
return - the sixth worker will not increase production as much as the
fifth worker.8"
B. Equilibrium Price and Quantity
In order to determine the price that actually will be charged and the
quantity that actually will be produced and purchased, we combine the
demand curve and the supply curve. The intersection of the demand
curve and the supply curve produces the "equilibrium price" and the
"equilibrium quantity."8 "This equilibrium price and quantity are the
price and quantity at which buyers willingly buy exactly the amount that
sellers willingly sell."82 The equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity
are illustrated in Figure #3.
would permit no more than 1 percent of the pollutants to be emitted, the company
brought in experts who testified that achieving this goal would require at least 15
filters per stack and would triple the cost. In other words, increasing the number of
filters leads to diminishing marginal returns in pollution reduction.
Id. at 178.
80. Id. at 176 ("let us consider the use of workers in a manufacturing operation ... according
to the law of diminishing returns.. . sooner or later the marginal production of additional workers
must decline. When the decline takes place, each additional worker that is hired will increase total
output by less than the previous worker did.").
81. STIOLr-Z, supra note 9, at 87-88 ("Equilibrium describes a situation where there are no
forces (reasons) for change. No one has an incentive to change the result .....











D-D = Demand curve
Pc = Equilibrium price in the competitive market
Qc = Equilibrium quantity in the competitive market
S-S = Supply curve
C. Shifts of the Demand and Supply Curves
As stated above, the demand and supply curves depict consumer
demand and producer supply at various prices, with "all other things
being constant." 3 In other words, the demand and supply curves depict
the demand and supply if the price of the good changes, but nothing else
changes.8 4 Over the course of any significant period of time, the "all
other things being constant" assumption will be unrealistic. 5 Over time,
"other things" will change, causing "shifts" of the entire demand and
supply curves. Different events can trigger a shift of the supply curve.
A change in the price of "inputs" - such as materials, labor, and
83. See supra note 78.
84. LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 73 ("The demand schedule is drawn with the assumption that
everything except the product's own price is being held constant.").
85. As one commentator has stated,
Other things being equal, as economists are fond of saying, there is a unique
schedule of supply or demand in any period of time. But other things will not
remain equal. The demand for cotton is declining over the years because of the
reduction in the price of synthetics. The supply schedule of radios is shifting
because technological progress permits more to be produced at the same cost. As
costs and tastes change, as incomes vary, as the prices of substitute products (coffee
in relation to tea) or of cooperating products (sugar in relation to tea) change, our
schedules will shift.
SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 388 (emphasis added). Demand and supply curves are generally
created for the "short run" - that period of time in which certain equipment, resources, and
commitments of the producer are fixed; but it is a period long enough for the producer to vary its
output by changing variable factors of production such, as labor and raw materials. Id. at 66, 388.
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machinery - will shift the supply curve.86 For example, if labor costs
to produce a product decrease, greater profits can be generated, so pro-
ducers will produce more at every price - causing a "rightward" shift
of the supply curve.87 Also, improved technology will shift the supply
curve.88 In various markets, other changes can shift the supply curve.89
Figure #4 shows a "rightward" shift of the supply curve from Si to S2
caused by a decrease in the cost of production. At every price, a greater
quantity is supplied on the S2 curve. 90
FIGURE #4
RIGHTWARD SHIFT OF THE SUPPLY CURVE FROM Si TO S2 (BECAUSE





Figure #5 below shows the same two supply curves (SI and S2),
but a demand curve (D-D) has been added. Figure #5 shows that the
rightward shift in the supply curve (from Si to S2) will reduce the
"equilibrium price" of wheat from $4 a bushel to $3 a bushel, and will
86. LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 78; SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 65, at 423 (A rise in
the "costs of production" will decrease supply.).
87. LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 78 (On the other hand, "the higher the price of any input used by
a firm, the less the firm will produce and offer for sale at any given price of the product.").
88. Id. at 79 ("Any technological innovation that decreases production costs will increase the
profits that can be earned at any given price of the product. Because increased profitability leads
to increased production, this change shifts the supply curve to the right, indicating an increased
willingness to produce the product and offer it for sale at each possible price.").
89. STIGLITZ, supra note 9, at 85-86 (for example, in agricultural markets changes in the
weather, insect infestations, animal diseases, and the availability of credit may cause shifts in the
supply curve).
90. For example, SI might show the market supply curve for wheat before the introduction of
the new "bushel-buncher" technology. When the price of wheat is $4 per bushel, the farmers are
willing to produce 10 million bushels of wheat. When the new "bushel-buncher" technology has
been adopted by the farmers, the market supply curve for wheat may move to S2. Because the
new "bushel-buncher" technology allows wheat to be made cheaper, the farmers will be willing to
produce 12 million bushels of wheat even if the market price drops to $3 per bushel.
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increase the "equilibrium quantity" from 10 million bushels to 12 mil-
lion bushels.
FIGURE #5
RIGHTWARD SHIFT OF THE SUPPLY CURVE CAUSING A DECREASE IN




In contrast, if the cost of production increases (for example,
because the cost of production increases, or a tax on each bushel sold
increases), 9 ' the farmers will produce less at each price. This can be
reflected by a "leftward" shift of the supply curve, which is shown in
Figure #6. The shift in supply is represented in Figure #6 as a shift from
S1 to S2.
91. This might be caused by the imposition of a flat tax on each unit sold (for example "a tax
of $1 for every bushel of wheat"). See SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 389.
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FIGURE #6
LEFTWARD SHIFT OF THE SUPPLY CURVE FROM S I TO S2






D. Focus on the Economic Behavior of an Individual Producer in a
Competitive Market
The discussion to this point has focused on the way in which price
and quantity are determined in an entire market. In order to appreciate
the difference between competitive markets and monopolies (or oligopo-
lies, or other situations in which a patent may grant "market power"),
this section considers how the individual producer in a competitive mar-
ket acts.
1. THE INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER IN THE COMPETITIVE MARKET AS A
"'PRICE TAKER"
When considering all the producers in a competitive market, the
actions of the producers as a group can change the price at which the
product is sold.92 However, if there are many producers in a market,
each individual producer will not be able to influence the price.9 3 In
other words, if the prevailing price for wheat is $3 per bushel, one indi-
92. To illustrate, if all the producers agreed to restrict supply (and actually restricted supply),
the shortage would cause the price to increase.
93. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 455 ("A perfect-competitor is too small and unimportant to
affect the market price. Like a wheat farmer, he is a 'price taker' who can sell all he wishes at the
ruling market price ... a perfect-competitor faces a (virtually) horizontal... demand curve for his
product - his elasticity of demand is infinite.").
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vidual farmer will have no choice but to sell her wheat for $3 per bushel.
If she charges more than $3 per bushel, no one will buy her wheat. In
effect, the market as a whole sets the price (where the market supply
curve meets the market demand curve),9 4 and each individual producer
is a "price taker" selling at the market price.
2. THE QUANTITY PRODUCED BY A SINGLE PRODUCER WILL DEPEND
ON HER MARGINAL COST
The economic question for the individual producer is the amount
(a/k/a the quantity) she will produce. In general, the producer will con-
tinue to make units (and sell those units at the equilibrium price) until
her marginal cost equals or exceeds her marginal revenue. The pro-
ducer's marginal revenue is the amount of revenue the producer will
receive by selling one additional unit. For the individual producer in a
competitive market, marginal revenue equals the market price (because
the individual producer is a price taker).
The producer's marginal cost is her cost to produce one more unit.
Marginal cost does not include sunk costs such as administration, over-
head, and plant and equipment. 95
Since the quantity produced will be determined by marginal cost,
rather than fixed cost, even if the producer spends a large amount to
create the business,96 the producer will be willing to increase quantity
(by producing more) as long as marginal revenue (the price she will
receive for selling one more unit) exceeds marginal cost (the amount she
will spend to produce one more unit).97 If the producer cannot recover
her original fixed costs, she will not be happy, but she will continue to
produce as long as her marginal revenue exceeds her marginal cost.98 In
effect, once the producer pays the fixed costs, the producer will continue
to produce and sell as long as the marginal revenue exceeds the marginal
cost, even if the producer will not be able to recover her fixed costs. 99
"Once the crop is in, so to speak, there is not much [the individual pro-
94. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (the intersection of the demand curve and
the supply curve determines the equilibrium price).
95. See SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 451-53.
96. Costs in "creating the business" could include the costs incurred in acquiring land,
buildings, equipment, fixtures, furniture, intellectual property rights, and assembling a workforce.
97. Marginal revenue is the amount of revenue that will be raised by selling one more unit.
Marginal cost is the cost of producing one more unit. See LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 178.
"[M]arginal cost" is also referred to as "variable cost" - "a cost that varies directly with output,
rising as more output is produced and falling as less output is produced .... " Id. at 177.
98. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 391.
99. LIPsEY, supra note 67, at 179 ("[For example, the marginal cost of producing a few more
potatoes by farming a given amount of land more intensively is not affected by the rent paid for
the land.").
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ducer in a competitive market] can do about it... [she has] no choice
but to minimize [her] short-term losses."' 00 However, if the producer is
unable to recover her fixed costs, she will be reluctant to ever incur
those types of fixed costs again.
As discussed earlier, because of the Law of Diminishing Returns,
as quantity increases, the marginal cost curve will become steeper as the
producer is forced to use less efficient and more expensive resources to
produce each additional unit.10'
The quantity of goods that the individual producer will produce
will be determined by the intersection of the marginal revenue "curve"
(which in a purely competitive market is a straight line equal to the
market price) and the producer's marginal cost curve. Figure #7 illus-
trates the demand curve facing a producer in a competitive market (the
demand curve is a straight line, labeled "Marginal Revenue = Price"),
and a producer's marginal cost curve (which is the producer's supply
curve, labeled "Marginal Cost = Supply"). The quantity produced is
"Q," determined by the intersection of the demand curve and the margi-
nal cost (supply) curve.
FIGURE #7
DEMAND AND SUPPLY CURVES FOR A SINGLE PRODUCER IN
A COMPETITIVE MARKET
Price
ZMarginal Cost =• Supply
Mar inal Revenue Price
Q Quantity
100. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 391.
101. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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III. THE ECONOMIC FAILURE OF COMPETITION IN THE
"INVENTION MARKET"
Inventions are a key factor in economic growth. 0 2 Unfortunately,
a competitive market will not generate the optimum quantity of inven-
tions because of the free-rider problem. 03
Imagine that Inventions Inc. spends $10 million to develop a great
new invention, and begins selling the invention at a price that will allow
it to recover its $10 million in development costs. Knock-Off Inc.
purchases one of Invention Inc.'s products, takes it apart, learns how it
can be made, and begins producing and selling the same product."°
Many other companies take the same actions as Knock-Off Inc. If there
is no patent (or other intellectual property) protection, Inventions Inc.
will be unable to stop or otherwise enjoin Knock-Off Inc. and the others.
The market price for the product will be based on the intersection of the
industry demand curve and the industry supply curve. The industry sup-
ply curve will consist of the marginal cost curves of all the individual
producers combined.0 5 Inventions Inc. presumably will have no advan-
tage over the competition because its marginal cost will be similar to the
marginal cost of the other producers. In this competitive market, in
which Inventions Inc. is merely one producer of many, Inventions Inc.
will be a price taker - in order to sell its products, Inventions Inc. must
sell at the industry market price. 10 6 While Inventions Inc. will find it
beneficial to produce the product as long as its marginal cost per unit is
below the market price per unit,0 7 if the market price is not high enough
to allow Inventions Inc. to recover its research and development costs,
Inventions Inc. will be trying to minimize its losses.
102. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 59 ("[M]ost of the economic growth in the United
States in the first half of this century could be explained by investments in research and
development and education rather than by increases in capital and labor.") (citing Robert M.
Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312,
320 (1957)); Kieff, supra note 30, at 699 n.4 ("Economic research over the past sixty years has
amply established a causal link between the development of intellectual property and the growth
of our national economy, while also showing that intellectual property is an increasingly critical
component of United States capital and foreign trade."). Merges & Nelson, supra note 2, at 878
("First, increases in research and development expenditures yield more inventions. Second, the
larger number of inventions from increased research and development have a positive effect on
future productivity growth. And third, productivity growth is important for economic well-
being.").
103. See supra notes 26-30, and accompanying text (including the discussion of "Arrow's
Information Paradox").
104. This process is frequently referred to as "reverse engineering." See supra note 27.
105. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 451 ("[W]e add horizontally all individual demand curves to
get the aggregate market demand curve. The same horizontal edition now applies to supply.").
106. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 95-98 and accompanying text.
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Thus, in the case of inventions that can be "reverse-engineered,"' 8
in the absence of intellectual property protection, there will be little or
no economic incentive for individuals or firms to spend significant
amounts of time or money to create inventions, because there will be no
opportunity to recoup the research and development costs. 10 9 Research,
development, and innovation are important for economic growth and
provide other benefits to society. However, under a purely competitive
economic system, the reward to those who engage in such activities will
not be commensurate with the societal benefit that those individuals and
firms provide. Thus, a purely competitive market would fail to provide
sufficient incentive to encourage the creation of an economically benefi-
cial level of research, development, and invention.
IV. THE PATENT RESPONSE TO THE FAILURE OF A COMPETITIVE
MARKET TO ENCOURAGE AN ECONOMICALLY BENEFICIAL LEVEL
OF INVENTION
A. Patents and the Under-Production of Inventions in a Purely
Competitive Market
As discussed above, a competitive market economy will under-pro-
duce inventions (because inventions are non-rival and lead to free-rider
problems).11
108. See supra note 27, and accompanying text (discussing reverse engineering).
109. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 69 ("[I]n a competitive market, the inventor will
face being undersold by the competitor; and thereby never recoup the cost of inventing. The
inability to recoup the costs of inventing will discourage inventors from inventing in the first
place."); Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual
Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 853, 854 (1992) ("[I]nventors would not be able to obtain much
payment for their work in the absence of a rule that restrained strangers from copying, and, as a
result, potential creators [would] produce fewer works than the public would have been willing to
pay for.").
If successful inventions are quickly imitated by free riders, competition will drive
prices down to a point where the inventor receives no return on the original
investment in research and development. As a result, the original inventor may be
unable to appropriate enough of the social value of the invention to justify the initial
research and development expenditures. The high risk involved in research
compounds the likelihood of underinvestment in invention. Thus inventions with
potentially great social benefits might never come about, or at least might be
significantly delayed ....
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental
Use, 56 U. CHI. L. Rev. 1017, 1025 (1989) (citations omitted).
In a competitive market in which anyone is free to use the invention to produce
goods without obligation to the inventor, the cost of the goods sold will be driven
down to a price approaching the marginal cost of their production, and thus the
selling price will not allow for any return on the sunk cost of the research and
development necessary to make the invention in the first place.
Id. at 1025 n.31.
110. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text. The term "non-rival" means that more
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If competitors could simply . . . take another's inventions... there
would be no incentive to spend the vast amounts, of time, energy, and
money necessary to develop these products and 'echniques. It would
be in each firm's self-interest to let others develop products, and then
mimic the results. No one would engage in original development
.... To avoid this disastrous result, the argument claims, we must
continue to grant intellectual property rights .... The grant of prop-
erty rights to producers is a mere means to an end."'
The use of a patent system is nothing new. Laws to promote inven-
tion can be traced back to Renaissance Italy."
t2
B. The Economic Necessity for the U.S. Patent System (or Another
Reward System)
While several different justifications can be offered for granting
special economic benefits to an inventor, 1 3 the Patent Clause of the U.S.
Constitution indicates that the primary purpose of the U.S. patent system
is utilitarian. Article I, section 8, clause 8 provides that Congress shall
have the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writing and Discoveries."' 14 Thus, inventors are pro-
than one person or entity can own the item and the fact that more persons own it does not reduce
the original owner's interest. In other words, if Person A has an idea, Person A will still have that
idea even if thousands of other people have the same idea. See Kieff, supra note 30, at 727.
Thomas Jefferson wrote, "[h]e who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without
lessening mine, as he who lights his taper at mine receives light without darkening me." Letter to
Isaac McPherson (Aug 13, 1813), reprinted in JEFFERSON WrrINcs, 1291-92 (M. Peterson ed.
1984) (quoted in CHIsUM ET AL., supra note 26 at 67 n. 12, and Kieff, supra note 30, at 727 n. 130).
111. Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. Aee. 31, 48 (1989)
(quoted in CHISUM FT AL., supra note 26, at 54-55).
112. Edward C. Walterschied, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law:
Antecedents (Part 1), 76 J. PAT. & TRAD. OFF. Soc'y 697, 707 (1994) ("While it is generally
agreed that the custom of granting patents of monopoly, i.e. exclusive rights to practice a
particular art, in return for its introduction into the state, originated in Italy, there is some question
as to whether it began in Venice or in Florence."); see also CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 10.
113. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (discussing the philosophy
of John Locke, as discussed in his book, Second Treatise on Civil Government in "Two Treatises
on Government" (3d ed. 1698), arguing that when a person adds her labor, she makes the resulting
object something of her own, and thereby makes it her property); Margaret Jane Radin, Property
and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982) (discussing the philosophy of Hegel, as discussed
in his book, Philosophy of Right, arguing that claiming property rights is an essential part of being
a person - "property is the first embodiment of freedom and so it is in itself a substantive end
. . . .").
114. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added); see also CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at
54 ("[T]he predominant justification for American intellectual property law has been, without
question, utilitarianism or consequentialism .... According to utilitarianism, but for the prospect
of the right to exclude in the form of a patent.., there will be inadequate incentives resulting in a
less than 'socially optimal output of intellectual property.' ") (quoting Hettinger, supra note 111,
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vided with exclusive rights - patents - to promote the useful arts." 5
C. Is the Modern Patent Grant the Appropriate Incentive?
Many questions can be raised regarding whether the U.S. patent
system is the correct response to the need to encourage invention. Some
of these questions include:
(1) Is the patent term appropriate? Should the patent term for every
invention and inventor begin when the patent is issued and end
20 years from the date of filing the patent application?" 6 Should
at 47); Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 1024 ("The United States Constitution posits an instrumental
justification for patents .... ).
115. Various sub-purposes have been identified. Commentators assert that in addition to
providing a financial reward to the patentee, the patent system "promote[s] the Progress of... the
useful Arts" in three additional ways - by providing (i) an incentive to disclose; (ii) an incentive
to commercialize; and (iii) an incentive to design around. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 70.
Incentive to Disclose - In addition to providing financial rewards to inventors, the patent
system requires the public disclosure of the new invention. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000) (requiring
public disclosure of a patent application unless the applicant certifies that there will be no foreign
filing that requires public disclosure). In the absence of public disclosure (through the patent
system), other researchers might waste resources trying to invent what has already been invented
- in other words "re-inventing the wheel." Under this view, the inventor is rewarded with a
patent for publicly disclosing her invention. See Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 1024 ("[T]he
patent system promotes disclosure of new inventions and thereby enlarges the public storehouse of
knowledge.").
Incentive to Commercialize - A patent provides a degree of certainty. From the date the
patent issues until 20 years from the date the patent application was filed, the inventor will have
an "exclusive" on her invention. Commentators have stated "[p]otentially, one of the most serious
problems facing the inventor is the lack of experience and resources necessary to produce,
advertise, distribute, and sell large quantities of the invention's commercial embodiment. The
patent grant creates a degree of certainty allowing venture capitalists and others to invest in the
invention and bring the patented product to market. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 73-74. As
an example, commentators have stated:
[A scientist] invented an excellent invalid chair, and thinking to give it to
the world without recompense to himself, he did not patent it. The result
was that no manufacturer dared risk undertaking its manufacture. Each knew
that if it succeeded, competitors would spring up and rob him of most or all
of his profits, while, on the other hand, it might fail.
Id. at 74 (quoting Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly
Laws, 24 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 84, 179 (1942)). For additional discussion regarding the incentive to
commercialize, see generally Kieff, supra note 30.
Incentive to Design Around - Since the patent system requires that the invention be publicly
disclosed, 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000), it provides all of the patentee's competitors with an
opportunity to study the new invention and create a new invention that will not infringe the
existing patent. Thus, while the patentee gains an "exclusive" in the new patented invention,
everyone else in the industry can be educated and take up the challenge of finding the next
breakthrough invention. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 75.
116. See Kitch, supra note 48, at 1740 ("Another economist wrote a whole book on the issue
of the length of the patent term.") (citing WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND
WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES (1969)); Merges &




every inventor working in every industry receive the same
reward from the patent system?
(2) Should the extent of patent protection depend on the level of
"work" or "effort" put forth by the inventor?
(3) Should the extent to which the patentee has relied on the work of
others impact the duration or degree of patent protection?' 
7
"The most famous formulation of this ... is credited to Sir Isaac
Newton, who reportedly said, 'If I have seen further it's by stand-
ing on the shoulders of giants.' This is occasionally referred to
... as the OTSOG (On the Shoulders of Giants) principle." ' 8
(4) Are there areas of innovation in which it is unnecessary to grant
patent protection?" 9
(5) Should inventors receive an entirely different type of prize or
benefit (rather than a patent)?1
2 0
This Article will not consider whether the patent reward is the best
possible response to the need to encourage invention - that subject has
been considered by many others.1 21 Instead, this Article will (i) consider
the theoretical economic principles that suggest that a patent creates eco-
nomic inefficiencies; (ii) analyze two specific markets to assess whether
the economic inefficiencies suggested by economic theory occur in real
markets; and (iii) recommend a change to the existing tax rules to
improve economic efficiency in markets that are dominated by patent
holders.
V. THE PATENT SOLUTION CREATES A MONOPOLY IN THE MARKET
FOR THE PATENTED PRODUCT
As stated above, a patent grants to the patentee "the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United
117. See Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 1026 ("If... one assumes that somebody else would
eventually have made the invention, it is no longer clearly appropriate to attribute the full social
value of the invention to the efforts of the first inventor.").
118. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tzx.
L. REv. 989, 997 n.30 (1997) (citation omitted).
119. For example, many university scientists (and others) may work for fame, prestige, and
personal reputation, and would continue to invent (and publish the results) even in the absence of
a patent reward. See Kieff, supra note 30, at 723 n.1 18.
120. See Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. Rev. 115 (2003);
Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 1026 ("Some critics of the patent system have suggested that
government should stimulate invention at less social cost by awarding prizes to inventors in lieu of
patents... such proposals are almost as old as the patent system .... James Madison proposed a
system of prizes and bonuses to inventors in lieu of patents at the Constitutional Convention in
1789."); John S. Leibovitz, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, Ill YALE L.J. 2251 (2002);
Oddi, supra note 5, at 268 n.6 (discussing various positions regarding the appropriateness of the
U.S. patent system); see also Kitch, supra note 52, at 289.
121. See supra note 120.
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States ... ."'122 Thus, the only producer in the market for the patented
product will be the patent holder (and its licensees, if any).123
A "monopoly" exists when there is only one producer in the mar-
ket. 1 24 As discussed below, a monopoly allows the producer to charge a
higher price and sell a smaller quantity than in a competitive market, and
this is an inefficient economic result because it fails to maximize con-
sumer satisfaction.
1 25
If a patented product is the only solution for a broad-based con-
sumer need or desire, the patentee can be the sole producer in a signifi-
cant market. One economist has stated, "The most important
monopolies granted by government today . . . are patents."'' 26 Courts
and commentators have stated that patents can create a monopoly.1 27 In
addition, Congress has referred to the exclusive rights granted by a pat-
ent as a "monopoly."''
28
VI. ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCIES WITH A PURE MONOPOLY
A. The Monopolist Has Discretion in Setting Price Above
Marginal Cost
As discussed earlier, in a competitive market, each producer is a
"price taker." The individual producer can charge only the market price
for her products; if she charges more, customers will buy from her com-
122. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2002) (emphasis added); Merges & Nelson, supra note 2, at 861
n.96 ("[A] patent grant is a right to exclude, not an affirmative right to practice an invention.")
(emphasis added).
123. As discussed below, see infra note 521 and accompanying text, the patent holder can
retain the patent and "license" others to make and sell the patented product.
124. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 489.
125. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text (regarding a monopolist charging a higher
price and producing a small quantity); see supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (regarding
the definition of economic efficiency).
126. STIGLrrz, supra note 9, at 349.
127. See Bonita Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989) ("Sections
102(a) and (b) operate in tandem to exclude from consideration for patent protection knowledge
which is already available to the public. They express a congressional determination that the
creation of a monopoly in such information would . . . serve no socially useful purpose .... )
(emphasis added); see also CHISUM, supra note 45, § 5.01, at 5-11 ("[The nonobvious
requirement] serves to limit patent monopolies to those innovations that in fact serve to advance
the state of the useful arts.") (emphasis added); CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 21 ("[F]rom
about 1930 to 1950, the Court approached patents with a great deal of suspicion, emphasizing the
monopolistic and social-cost aspects of patents."); Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 1022 ("Judicial
decisions characterize the enabling disclosure in the patent as the 'quid pro quo' of the patent
monopoly."). Thomas Jefferson initially warned about the dangerous economic effects that could
result from granting patent "monopolies" to inventors. MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS
JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION 450 (1970) (quoted in CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 17.
128. See S. REP. No. 83-1622, reprinted in 1954 C.B. 438, 439; Falk, supra note 59, at B-301
("[Section 1235 of the Internal Revenue Code] does not apply to a property right in an invention




In contrast, in a pure monopoly, there is only one seller. 3 ° We will
see that the monopolist has discretion in pricing her product,' 3 t because
there is no competition. Unlike the producer in the competitive market
who faces a horizontal demand curve, 3 2 the monopolist faces a down-
ward-sloping demand curve. As a result, if the monopolist produces and
sells more, the monopolist drives down the price. If the monopolist pro-
duces and sells less, the price will rise.' 33
B. The Demand Curve and Marginal Revenue Curve in a
Monopoly Market
In order to appreciate the monopolist's economic situation, we need
to analyze the demand curve and the marginal revenue curve facing the
monopolist. As discussed earlier, the demand curve reflects the quantity
that consumers will purchase at each price, for the entire industry.1
34
Becuase the monopolist is the only producer in the industry, the demand
curve facing the monopolist is the demand curve for the entire industry.
The demand curve is downward sloping because as price rises, fewer
consumers will buy (and those who will still buy will buy less). 
13 5
In contrast, the marginal revenue curve plots the increase (or
decrease) in revenue from the sale of each additional unit. 136 The margi-
nal revenue curve can be explained by an example. Figure #8 provides
information from which a demand curve and a marginal revenue curve
can be plotted.
129. See supra notes 93-94; SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 484 ("[A] perfect competitor is a
firm that has no control over price... only potatoes, tobacco, wheat, and cotton come within our
strict definition of perfect competition.").
130. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 489 ("[S]he is called a 'monopolist' from the Greek word
mono for 'one' and polist for 'seller.' [S]he is the only one producing in [her] industry, and there
is no industry producing a close substitute for [her] goods.").
131. Id. However, if there are competing goods, the monopolist's discretion in setting price
will be limited by the price and consumer demand for the competing goods. See Kitch, supra note
48, at 1729-30; CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 61.
132. See supra notes 93-94, and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. See SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 485;
LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 232 ("Because a monopolist is the sole producer of the product that it
sells, its demand curve is simply the market demand curve for that product. The market demand
curve, which shows the total quantity that buyers want to purchase at each price, also shows the
quantity that the monopolist will be able to sell at each price.").
134. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
136. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 494.
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FIGURE #8
EXAMPLE OF TOTAL REVENUE AND MARGINAL REVENUE IN A
MONOPOLY MARKET
13 7
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quantity Price Total Revenue Marginal Revenue
q P TR = P x q MR*
0 1,000 -0- +900
1 900 900 +700
2 800 1,600 +500
3 700 2,100 +300
4 600 2,400 +100
5 500 2,500 -100
6 400 2,400 -300
7 300 2,100 -500
8 200 1,600 -700
9 100 900 -900
10 -0- -0-
*Marginal Revenue is the charge in Total Revenue caused by the production and sale of one
additional unit.
The demand curve (Dl - Dl) and the marginal revenue curve (MR1
- MR1) can be plotted as follows:
FIGURE #9




The relationship between the demand curve and the marginal reve-
nue curve has been described as follows:
[Marginal Revenue] is definitely less than [Price or Average Reve-
137. This chart is adapted from SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 492.
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nue] for the imperfect competitor. True, I sell my last unit ... for the
[Price]. But what did I have to do to coax out that last unit of sale?
Clearly, I had to lower my [Price], since I didn't face a perfect-com-
petitor's horizontal [demand curve]. But in lowering my [Price] for
the last new buyer, I also had to lower [the Price] for all the previous
buyers. So my extra revenue [the Marginal Revenue], is evidently
less than [the Price] by this loss on previous units from the price
drop ..... .Graphically, a straight line Marginal Revenue curve
always has twice the steepness of the [demand] curve. 138
For example, in Figure #8, when the producer dropped the price
from $600 to $500, the producer sold one more unit, which increased
total revenue by $500. However, the producer had to drop the price
from $600 to $500 for all the other consumers.' 39 The other consumers
would have purchased four units total at the $600 price, but now the
sales price on each of those four units will drop by $100, for a total drop
of $400 (a drop in total revenue of $400). Thus, the net charge in total
revenue - called the marginal revenue - is $100 [$500 - $400 =
$100].140 When the demand curve is a straight line, the marginal reve-
nue line will drop twice as fast as the straight-line demand curve (as
indicated in Figure #9).141
138. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 494-95; SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 65, at 578.
139. In this situation, it is assumed that price discrimination is not practical. Price
discrimination is the ability to charge different prices to different consumers (normally based on
their ability to pay). If the monopolist could practice perfect price discrimination, she could
generate greater total revenue. A monopolist practicing perfect price discrimination would
produce and sell the same amount as if the products were being produced by many firms in a
competitive market. LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 246. There are several potential barriers to
effective price discrimination.
Discrimination among buyers is only possible if the buyers who face the low price
cannot resell the goods to the buyers who face the high price .... [E]ven though the
local butcher might like to charge the banker twice as much for steak as [she]
charged the taxi driver, [she] cannot succeed in doing so. The banker can always
shop for meat in the supermarket where her occupation is not known. Even if the
butcher and the supermarket agreed to charge [the banker] twice as much, [the
banker] could hire the taxi driver to shop for her.
Id.
There are some examples of price discrimination - cheaper prices at movies and restaurants for
children or seniors, and higher airfares for business travelers who do not spend Saturday night at
their travel destination. Price discrimination gives a seller "an opportunity to capture some (if not
all) of the consumer surplus. In general, the larger the number of different prices a firm can
charge, the greater its ability to increase its revenue at the expense of consumers." Id. at 244.
However, for most products, everyone pays the same price. As one commentator has stated,
"perfect price discrimination is not practicable." Gordon, supra note 109, at 855 n.9; see also
LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 242. When price discrimination is not available, the decision to lower
the price to sell one more unit to a new buyer will decrease the price that all consumers will pay.
As a result, the marginal revenue curve will be inside the demand curve (as in Figures #9 and
#11).
140. See LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 232.
141. Id. at 233 n.l; SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 483, 495.
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C. The Monopolist's Marginal Cost
As discussed above,'42 a producer's marginal cost is the cost to
produce one more unit. Marginal cost does not include sunk costs such
as administration, overhead, and plant and equipment. Like any other
producer, a monopolist seeking to maximize profits will continue to pro-
duce units as long as her marginal revenue exceeds her marginal cost. In
other words, the monopolist will produce one more unit if the sale of
that unit will generate more revenue that it will cost to produce. On the
other hand, if the marginal cost from producing that unit will exceed the
marginal revenue from selling that unit, there is no incentive to produce
that unit. t4 3 An example of Marginal Revenue and Marginal Cost is set
forth in Figure #10:
FIGURE #10
MARGINAL COST AND MARGINAL REVENUE
IN A MONOPOLY MARKET
14 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Quantity Price Total Total Cost Total Profit Marginal Marginal
Q P Revenue TC TP Revenue Cost
TR (TR-TC) MR MC*
(P x Q)
0 1,000 0 725 -0- +900 150
1 900 900 875 +25 +700 125
2 800 1,600 1,000 +600 +500 110
3 700 2,100 1,110 +990 +300 140
4* 600 2,400 1,250 +1,150 +100 250
5 500 2,500 1,500 +1,000 -100 350
6 400 2,400 1,850 +550 -300 450
7 300 2,100 2,300 -200 -500 550
8 200 1,600 2,850 -1,250 -700
9 100 900
10 -0- -0-
The marginal cost figures reflect the Law of Diminishing Returns that was discussed earlier.
t 4 5 As
column (7) indicates, as production increases, at some point (in this case at the point of producing the
fourth unit), it becomes more and more expensive to produce each unit).
142. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
143. As one commentator has stated:
[B]usiness firms don't make goods and services available in markets for the
pleasure of doing good deeds. Instead, their purpose is to earn income for their
owners. Like your personal goals, the goals of a business firm can be multifaceted.
However, much of economic theory about the behavior of business firms assumes
that their primary goal is to make profits - just as your primary goal as a rational
consumer is to maximize your satisfaction.
DAVID N. HYMAN, MICROECONOMICS 170 (1989). "When asked to list their goals, 36.7% of the
[chief executive officers] listed as their key goal maintaining or improving profits of the company.
The profit goal outranked all other objectives. The runner-up to profit as an objective was
company growth, which is probably related to long-term profits." Id. at 175.
144. This chart is adapted from SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 496.
145. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
1080
CHANGING INVENTION ECONOMICS
The demand curve (D-D), marginal revenue curve (MR-MR), and
marginal cost curve (MC-MC) can be plotted as follows:
FIGURE #11
DEMAND CURVE, MARGINAL REVENUE CURVE, AND
MARGINAL COST CURVE IN A MONOPOLY MARKET
Price MC
Quantity
D. The Price and Quantity in a Monopoly Market
As in the case of a competitive market,146 the monopolist will pro-
duce (and sell) the quantity determined by the intersection of the margi-
nal revenue curve and the marginal cost curve14 7 because the monopolist
will produce (and sell) one more unit as long as the additional revenue
generated from the sale of that unit exceeds the cost of producing that
unit. However, unlike a producer in a competitive market, for the
monopolist the marginal revenue curve does not match the market price
(or the market demand curve). Instead, the marginal revenue curve lies
well inside the demand curve.' 4 8 Thus, unlike the situation in a purely
competitive market in which the quantity is determined by the intersec-
tion of the industry demand curve and the industry supply curve, in a
monopoly the quantity is set by the intersection of the marginal revenue
curve and the marginal cost curve (and the marginal revenue curve is
inside the industry demand curve). As a result, in the case of a monop-
146. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
148. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 495 ("Graphically, a straight line Marginal Revenue Curve
always has twice the steepness of the [demand curve].").
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oly the quantity produced will be lower.149
For the monopolist, price is not established at the intersection of the
marginal revenue curve and marginal cost curve. Because there is no
competition, the monopolist can set her price above her marginal cost.
However, the monopolist is constrained by the market demand curve -
in other words, once the monopolist determines how much to produce,
the monopolist must set the price low enough so that consumers will buy
the quantity produced. The monopolist can sell at any price between (i)
the price at which the marginal revenue curve intersects the marginal
cost curve, and (ii) the price corresponding to the position on the
demand curve for the quantity at which the marginal cost curve inter-
sects the marginal revenue curve. 150 The profit maximizing monopolist
will sell at the price corresponding to the position on the demand curve
at the quantity established by the intersection of the marginal cost curve
and the marginal revenue curve, shown as Pm in Figure #12.
FIGURE #12





D-D = Market demand curve
MC-MC = Marginal cost curve (also the industry supply curve)
MR-MR = Marginal revenue curve
Pm = Price in the monopoly market
Qm = Quantity in the monopoly market
149. This is reflected in Figure #13 below.
150. See LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 235 ("For a monopolist, there is no unique relationship
between market price and quantity supplied.").
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E. The Monopolist's Price Will Be Higher, and the Quantity
Supplied Will Be Lower, than in a Competitive Market
Figure #13 compares the price and quantity in a monopoly market
with the price and quantity in a competitive market.
FIGURE #13
COMPARISON OF PRICE AND QUANTITY IN A COMPETITIVE









I I I Demand
Qm Qc Quantity
10 12
Dc = Demand in the competitive market facing the individual producer (the
same as the market price and the marginal revenue curve in the competitve
market)
MC = Marginal Cost
MRc = Marginal Revenue in the competitive market facing the individual producer
(the same as the market price and the demand curve)
Pc = Price in the competitive market = $3
Pm = Price in the monopoly market = $4
Qc = Quantity in the competitive market = 12 units
Qm = Quantity in the monopoly market = 10 units
Figure #13 demonstrates that in a monopoly market the price will
be higher - in the monopoly market the price is Pm (which is $4), and
in the competitive market the price is Pc (which is $3).151
151. One commentator has stated:
[Mionopolists can make profits in ways not available to competing firms. One way
is to drive up the price of a good by restricting output .... They can, to use the
popular term, gouge their customers. Consumers, by choosing to buy the
monopolist's good, are revealing that they are better off then they would be without
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
In addition, in the monopoly market the quantity will be lower. 152
Specifically, in Figure #13, the quantity produced and sold in the
monopoly market is only 10, while the quantity produced and sold in the
competitive market is 12. "The canny seller contrives an artificial scar-
city of his product so as not to spoil the price he can get .... Thus,
less of the product will be consumed.
As discussed at the outset, an efficient economy produces at maxi-
mum output and satisfies consumer demand to the maximum extent pos-
sible. 1 54  Thus, a monopoly results in economic inefficiencies - the
economy is failing to maximize output and is failing to maximize con-
sumer satisfaction.
[The monopolist] does not produce output up to the point where the
social cost ... is equal to the value of the good to consumers ....
Rather, the monopolist is keeping its output a little scarce. It does not
produce up to the point of [Price = Marginal Cost] because to do so
would require lowering [Price] to all consumers, which would lose
the monopolist some profit. So society does not get as much of the
monopolist's output as it wants in terms of the good's marginal cost
and marginal value to consumers.
1 55
Another commentator has stated,
Because price exceeds marginal cost for a monopolist, society as a
whole would benefit from a reallocation of resources that [would pro-
duce] more of the monopolist's product - because the gain to soci-
ety of additional output, as reflected in the marginal value (price) of
the product, exceeds the marginal cost of producing the additional
output. In contrast, a perfectly competitive industry has price equal
to marginal cost. Thus, the marginal value (price) to society of addi-
the product. But they are paying more than they would if the industry were
competitive.
STrGLrrz, supra note 9, at 389. Another commentator has stated:
In economic terms, intellectual property rights prevent competition in the sale of the
particular work or invention covered by the intellectual property right, and therefore
allow the intellectual property owner to raise the price of that work above the
marginal cost of reproducing it .... This means that in many cases fewer people
will buy the work than if it were distributed on a competitive basis, and they will
pay more for the privilege.
Lemley, supra note 117, at 996.
152. See LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 236 ("The level of output in a monopolized industry is
therefore less than the level of output that would be produced if the industry were composed of
many price-taking firms.").
153. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 497.
154. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text; SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 500 ("it is a
social inefficiency when monopolists' outputs are too small."); SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra
note 65, at 582 ("the ability to control the entire market would allow a monopolist to raise its price
above marginal cost, thereby reducing output below the most efficient levels.").
155. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 65, at 583.
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tional output is just equal to the marginal cost of producing it, and
there is no scope for improving the outcome." 6
The consequences of this failure can be significant. For example,
imagine that Figure #13 represents the market for a life-saving drug. If
the market for the drug is purely competitive, the industry will produce
and sell 12 units (designated by Q), and the drug will sell for $3 (desig-
nated at P). Thus, many people will buy the drug and will be cured. In
contrast, if the drug is patented and the market for the drug is a pure
monopoly, the industry (in which the only producer is the patent holder)
will produce only 10 units (designated by Qm), and will charge $4 per
unit (designated by Pm). As a result, fewer consumers will be able to
buy the drug and be cured. In effect, some consumers (who could have
purchased the drug at the $3 competitive price) will be "priced out of the
market." Nevertheless, without a patent system (or a different system)
to stimulate invention, the life-saving drug may have never been pro-
duced, and none of the potential consumers would have been cured.5 7
F. A Monopoly Also Leads to a Dead-Weight Loss
In addition to the economic inefficiency of higher prices and lower
quantities supplied, pure monopolies are criticized for creating a dead-
weight loss. A dead-weight loss is illustrated in Figure #14.158
156. LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 236.
157. See CmiSUM ET AL.., supra note 26, at 53 (citing Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to
Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CH-KIrr L. REv. 841,
866 (1993)).
158. Kieff, supra note 30, at 703 n.22 ("Dead-weight loss refers to the loss in potential social
wealth when a competitive market is compared to an otherwise identical market in which there is
monopoly power, or power over price").
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FIGURE #14











Dc = Demand in a competitive market
MC - MC = Marginal Cost curve
MR - MR = Marginal Revenue curve
MRc = Marginal Revenue curve in a competitive market
Pc = Price in a competitive market
Pm = Price in a monopoly market
Qc = Quantity in a competitive market
Qm = Quantity in a monopoly market
As the monopolist produces and sells a smaller quantity (Qm in
Figure #14) than in a competitive market (Qc in Figure #14), the con-
sumer surplus relating to the difference in quantity is lost (in Figure #14
that is the shaded area above the "Dc = MRc = Pc" line), and the pro-
ducer's surplus relating to that difference in quantity (in Figure #14 that
is the solid area below the "Dc = MRc = Pc" line) is lost. While the
monopolist makes a larger profit than in a competitive market (repre-
sented by the area from Pc to Pm and bounded by the market demand
line), the loss in consumer surplus plus the loss in producer surplus
exceeds the producer's extra profit. The excess is the dead-weight
loss.' 6 ° This dead-weight loss represents a detriment to the economy as
159. Figure #14 is adapted from CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 65.
160. Consumer surplus is the benefit enjoyed by consumers who would pay a higher price for
the product, but are able to pay the lower market price. As discussed earlier, the market demand
curve for almost all products is downward sloping. See supra note 80. For example, 10 people
might be willing to buy a product at $10. In the competitive market for that product, the actual
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a whole.
While the dead-weight loss is viewed as an overall loss to society,
"[i]t is not the profit a monopoly ... exacts that constitutes its greatest
evil, but rather its setting too high a price in relation to social marginal-
cost pricing."''
G. Other Economic Inefficiencies Caused by a Monopoly
Economists have identified other inefficiencies that result from a
monopoly. First, monopolists do not have as great an incentive to
reduce or maintain expenses when compared to firms in a competitive
market.162 This has been called managerial slack. 63
Second, a monopolist may not be as motivated to pursue research
and development to develop new products and new methods, as a firm in
a competitive market. 164 Because the monopolist already controls the
market, there is limited incentive to change the market. Economists
have stated, "the impact of monopoly on dynamic innovation and techni-
cal change is likely to far outweigh any dead-weight losses."
' 165
Third, the monopolist may expend resources in an attempt to pre-
serve or extend the monopoly, 66 instead of devoting those resources to
market equilibrium price might be $6. Thus, each consumer who would pay $10, but need only
pay $6, receives a benefit - or has a surplus - of $4. The total consumer surplus for the 10
consumers who would have paid $10, would be $40 [10 consumers x $4 surplus per consumer =
$40]. See STIGLrrz, supra note 9, at 390. ("At points left of the intersection of the price line and
demand curve, people are willing to pay more for the goods than they have to"); Kieff, supra note
30, at 703 n.22; see also SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 65, at 583 ("for each unit of
quantity reduction ... the net social loss is the vertical distance "shifts" between the demand
curve and the [marginal cost] curve ....").
161. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 518.
162. STIGLITZ, supra note 9, at 391.
In the absence of competition, it can be difficult to tell whether managers are being
efficient. How much, for instance, should it cost for AT&T to put a call through
from New York to Chicago? In the days when AT&T had a monopoly on long-
distance telephone service, it might have claimed that its costs were as low as
possible. However, not even trained engineers could really tell whether that was
true. When competition developed for intercity telephone calls, shareholders in
AT&T could compare its costs with those of Sprint, MCI, and other competitors,
and competition provided each company with an incentive to be as efficient as
possible. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 392; Merges & Nelson, supra note 2, at 873 n.143 ("To the extent that the holder of
a broad patent has market power, it is relevant to note that analysts of monopoly power often
remark on the monopolist's reduced incentives to innovate").
165. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 65, at 584. Nevertheless, eventually the patent will
expire, and the monopolist will have a strong incentive to develop a new innovation that will
allow it to continue to control the market once the first patent expires.
166. STaGLrrz, supra note 9, at 392 ("How much would a firm be willing to spend to gain and
hold a monopoly position? The firm would be willing to spend up to the amount it would receive
as monopoly profits. The waste from this rent-seeking activity can be much larger than the loss
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1045
developing new products or finding ways to reduce costs. For example,
the patent holding monopolist may buy related patents or technologies
that might threaten the monopoly, 167 and then suppress the technology
(if that is the most profitable course of action).
Commentators have noted that a patent holder may employ a num-
ber of tactics to preserve market power even after a patent expires.'
68
These tactics can include predatory pricing, excess capacity, and limit
pricing. 169
VII. RATHER THAN A PURE MONOPOLY, A PATENT MAY CREATE AN
OLIGOPOLY OR A MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION SITUATION -
RELATED ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCIES
A. Whether a "Monopoly" Exists Depends on How the Market
Is Defined
While a patent creates a "pure monopoly" in the market for the
patented product, 170  in many cases this may not be the relevant
market. 1 7 '
from the reduced output"); Merges & Nelson, supra note 2, at 873 n.143 ("[the monopolist] may
become more concerned with protecting its current monopoly position than in acquiring a new
one").
167. See infra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing a situation in which a drug maker
with a patent paid approximately $400 million to prevent other drug companies from entering the
market).
168. STIGLrrz, supra note 9, at 350-51, 353-54.
169. Id. at 353-54. In predatory pricing, each time a new producer enters the market the
incumbent drops the price below the new entrant's marginal cost. While the new entrant may
argue that this violates the antitrust laws, the incumbent may argue that there have been changes in
its cost patterns which justify the price drop. In an excess capacity strategy, the incumbent builds
extra plant and equipment (and otherwise develops excess capacity) so that if a new entrant
appears, the incumbent can increase production without a significant investment. In limit pricing,
the incumbent attempts to demonstrate that its costs are low to any potential entrant. See id.
170. If another entity uses a process or makes a product that is described by the claims of the
patent (which could be said to be anticipated by the claims of the patent), the patent holder could
obtain an injunction to prevent that other entity from making, using, or selling the process or
product. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000). As a result, the patent holder would continue to be the sole
producer.
171. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-78 (1965)
("It may be that the [patented] device ... does not comprise a relevant market. There may be
effective substitutes for the device which do not infringe the patent"). Strictly speaking, a pure
monopoly exists where there is only one producer in the industry, and "there is no industry
producing a close substitute for [her] good . .. [so that] a change in another firm's price would
shift [her demand] curve negligibly." SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 489.
Exclusive monopolies, like public utilities or telephones, are usually regulated by
the government; and even they must usually take account of the potential
competition of alternative products - oil for coal, or cables for telephone. This
shows how relatively unimportant complete monopolies are.
Id. See id. at 490 ("few firms in real life enjoy anything like a complete monopoly; usually some
other products will be partially substitutable for the ones you sell"); SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS,
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Whether a monopoly exists depends on the relevant market. 17 2 In
general, a market involves providing a product to satisfy a consumer
need or desire. 7 3 If the only product that will satisfy the need or desire
is the patented product, then the patent holder has a pure monopoly. On
the other hand, if the goods offered by multiple producers will satisfy
the need or desire, the patent holder does not have a pure monopoly.1
74
In the later situation, the items provided by the other producers may be
considered substitutes - a consumer can substitute one producer's
product for another.
If the need or desire is defined broadly, it is less likely that a pure
monopoly will be found; if the need or desire is defined narrowly, it is
more likely that the market can be described as a pure monopoly.
Example #2: The Reverend Praiseworthy has developed (and
patented) a revolutionary new miracle device called Snow-Be-Gone.
The user rides the Snow-Be-Gone device in the same manner as a
riding lawn-mower. Like a snow-blower, the Snow-Be-Gone picks
up snow in its path; but unlike any other machine, it heats the snow to
the point where the snow simply evaporates into the heavens. Thus,
unlike using a snow-blower in which one might clear the sidewalk
but simultaneously bury the driveway, the Snow-Be-Gone actually
causes snow to vanish. If one defines the applicable market as snow
removal, the market in which the Snow-Be-Gone is sold would not be
a pure monopoly - substitute products would include the ordinary
snow-blower, or the good old-fashioned shovel.
However, if the market is defined to include only those who do not
want to merely move the snow but want to make it vanish, the only
product in the relevant market is the Snow-Be-Gone. In that market,
because of the patent, Reverend Praiseworthy's product may be the
only one that can satisfy the need or desire (for approximately 20
years from the date the patent application is filed), 75 so in that mar-
supra note 65, at 568 ("Exclusive monopolies are rare today"); STIGLrrz, supra note 9, at 346
("imperfect competition is more typical").
172. CHIsUM Er AL., supra note 26, at 61 ("We now see that in the context of a market for
solutions, a patentee can prevent others from selling a certain solution, though not all solutions to
a given problem"). Id. at 66 (example involving the invention of a better mousetrap, and the
market for rodent catchers (which includes cats)); Kieff, supra note 30, at 730 ("people will buy
better mousetraps only if they cost less than cats, accounting for all costs and benefits such as cat
food and companionship").
173. Id. ("Markets order themselves around consumer demand - producers sell what
consumers will buy. In general, consumers buy to satisfy their needs or desires").
174. Kitch, supra note 48, at 1730 (a patent creates a monopoly "only if the claims cover all of
an economically relevant market, i.e., there is no alternative way for competitors to provide the
same economic functionality to their customers without infringing the claims").
175. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (For patent applications filed on or after June 8, 1995, patent
protection begins when the patent is issued, and ends twenty years from the date the patent
application was filed.). Of course, others might develop new products that perform the same
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ket the Reverend Praiseworthy would enjoy a pure monopoly.
In some situations the market for a patented product might be better
described as an oligopoly rather than a monopoly. In discussing the rar-
ity of a pure monopoly, one commentator states:
A continuing problem is that the literature contains a number of ele-
mentary but persistently repeated errors. The literature... [has] over
a long period of time, not infrequently (1) analyzed intellectual prop-
erty rights on the assumption that they confer an economic monopoly
on their owner . . . . This assumption is most commonly made in
connection with patents. Patents . . . are the intellectual property
right most plausibly characterized as a monopoly. But this is true
only if the [patent] claims cover all of an economically relevant mar-
ket, i.e., there is no alternative way for competitors to provide the
same economic functionality to their customers without infringing the
claims. 176
In order to evaluate the economic impact of patents, it is not only
appropriate to consider the case of pure monopoly, but also (i) oligop-
oly, and (ii) monopolistic competition.
B. Oligopoly
In an oligopoly, 177 there are a few sellers who sell differentiated
products that respond to the consumers' need or desire.
178
In describing oligopoly, one commentator states:
In heavy machinery, such companies as General Electric, Westing-
house, Allis-Chalmers, and others illustrate the case of an oligopoly
that has few sellers and some differentiation of product.
179
Example #3: Same as Example #2 except that shortly after Reverend
Praiseworthy hits the market with the Snow-Be-Gone, two other pro-
ducers each develop (and patent) a product that can perform the same
function as the Snow-Be-Gone. None of the three products infringes
the patents of the other two producers. At that point, there are three
producers who can satisfy the consumer need or desire, but no other
producers can enter the market - the patents act as a barrier to keep
function and which do not infringe the Reverend Praiseworthy's patent, so it is possible that the
Reverend could have competition before the patent term expires.
176. Kitch, supra note 48, at 1729-30 (emphasis added).
177. The term "oligopoly" means "few sellers." SAMUELSON, supra note 5, at 489.
178. Id. at 489-90. Markets characterized as an oligopoly include aluminum, meat packing,
soap, the communications industry, and aircraft manufacture. Id. at 512. There are also oligopoly
markets in which there are a few sellers who sell identical products - such as the steel industry
- but since only a patentee can sell the patented product, presumably the patentee's product will
always be somewhat different from the competition. As a result, the oligopoly market in which
the products are identical will not be considered in this Article.
179. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 489-90; STIGLITZ, supra note 9, at 361.
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out other potential competitors.'18  This market can be described as
an oligopoly.
Advertising, brand names, trademarks, patents, and customs may explain
why there is product differentiation."'
An oligopolist's situation differs from the situation facing the indi-
vidual seller in a purely competitive market. As discussed above, the
individual in a competitive market faces a horizontal demand curve so
that she will sell nothing if she charges a price above the market price. 82
In contrast, the oligopolist faces a downward sloping demand curve,
because the oligopolist will still be able to sell some of her products if
she increases price above marginal cost. The extent to which the oligo-
polist can increase price above marginal cost and still sell units is her
market power. 1
8 3
The oligopolists in a market have a mutual interest in keeping price
above marginal cost. If one firm cuts its price, initially that firm may be
able to capture additional market share (and profits), but the increased
market share (and profits) will disappear if the other producers in the
market lower their prices. In that case, the initial price cutter (and all the
other producers in the market) may then have smaller profits than when
prices were high. As a result, all the oligopolists as a group will have an
incentive to keep prices high so that profits will be high.'8 4 On the other
hand, if one oligopolist increases price, the other oligopolists in the mar-
ket will be reluctant to increase their price - the other oligopolists may
not change their price in hopes that they will capture some of the market
share and profits from the one firm that increased its price. 85 The oligo-
polist's determination of price and quantity is illustrated in Figure #15
below.
180. It is possible that other producers could design around the three existing patents and
obtain a new patent, but in this example it is assumed that no other potential competitor is
successful in designing around the patents.
181. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 517 (emphasis added).
182. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
183. See infra note 200.
184. In describing the pricing strategy of oligopolists, one commentator states:
We can deduce a theory of [price] inflexibility from the fact that rivals may behave
one way when you cut your price - namely, matching your cuts and thwarting your
hope for new sales; and they behave another way when you raise your [price] above
the customary level - namely, holding their prices constant in order to pick up
some of your customers. In consequence, you have little motive to change your
price in either direction. Instead, you "administer" your price in a rigid fashion,
particularly since each oligopolist learns from game-theoretic experience that it is
easier to agree - tacitly or explicitly - on a common [price] that is fixed rather
than one that is changing from month to month.
SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 515 (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 515.
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The tendency of its competitors to respond to a decrease in price,
and not respond to an increase in price, presents the oligopolist with a
"kinked" or "cornered demand" curve. In summarizing an oligopoly,
one economist states, "[Tihis oligopoly equilibrium looks much like the
simple monopoly equilibrium"'186
In describing the price charged in an oligopoly market, this econo-
mist states, "With or without a price leader, the sellers may be quoting
rather similar prices - prices which come nowhere near the level of
[marginal cost] as would have been the case of the perfectly competitive
industry . "..."187
An explicit agreement among the producers in an oligopoly market
presumably would violate the antitrust laws. 188 In 1946, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that cigarette oligopolists could be guilty of price
186. Id. at 514 (emphasis added). In this Article, the monopoly equilibrium is shown in Figure
12.
187. Id. at 516.
188. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (2000); JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., 1 ANTITRUST LAWS
AND TRADE REGULATIONS, § 13.01, at 13-1-13-4 (2d ed. 2003).
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fixing even if there was no overt collusion. 89
Oligopolists may set their price below the price that would be
established in a pure monopoly "to take account of the fact that setting a
high price would tempt new rivals into their field, [thus] they would
agree on a price higher than a purely competitive one, but set with some
moderation for fear of attracting [a] new [rival]."'19
Since oligopolists generally cannot profit by competing on the basis
of price, they attempt to compete based on "forms of product differentia-
tion, product innovation, customer service, quality, performance, conve-
nience of use, terms of credit, styling and design, durability, advertising,
and sales promotion. Indeed billions of dollars are spent each year in
efforts to maintain, strengthen, and promote product differentiation."' 19'
C. Monopolistic Competition
In addition to a monopoly or an oligopoly, the relevant market for a
patent holder might be described as a monopolistic competition situa-
tion. In a market characterized as monopolistic competition,1 92 there are
many sellers in the market selling differentiated products. The key to
market power in this situation is the level of product differentiation.
Product differentiation may be achieved by obtaining a patent because
the patent holder can sue any competitor for infringement if the competi-
tor's product is the same or substantially equivalent to the patented prod-
uct. 193 Other ways to achieve product differentiation include developing
brand name recognition, advertising, and varying the features of the
189. Am. Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (applying section 2 of the Sherman
Act); VON KALINOWSKJ ET AL., supra note 187, § 25.05, at 25-113 ("the Supreme Court upheld
convictions of three tobacco companies for both actual monopolization and conspiracy to
monopolize where the three companies had combined market shares of 68 to 80 percent"). See
also SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 516 ("on the other hand, if a few large firms encounter the same
problem, experience suggests that they may - even without meeting, phoning, winking or
corresponding - arrive at a tacit mode of behavior that avoids fierce competition") (emphasis
added).
190. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 516 (emphasis added).
191. ARTHUR A. THOMPSON, JR., ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 427 (3d ed.
1981); see also SAMUELSON, supra note 5, at 517 ("Oligopolists particularly love to shift rivalry
and competition into dimensions other than price; into advertising the real or fancied merits of the
brand .... ).
192. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 65, at 569.
193. In regard to suing a competitor making an equivalent product, "the doctrine of equivalents
provides that accused products or process that do not fall within the literal scope of the patent
claims nonetheless infringe the patent if they are only 'insubstantially different' from the patent
claims. The effect is to create a 'penumbra' around the literal scope of the [patent] claims, and
therefore to expand the protection given to the patent owners." Lemley, supra note 118, at 1004
(citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997)). Also, if the
patentee has patented a process, the patentee can sue anyone for infringement who uses the same
or a substantially equivalent process. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
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product (such as taste, color, style, or other factors that consumers may
find significant). 194 Producers desire to create product differentiation in
order to avoid price competition. 195
In a case of monopolistic competition (many sellers, selling differ-
entiated products), the demand curve facing each seller is downward
sloping - because of the product differentiation, the individual seller
will not lose all of its customers if it increases price above marginal
cost.' 96 Like the monopolist or the oligopolist, the monopolistic com-
petitor will produce the quantity determined by the intersection of the
marginal revenue and marginal cost curves, and will determine the price
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= Marginal Cost Curve
= Marginal Revenue Curve
= Price in the monopolistic competition market
= Quantity in the monopolistic competition market
194. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 488; SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 65, at 569
("Often, custom, familiarity, or inertia leads consumers to prefer one seller over another").
195. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 487-88.
196. Id. at 517; STIGLITZ, supra note 9, at 355.
197. Id. at 356.
198. Figure #17 is based on id. (figure #14.9, item A).
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One economist has stated, "One can think of this situation as a sort
of minimonopoly, where each firm has a monopoly on its own brand or
its own store location [or its own patented product or process]."' 199
D. Comparing Monopoly, Oligopoly, and Monopolistic Competition
When compared to a pure monopoly, the economic inefficiencies
are not as extreme in the cases of oligopoly or monopolistic competi-
tion.20 Nevertheless, once we leave the world of perfect competition,
"we have left the Garden of Eden."' ' When the seller has a downward
sloping demand curve, unlike a case of pure competition, the seller's
price will exceed marginal cost, and the quantity will be less than in a
competitive market. The goal is then to "minimize the evil and waste
involved in such imperfections,"2 2 while still providing a sufficient eco-
nomic incentive to inventors.
VIII. ATTEMPTING TO VERIFY THAT VALUABLE PATENTS PERMIT A
PATENT HOLDER TO EXERCISE MARKET POWER: THE ANTHRAX
THREAT, THE AIDS PANDEMIC, AND PATENT DAMAGES IN GENERAL
"Whether a particular [patent] confers an economic monopoly is an
empirical question."203 In the great majority of cases, patents likely pro-
vide the inventor with no market power whatsoever. Most patents likely
fall into one of three categories: (i) the patent never results in a commer-
cially viable product; (ii) the patent might be used in a commercially
viable product but consumers place no extra value on the patented prod-
uct, or (iii) if a commercially viable product is ever developed, it is
developed after the patent has expired. 2" However, this Article will
consider the income tax consequences on the sale of a patent, and a
patent that can be sold for a significant price likely provides the patent
holder with market power.
The extent of a patentee's market power - and the resulting eco-
nomic inefficiencies - will depend on several factors, including the
199. Id. (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 403 ('The extent to which a firm's demand curve is downward sloping, so it can
raise prices without losing all its customers ... its market power.., is related to both the number
of firms in the industry and the extent of product differentiation").
201. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 500. "Once the rules of perfect competition are left behind,
there is no Invisible Hand principle which sets up a presumption that the working out of laissez
faire is likely to be in the direction of satisfying wants most efficiently." Id. at 517.
202. Id. at 500; SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 65, at 567 ("prices are higher and
outputs are lower under imperfect competition then under perfect competition").
203. Kitch, supra note 48, at 1731.
204. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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definition of the relevant market,2 °5 the extent of the market demand,2 °6
the availability of substitutes, and the presence of competing producers.
In order to assess the market power of a patent holder, one would
want to analyze the "relevant market," which is the actual market in
which the patented product is sold. As discussed above, obtaining the
relevant data for evaluating market power - such as the patent holder's
marginal cost for the patented product and the price that potential com-
petitors would sell the product for if the patent did not exist - can be
difficult.
20 7
Nevertheless, two major events triggered the disclosure of substan-
tial information about two patented products and the market power
available to those patent holders. First, this Article examines the market
for Bayer A.G.'s (Bayer) patented drug, Cipro, prior to the anthrax
threat. Second, this Article examines the market for the three-drug
cocktail used to treat HIV and AIDS in connection with President Clin-
ton's issuance of an Executive Order regarding the rights of patent hold-
ers and the availability of anti-AIDS drugs in Africa.
A. Market Power and Cipro, as Reported in Connection with the
Anthrax Threat
1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIPRO
The development of ciprofloxacin (Cipro), an antibiotic, began in
the 1970s.20 Bayer filed patent applications in the United States and in
foreign countries from 1980 to 1982.209 Some foreign patents were
205. If the market is defined narrowly to include only the patented product, then a monopoly
exists. See supra notes 124-28. However, if the market is defined broadly, there may be other
products that consumers can substitute for the patented product. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at
61.
206. If no consumers want to purchase the potential product, the patent provides no market
power. See supra note 52.
207. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. In addition, some commentators assert that
patent holders may intentionally avoid disclosing information that would indicate market power.
Halbert, supra note 15, at 277; Rosalyn S. Park, Note, The International Drug Industry: What the
Future Holds for South Africa's HIV/AIDS Patients, I 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 125, 147-48
(2002) (the brand name pharmaceutical industry withdrew from a lawsuit involving South
Africa's access to the generic versions of patented anti-AIDS drugs because it "did not want to
face the possibility that their actual expenditures and profit margins would be scrutinized during a
trial"). See also Keith Bradsher, Bayer Halves Price for Cipro, But Rivals Offer Drugs Free, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at Al ("Executives in the generic drug industry say Bayer is still at least
breaking even, and may even be making large profits .... [Bayer's chief executive of American
operations] refused to discuss whether Bayer was making a profit on the deal").
208. For a discussion of the history of the Cipro patent, see Bayer AG v. Schein
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1309-11 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
209. Id. at 1311.
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issued as early as 1982,21 ° and the U.S. patent was issued in 1987.211
Cipro can be prescribed to treat a variety of infections, including urinary
tract infections, various infections that arise after surgery,2 12 pneumonia,
cystic fibrosis, and Crohn's disease. 213  For the nine-month period
immediately preceding the anthrax threat, Cipro was the 43rd most pop-
ular prescription drug in the United States.214 Cipro was the largest sell-
ing drug for Bayer,215 the 15th largest pharmaceutical company,
216
which held the patent2 7 and manufactured Cipro. While Cipro was a
popular antibiotic,218 if the relevant market is defined as "antibiotics,"
Bayer likely did not enjoy a "monopoly" - other classes of antibiotics
would include penicillin and tetracyclines.21 9
In 2000, at the urging of the U.S. government,220 Bayer obtained
approval from the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) for Cipro to
be used to treat inhaled anthrax.221 While many other drugs had been
210. Id.
211. Id. See also Foreign Patents Don't Invalidate Cipro Patent, ANDREWS INTELL. PROP.
LrnG. REp., Aug. 20, 2002.
212. Edmund L. Andrews, Demand for Cipro May Be Break for Bayer, and a Headache, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, at B8.
213. Leslie Kaufman and Milt Freudenheim, Some Wholesalers Rationing Their Shipments of
Antibiotic, N.Y. Timms, Oct. 19, 2001, at B7. Cipro is also used by AIDS patents to treat
secondary brain infections. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., The Rush for Cipro, and the Global Ripples,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 17, 2001, at B7. It is also "used to treat pneumonia and blood infections in
critically ill patients ...." Bradsher, supra note 206.
214. HAROLD M. SILVERMAN, THE PILL BOOK 1179 (10th ed. 2002).
215. Andrews, supra note 211 ("Cipro has been Bayer's biggest-selling drug for several years.
... Sales of Cipro totaled about $1.6 billion last year, and about two-thirds of that was in the
United States"); Edmund L. Andrews, Bayer Is a Bit Taken Aback By the Frenzy to Get Its Drug,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at B8 ("For Bayer, the main value of Cipro is its effectiveness against
a wide variety of more conventional infections. Cipro generated more that $1.6 billion in sales
last year, but Bayer executives say treating anthrax was never really a part of their commercial
strategy").
216. Andrews, supra note 211.
217. Bayer AG v. Schein Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
218. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 194
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Cipro has been the best selling antibiotic in the United States for many
consecutive years and is described as 'the most prescribed antibiotic in the world.' ... since 1997,
Bayer has derived over $1 billion in U.S. net sales of all Cipro products").
219. Gina Kolata, Cipro Isn't the Only Drug That Can Be Prescribed, Anthrax Experts Say,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 17, 2001, at B7.
220. Edmund L. Andrews, Bayer Is a Bit Taken Aback By the Frenzy to Get Its Drug, supra
note 214 ("Bayer... applied last year for a label indicating its effectiveness against anthrax only
after they were asked to do so by the Pentagon and other government agencies"); Edmund L.
Andrews, Drug Maker Seems Uncertain In Response to Cipro Frenzy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2001,
at B8 ("Bayer executives admit they had given little thought to anthrax before Sept. 11. Cipro had
long been approved for fighting a wide variety of other infections, and it was the Food and Drug
Administration rather than Bayer that pressed to have Cipro approved as an anthrax treatment.
'We are experts in Cipro, but we are not experts in anthrax,' one Bayer executive said ... .
221. Kolata, supra note 218.
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approved for use in connection with other forms of anthrax,2 22 Bayer's
Cipro was the only drug approved for inhaled anthrax.
The timing of Bayer's patent protection on Cipro makes Cipro par-
ticularly relevant for analyzing a patent holder's market power. By
2001, Bayer's Cipro patent had already expired in several non-U.S.
countries. 223 As a result, in several non-U.S. countries, generic drug
manufacturers were already producing and selling ciprofloxacin in com-
petition against Bayer.224 However, at the time of the anthrax threat,
Bayer still enjoyed patent protection on Cipro in the United States.
Bayer's original U.S. patent on Cipro expired on December 9, 2003.225
2. THE ANTHRAX THREAT PUTS THE SPOTLIGHT ON CIPRO
Shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World
Trade Center in New York, several letters containing anthrax were
mailed to prominent U.S. Congressmen and U.S. media personalities. 226
In some cases the anthrax had been milled to the extent that very small
anthrax spores could travel significant distances by air if released. The
mere processing of an envelope containing this type of anthrax through
standard mail sorting and handling equipment could release the spores
into the air and inflect postal workers. 227  The potential threat of air-
222. Id. An anthrax infection caused by touching anthrax is referred to as "cutaneous anthrax."
223. Bayer AG v. Schein Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("The
Chilean, South African, Spanish, and Argentinean patents issued between May and September of
1982"). Assuming a 17-year patent term (beginning from the date the patent was issued), Bayer's
Cipro patents would have expired in those countries in 1999. See Bradsher, supra note 206
("[Cipro] is manufactured by dozens of factories around the world because Bayer's patent has
expired in practically every country except the United States .... ").
224. In addition to those producers, "Indian patent laws cover only the drug patent holders'
manufacturing process and not the drugs themselves, and Indian drug companies have produced
'no fewer than 78 knock-offs of Cipro.'" Bioterrorism Cipro: Senate Committee Targets Trade
Agreements, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, AMERICAN HEALTH LINE, Oct. 19, 2001.
225. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 194
(E.D.N.Y. 2003); Donald G. McNeil, Jr., The Rush for Cipro, and the Global Ripples, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at B7.
226. David Johnston & Alison Mitchell, Anthrax Mailed to Senate Is Found to Be Potent
Form; Case Tied to Illness at NBC, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at Al.
227. See Postal Service Is Ready to Begin Test of System to Detect Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 2003, at A17. The greatest concern arose with the examination of the anthrax sent to Senator
Tom Daschle's office.
The key to understanding the danger, experts said, is in the size of the particles. The
anthrax sent to Mr. Daschle, government officials said, was finely milled so that it
would float a considerable distance on the smallest of air currents.
Producing germs that could be spread as a mist had been the main technical
challenge facing germ warriors throughout the 20th century. Anthrax is what the
Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg calls a "professional pathogen," a hardy germ that
could wreak havoc if inhaled. The trick was turning it into an aerosol that lingers.
Stephen Engelberg & Judith Miller, Sign of Escalating Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at Al.
In regard to the number of actual reported anthrax infections, 22 people were infected and 5
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borne anthrax led many physicians to prescribe Cipro for their patients,
and led the U.S. government to embark on an ambitious program to
acquire enough drugs to treat 12 million people for inhaled anthrax for
60 days. 228  Tom Brokaw held up a bottle of Cipro on the NBC Nightly
News and declared, "In Cipro we trust. '2 29 The demand for Bayer's
Cipro soared overnight.23 ° One reporter stated that Cipro became the
"most sought-after pharmaceutical since Viagra. '' 23' As a result, the
press began searching for (and reporting) information regarding the
price charged for Cipro and similar drugs, the quantities supplied, and
the costs of production - precisely the type of information that can
indicate a patent holder's market power.
3. BAYER'S MARKET POWER BEFORE THE ANTHRAX THREAT
Newspaper accounts indicate that Bayer exercised substantial mar-
ket power in setting the price for Cipro before the anthrax threat. As
discussed above, market power is the ability of a producer to increase its
price above marginal cost and still sell substantial quantities. 232 It is
clear that Bayer itself greatly valued its market power, because over a
span of six years (1997 through December of 2003), Bayer paid poten-
tial competitors approximately $400 million not to produce drugs that
could compete with Cipro.233
people died. Postal Service Is Ready to Begin Test of System to Detect Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 2003, at A 17 ("[The system] was developed after the anthrax letter attacks in the fall of 2001
that killed five people and sickened 17 others").
228. Melody Petersen & Robert Pear, Production of Cipro Is Being Tripled, German Company
Says, N.Y. TIES, Oct. 17, 2001, at B7 (in order to reach this goal, the U.S. government would
need to increase its inventory of Cipro by six times the amount available at the time the threat
began).
229. Andrews, supra note 214. At the time of the anthrax threat, Cipro was the only brand-
name drug with a label explicitly stating that it was effective against pulmonary anthrax. Id.
230. Petersen & Pear, supra note 227 (a Bayer spokesperson stated that as a result of the threat,
it would increase production from 60 million tablets every three months to 200 million tablets
every three months); Andrews, supra note 211 ("Bayer A.G. would finally seem to be blessed
with the most hotly desired drug in the United States: Cipro, the drug of choice for treating
inhaled anthrax").
231. Andrews, supra note 219.
232. STIGLITrZ, supra note 9, at 403.
233. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 196
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("To date, Bayer has chosen to make payments to the Barr Escrow Account,
which through December 2003 will total approximately $398 million"); See also Barr Cleared of
Antitrust Charges in Cipro Agreement, GENERIC LINE, June 4, 2003. In 1991, Barr Laboratories
(a competing drug company) filed forms with the U.S. Food & Drug Administration indicating
that it had developed a drug similar to Cipro that did not violate Bayer's patent on Cipro. In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 188. In 1992, Bayer sued
Barr Laboratories for patent infringement. Id. In 1995, Barr Laboratories received tentative FDA
approval pending the resolution of the patent infringement litigation. Id. ("In a letter dated
January 4, 1995, while the patent litigation was pending, the FDA granted tentative approval of
Barr's ANDA for generic Cipro"). In settlement of the lawsuit, Barr Laboratories agreed not to
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In regard to Bayer's ability to charge a price in excess of its margi-
nal cost, in the United States Bayer typically sold Cipro to individuals
for $4.67 per tablet.2 34 At the same time, Bayer was planning to sell
Cipro to the U.S. government for $1.75 to $1.83 per tablet.235  Ulti-
mately, in connection with the anthrax threat, Bayer agreed to sell large
quantity of Cipro to the U.S. government for 95 cents per tablet, and
there were reports that Bayer was still making significant profits on the
sales at 95 cents.23 6 Generic 237 manufacturers indicated that they would
produce the drug, and Bayer agreed to pay Barr Laboratories approximately $25 million per year
(presumably until Bayer's patent on Cipro would expire in December of 2003). Bayer entered
into similar agreements with several other drug companies, including The Rugby Group, Inc.,
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., and Watson Pharmaceuticals. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litigation, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 195; Barr Cleared of Antitrust Charges in Cipro
Agreement, supra. By the end of 2001, those payments had totaled approximately $200 million.
17 No. 7 ANDREWS PHARMACEUTICAL LrriG. REP. 7, (Dec. 2001); Petersen & Pear, supra note 227
("Senator Shumer pointed to an agreement between Bayer and Barr Laboratories in 1997 in
which Bayer pays Barr about $30 million a year not to make a generic version of Cipro"). The
amount of the payments by December of 2003 (when Bayer's U.S. patent on Cipro expires) has
been estimated at $398 million. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 261 F.
Supp. 2d at 196. The Prescription Access Litigation group, an activist organization, sued Bayer
arguing that the "pact unlawfully blocked access to adequate supplies and cheaper versions of
Cipro." Id. In what may be just the first round of the litigation, a U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York rejected the claim by the Prescription Access Litigation group. In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 261 F. Supp.2d 188. At the time of the anthrax
threat, Congress expressed concern abut such agreements. Bioterrorism Cipro: Senate
Committee Targets Trade Agreements, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, AMERICAN HEALTH LIrE
(Oct. 19, 2001) ("the Senate Judiciary Committee yesterday approved a bill that would force
drugmakers to disclose agreements with generic manufacturers that 'keep less expensive'
treatments off the market"). In commenting on the Bayer arrangement, one particularly cynical
report states, "To most people, that sounds suspiciously like a payoff to avoid competition ......
Cipro Saga Exposes How Drugmakers Protect Profits, USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 2001 ("Bayer...
paid off [several potential competitors] years ago to keep [them] from introducing a cheaper
version of the drug").
234. Keith Bradsher & Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Says Bayer Will Cut Costs of its Anthrax
Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2001, at B7 ("Bayer charges $4.67 a tablet in wholesale transactions
with pharmacies .... ). But see Andrews, supra note 211 (stating that the price was about $4.40).
235. Bradsher & Andrews, supra note 233 ("Bayer offered... to sell the medicine for $1.75 to
$1.83 a tablet . . . [Tommy Thompson, secretary of Health and Human Services] rejected the
bid."). The reduced price to the U.S. government may have been, in part, in recognition of the
government's ability to issue a compulsory license to a U.S. generic manufacturer to produce
Cipro (in which case Bayer would have received only a reasonable royalty). 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)
(1994); Standard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748, 756-57 (Ct. Cl. 1999); see also
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., A Rush for Cipro, and the Global Ripples, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at
Al ("American law is very clear: when the United States government needs a patented product,
any official authorized to make purchases can ignore the patent and license someone else to make
it .... Any employee of the United States government can authorize a compulsory license for the
product without even holding a hearing .... ").
236. Denise Gellene, Anthrax Cases Reshape Drug Price Debate, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at
B3 (Bill Haddad, chief executive of generic drug maker U.S. Research & Development Corp. is
reported to have stated that at a price of 95 cents a pill, Bayer is making 75 cents profit).
237. A generic is a drug that is not produced under a patent. Samantha Shoell, Why Can't the
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have been willing to manufacture and sell Cipro for 40 cents per tab-
let.2 38 As a result, it appears that Bayer's Cipro was selling for 10 times
more than its marginal cost. With a patent, Bayer was able to charge
$4.67 per tablet; apparently without a patent, Bayer likely would have
been able to charge only 40 cents per tablet.239
4. APPROACHES DURING THE ANTHRAX THREAT TO REDUCE BAYER'S
MARKET POWER
The anthrax threat greatly increased the demand for Cipro almost
overnight. In the absence of special action, this increase in demand
would tend to exacerbate the economic inefficiencies associated with a
monopoly, oligopoly, or monopolistic competition situation - the price
would increase significantly, and the "gap" between the quantity
demanded (at a competitive market price) and the quantity actually sup-
plied would increase. In response, the parties involved demonstrated a
variety of approaches to prevent Bayer's market power from growing.
a. The Canadian Government's Attempt to Disregard Bayer's Patent
The Canadian government initially disregarded Bayer's patent on
Cipro and hired a Canadian generic drug manufacturer to produce
approximately one million tablets for the Canadian government.2 4 °
Bayer threatened to sue,241 and eventually the Canadian government
agreed to buy Cipro from Bayer at $1.30 per tablet, and the Canadian
generic manufacturer agreed to bear its costs incurred in attempting to
respond to the Canadian government's order.24 2 Eventually, Bayer
agreed to reduce the price it charged the Canadian government to 95
Poor Access Lifesaving Medicines? An Explanation of Solving the Patent Issue, 4 MINN. INTELL.
PROP. REv. 151, 168-69 (2002).
238. See Andrews, supra note 211 ($4.40 per tablet); Linda Loyd, The New Good Guy: It's
Your Drug Firm, PHILA. INQ., Oct. 28, 2001, at El ("[M]akers of generic drugs and consumer
groups say Bayer's price is still high. Generic manufacturers would sell the pills for as little as 40
cents each").
239. Id.
240. Amy Harmon & Robert Pear, Canada Overrides Patent for Cipro to Treat Anthrax, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at Al, B7 ("the government has ordered a million tablets of a generic
version of Cipro from Apotex Inc., which is based in Toronto .... ").
241. Bernard Simon, The Good, the Bad, and the Generic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, §3, at 2.
("Bayer ... threatened to sue the [Canadian] health department for patent infringement, if it went
ahead with the order. And on Thursday, Apotex and Bayer came up with a solution that helped
[the Canadian] health minister find his way out of a corner").
242. Anthrax Fears Rise in U.S. as New Cases Lack Known Link to Previous Targets or
Tainted Mail, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Oct. 31, 2001 ('Toronto, Canada-based
generic-drug manufacturer Apotex Inc. October 24 agreed to bear the $1.5 million (US $950,000)
cost of the Canadian government's canceled order for a generic version of Cipro"); Bernard
Simon, The Good, the Bad, and the Generic, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 2001, §3 at 2 ("Apotex has
agreed to absorb the $1 million cost of the tablets that it said had already been produced).
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cents per tablet.243
b. The Threat of Compulsory Licensing
Another government option was to grant other drug manufacturers
a "compulsory license" to make, use and sell Cipro. In compulsory
licensing, the patentee loses its "exclusive" on the patented product, and
the government authorizes other producers to take actions that otherwise
would constitute patent infringement.244 In a compulsory licensing
scheme, the patent holder is entitled to receive a reasonably royalty.245
In effect, compulsory licensing transforms the patent law "property
rules" into "liability rules" - the patent holder cannot enjoin its com-
petitor, 46 but the patent holder must be paid for the use. Compulsory
licensing basically assigns a royalty rate to the patent holder, and the
patent holder loses the flexibility to establish its own price and restrict
the supply. In the case of manufacture for the U.S. government, the
compulsory licensing rate is established consistent with the Fifth
Amendment "taking" clause. 24 7 Bayer opposed the adoption of a com-
pulsory licensing scheme. 48
c. Moves by Other Drug Companies
Other drug companies attempted to encourage the U.S. government
to approve their drugs for treatment of pulmonary anthrax. Several drug
companies offered to manufacture and donate drugs for free if the FDA
would approve their particular drug.2 49 In effect, these drug companies
243. Anthrax Fears Rise in U.S. as New Cases Lack Known Link to Previous Targets or
Tainted Mail, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Oct. 31, 2001.
244. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (1994).
245. Standard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748, 756-7 (Ct. Cl. 1999)
("Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States is used or
manufactured by or for the United States without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to
use or manufacture the same, the owner's remedy shall be by action against the United States in
the United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire
compensation for such use and manufacture").
246. Id. at 758 ("[llnjunctive relief [is] not permitted in eminent domain proceedings").
247. Id. at 756 ("Use by the government of a patented invention without an express license
from the patentee is properly viewed as a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution through the government's exercise of its power of eminent domain"); McNeil, supra
note 234 ("That [reasonable royalty] ... is based on eminent domain, the principle used when the
government seizes land for a highway or military base. A judge picks an amount based on lost
value, but not necessarily the highest price that could have been charged ... In the 1960's, [the
U.S. government] used the law to buy a drug, and the reason was simply that the patent holder
charged too much").
248. See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
249. Bradsher, supra note 206 ("[Johnson & Johnson, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Glaxo Smith
Kline] have offered to provide large quantities of their drugs if the Food and Drug Administration
will approve their use for the treatment of anthrax"). Keith Bradsher & Melody Petersen, Offers
of Free and Discounted Medicine May Help Industry Prevent New Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
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were willing to employ a "loss leader" approach - they would agree to
lose money on a certain number of tablets if they could then enter the
"pulmonary anthrax market" and share in the profits. °
5. BAYER'S RESPONSE TO SURGING DEMAND AND
GOVERNMENT PRESSURE
Commentators criticized Bayer for being slow to respond,251 argu-
ing that Bayer focused on defending its patent rights instead of respond-
ing to national security needs.252 Bayer fought the attempt to disregard
its patent (or allow compulsory licensing),253 but agreed to substantially
increase supply. 254 In effect, Bayer stated that it would increase supply
(so that adequate Cipro would be available in the case of a national
emergency), but resisted measures that would have restricted Bayer's
ability to set the price of Cipro.255
27, 2001, at B8. (Five companies have offered to provide antibiotics free or at cost to treat people
exposed to anthrax.)
250. See Melody Petersen, 4 Drug Makers Finally Outline Their Intentions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 2001, at C2 ("Johnson & Johnson said that it was offering to give 100 million tablets of
Levaquin, an antibiotic that is in the same class of drugs as Cipro, to the government for free").
Bradsher, supra note 206 (One reporter stated that "While the various offers of free drugs are
generous, they could also benefit the companies by raising sales as the public becomes aware of
their brands.").
251. Andrews, supra note 219 ("Few companies have seemed as unprepared as Bayer A.G.
was when the reaction to anthrax attacks transformed its antibiotic Cipro into the most sought-
after pharmaceutical since Viagra .... public relations executives say, the company has appeared
to be detached").
252. Andrews, supra note 211 ("Bayer... argued today that there was no need for the United
States government to override its patents and buy the drug from companies that produce it without
Bayer's approval"); Amy Harmon & Robert Pear, Canada Overrides Patent for Cipro to Treat
Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at Al ("Bayer A.G. condemned the move [Canada's decision
to override Bayer's Canadian patent on Cipro] and said it could meet the demand for Cipro on its
own"); New Bill Would Extend 100 Drug Patents, Consumer Group Says, 8 No. 12 ANDREWS
INTELL. PROP. LrnG. REP. 17, (Dec. 11, 2001). Frank Clemente, director of Public Citizen's
Congress Watch stated, "The drug industry has put up a cynical PR front about its patriotic effort
to fight bioterrorism .... ").
253. Harmon & Pear, supra note 251 (One Bayer executive stated, "We take patent
infringement very seriously, and we are prepared to consider all options in order to defend our
patents."); Edmund L. Andrews, Bayer, Defending Its Turf Says It Can Meet Demand, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at B7 ("Bayer A.G. is fighting efforts by other companies to supply generic
versions of the drug.., and is insisting that it can produce enough to meet soaring demands"); Id.
("Mr. Morich [a Bayer management board member] warned sharply against any efforts to
circumvent Bayer's patents by buying the drug from other manufacturers").
254. McNeil, supra note 234 ("Bayer ... said today that it was tripling production of the
antibiotic in the face of growing public fears about anthrax").
255. See supra note 251; Robert Pear, Government Talks with Drug Companies About Buying
Antibiotics That Treat Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2001, at B8. (Senator Charles E. Schumer,
Democrat of New York, stated "Such a licensing arrangement would get a quick supply of Cipro,
but it does not solve the price problem ... Bayer charges a lot more than generic manufacturers
would. Our goal is to ensure that the nation has an adequate supply of ciprofloxacin at reasonable
prices") (emphasis added).
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Although Bayer was sharply criticized, it should be noted that
Bayer: (i) did not increase the price of Cipro after Sept. 11, 2001;256 (ii)
eventually agreed with government scientists that someone with pulmo-
nary anthrax would only need ten tablets of Cipro (rather than 120 as
previously recommended by federal guidelines);257 (iii) offered to
donate two million tablets for free to the U.S. government;2 58 and (iv)
offered to donate 200,000 tablets for free to the Canadian
government. 9
6. U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
While Senator Schumer of New York argued that the U.S. govern-
ment should either disregard Bayer's patent or establish a compulsory
licensing scheme,2 6 ° President Bush's administration did not advocate
either of those approaches (at least until the final hour of negotia-
tions).26 1 Instead, the Bush administration appeared to take four
approaches.
256. Petersen & Pear, supra note 227.
257. Keith Bradsher, Bayer Insists Cipro Supply Is Sufficient; Fights Generic, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 21, 2001, at B7 ("Cipro supplies would also go a lot farther if people took the drug for only
the first five days after exposure to anthrax and switched to other antibiotics for the remaining 55
days of the typical 60-day treatment .... Federal officials recommended this approach a week
ago, but today was the first time Bayer officials had urged the public to follow this advice"); See
also Edmund L. Andrews, Bayer Defending Its Turf Says It Can Meet Demand, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
19, 2001, at B7 ("Bayer, which has been conferring with the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention in Atlanta, calculates that anybody suspected of being infected with anthrax will need a
five-day treatment of Cipro - 10 tablets - and can then follow up with treatment involving other
antibiotics"); Keith Bradsher, supra ("Until a week ago, federal guidelines called for Cipro for 60
days for someone who inhaled anthrax, but only 5 days of Cipro and then other antibiotics for
anthrax absorbed through the skin or ingested. Regulators declared a week ago that Cipro was
needed for only five days in inhalation cases as well, but many doctors continue to prescribe 120
tablets .... ).
258. Bradsher, supra note 206 ("The Bayer deal on Wednesday included the donation of two
million tablets beginning next week").
259. Andrews, supra note 219 ("Bayer offered today to donate 200,000 tablets for the
government to give to 'front line' workers in government offices and the media").
260. McNeil, supra note 234 ("Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York, proposed
today that the government buy generic versions for its emergency stockpile, noting that such a
step would reduce dependence on a single supplier and could significantly reduce the costs of
getting the amount of ciprofloxacin needed"). A compulsory licensing scheme would be
permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, but would require that the United States pay a reasonable
royalty. See Standard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748 (Ct. Cl. 1999); see also Lee,
supra note 48, at 186 ("If the federal government infringes a patent, the infringement may amount
to a 'taking' under the Fifth Amendment, and the patentee is entitled to compensation for the
infringing use").
261. Elisabeth Bumiller, Administration Won't Allow Generic Versions of Drug, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 2001, at B8 ("Tommy G. Thompson, the health and human services secretary, said ...
that violating the patent on Cipro .... was illegal"); Harmon & Pear, supra note 251 ("'We don't
feel there's a need to lift the patent at this time,' said Anthony T. Jewell, a spokesman at the [U.S.]
Department of Health and Human Services").
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First, scientists re-evaluated the need for Cipro. 262  At the begin-
ning of the anthrax threat, federal guidelines provided that the proper
prescription for pulmonary anthrax would be 120 Cipro tablets (two a
day for 60 days), and many physicians prescribed 120 tablets to their
patients.263 However, several scientists concluded shortly after the
anthrax threat began that an effective approach to treatment would be to
take Cipro for the first five days (a total of ten Cipro tablets), and then
use other drugs for approximately fifty-five days.264 Eventually the
Center for Disease Control approved that approach.265 Second, the Bush
administration emphasized that other antibiotics could be used to treat
anthrax.2 66  Third, in an apparent attempt to reduce consumer demand
for Cipro, government officials emphasized the potential side effects and
other negative consequences of unnecessarily taking Cipro.267
Fourth, the Bush administration negotiated with Bayer for a deep
discount on government purchases. During these negotiations, the Bush
administration allegedly threatened to disregard Bayer's patent.268
262. Kolata, supra note 218 ("The Food and Drug Administration has also approved two other
types of drugs against anthrax, tetracyclines, including doxycycline, and penicillins. Originally,
they were meant to prevent and treat cutaneous anthrax [anthrax that is absorbed through the skin
or ingested]. But both drugs are also generally expected to work against infections caused by
anthrax spores").
263. Bradsher, supra note 256 ("Until a week ago, federal guidelines called for Cipro for 60
days for someone who inhaled anthrax, but only 5 days of Cipro and then other antibiotics for
anthrax absorbed through the skin or ingested. Regulators declared a week ago that Cipro was
needed for only five days in inhalation cases as well, but many doctors continue to prescribe 120
tablets .... "); Bradsher & Andrews, supra note 17 ("many private doctors initially prescribed 60
days' worth of Cipro for people who demanded the medicine..."); Petersen & Pear, supra note
227 ("The standard full course of Cipro is two pills a day for 60 days .... ). Id. ("Instead of
prescribing two tablets of Cipro a day for five days, or 10 tablets in all, and then prescribing
another antibiotic, many doctors have been prescribing two [Cipro] tablets a day for 60 days, or
120 tablets").
264. Andrews, supra note 256; Bradsher, supra note 256.
265. Bradsher, supra note 256 ("Regulators declared a week ago that Cipro was needed for
only five days in inhalation cases .... ").
266. Bumiller, supra note 260 ("Five drug companies . . . have received initial approval to
make generic Cipro, pending the expiration of Bayer's patent [on December 9, 2003] .... ");
Cipro Saga Exposes How Drugmakers Protect Profits, supra note 232 ("Although Cipro has
become inextricably linked with treatment for anthrax, the form of anthrax that was used in the
latest terrorist attack is susceptible to a variety of antibiotics. Among them: Ciprofloxacin,
Penicillin, Doxycycline, Tetracycline, Clarithromycin, Vancomycin, and Clindamycin").
267. See Kolata, supra note 218 ("Surgeon General David Satcher said he worried that if
people started taking antibiotics 'just in case' that they could do themselves more harm than good,
encouraging the growth of the bacterial strains that are resistant to the drugs"); id. (in regard to
side effects, "Cipro and drugs in its class can cause nausea and diarrhea, and rarely allergic
reactions, serious skin rashes, tremors, hallucinations, abnormal heartbeats and liver damage").
268. Bradsher & Andrews, supra note 17 ("The Bush administration said tonight that it had
won a major price concession from Bayer A.G. for its anthrax medicine, Cipro, after the
administration threatened to buy generic alternatives instead"). See also Edmund Andrews, supra
note 214 ("Anxiety over Cipro was so high this week that the Bush administration threatened to
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Before the anthrax threat, Bayer sold Cipro for $4.67 per tablet to U.S.
consumers, 269 and Bayer sold Cipro for $1.83 per tablet to the U.S. gov-
ernment. 270 As a result of the negotiations with the Bush administration,
Bayer eventually agreed to sell Cipro to the U.S. government for 95
cents per tablet. 27 1 Even with this drop in price, Bayer likely will still be
making a substantial profit on its sales to the U.S. government.
2 72
Industry analysts indicate that the price cut reduces Bayer's profit mar-
gin on Cipro sales to the U.S. government from 95% to 65%.273 Ana-
lysts also state that if Bayer's patent on Cipro had instead been
disregarded by the United States, Bayer would have lost an additional
$800 million.274
7. CHART ON BAYER'S MARKET POWER FOR CIPRO
Bayer's power to set the price of Cipro above marginal cost may be
indicated by the following chart:
seek Congressional authority to revoke the patent on the drug, held by the German drug maker
Bayer, unless the company agreed to cut its price to the government in half. Bayer complied");
But see Keith Bradsher & Melody Petersen, A Nation Challenged: The Drug Makers; Offers of
Free and Discounted Medicine May Help Industry Prevent New Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
2001, at B8 ("After Bayer agreed to nearly halve the price, Mr. Thompson denied that his
comments had been a threat").
269. Bradsher & Andrews, supra note 17 ("Bayer charges $4.67 a tablet in wholesale
transactions with pharmacies ... .
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Gellene, supra note 235 (Bill Haddad, chief executive of generic drug maker U.S.
Research & Development Corp. is reported to have stated that at a price of 95 cents a pill, Bayer is
making 75 cents profit).
273. Leslie Wayne & Melody Petersen, A Muscular Lobby Rolls Up Its Sleeves, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2001, at C1.
274. Id. ("Bayer will still be doing O.K. on [Cipro] ... If Bayer lost the patent protection and
the drug could be sold in the U.S. at generic prices, it would have been devastating for the
company"); Bradsher, supra note 206 ("Executives in the generic drug industry say Bayer is still
at least breaking even and may even be making a large profit"). Id. (Bayer's chief executive of
American operations "refused to discuss whether Bayer was making a profit on the deal"); See
also id. ("Agnes Vais, president of Agvar Chemicals, a pharmaceutical trading company in Little
Falls, N.J., said ciprofloxacin costs 12.5 cents to 20 cents a tablet in global markets. It is
manufactured by dozens of factories around the world because Bayer's patent has expired in
practically every country except the United States .... ").
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U.S. - Bayer's Sale Price to U.S. Pharmacies 2 7 5  $4.67276
U.S. - Bayer's Sale Price to the U.S. Government Before the Anthrax $1.83
Threat
Mexico - Generic Manufacturer's Sale Price Offered in Mexico2 7 7  $1.50
Canada - Bayer's Initial Sale Price to the Canadian Government After the $1.30
Anthrax Threat
2 78
U.S. - Bayer's Sale Price to the U.S. Government for the First 100 Million $0.95
Tablets After Negotiations279
U.S. - Sale Price Offered by Bayer to the U.S. Government After the Sale $0.75 to
of the First 100 Million Tablets280 $0.85281
Canada - Canadian Generic Manufacturer's Estimated Sale Price $0.62282
U.S. - Sales Price of Similar Drug (Doxycycline) for which Patent Has $0.44
Expired
U.S. - Price that Bayer Charges the U.S. Health & Human Services Dept. $0.43
for Hospitals in Poor Regions283
U.S. - Estimated Price that U.S. Generic Manufacturers Would Charge to $0.40284
Sell a Generic Version of Cipro 285
U.S. - Estimated Cost to Bayer of Producing Cipro (estimate by a U.S. $0.20,286
generic manufacturer) $0.25
India - Sales Price Charged by an Indian Generic Producer 2 8 7  $0.15
India - Sales Price Charged by a Second Indian Generic Producer2 8 8 $0.10
100%
39%
275. Bradsher & Andrews, supra note 17 ("Bayer charges $4.67 a tablet in wholesale
transactions with pharmacies .... "); Jesse Pesta & Daniel Pearl, Tapping India for Antibiotics;
Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., ASIAN WALL STREET J. WEEKLY, Oct. 29, 2001.
276. Bradsher & Andrews, supra note 17.
277. Greg Winter, Si, We Have Cipro; the Panicky and the Profiteers Head to Mexico, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2001, at B 1 ("The generic drug comes in packages of 36 tablets, which costs $55
... She estimated that the same amount of the drug would cost about $170 to $180 in the United
States").
278. Bradsher & Andrews, supra note 17.
279. Id.
280. Bradsher, supra note 206.
281. Harmon & Pear, supra note 251 ("Jack Kay, president of Apotex [the Canadian generic
manufacturer] said that his company made the drugs through a process that did not infringe on
Bayer's patent and that Apotex could deliver the drugs faster and for about 63 cents less than the
approximately $1.25 that Bayer charges the Canadian government for a 500-miligram tablet").
282. Pear, supra note 254 ("Mr. Reicher [the chairman of Halsey Pharmaceuticals of Rockford,
Illinois] said doxycycline costs about a tenth of what Cipro does").
283. Anthrax Fears Rise in U.S. as New Cases Lack Known Link to Previous Targets or
Tainted Mail, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Oct. 31, 2001.
284. Loyd, supra note 238. ("[M]akers of generic drugs and consumer groups say Bayer's
price is still high. Generic manufacturers would sell the pills for as little as 40 cents each").
285. Gellene, supra note 235.
286. Nancy Gibbs, TIME, Oct. 29, 2001, at 40 ("Although [Cipro] reportedly costs less than 25
cents to make, Bayer charges the [U.S.] government $1.83, and the frightened public is shelling
out about $5 a pill. Generic companies have told the [U.S.] government they would charge it no
more than 50 cents").
287. Bradsher, supra note 256 ("Companies in countries that have less stringent patent laws
sell the antibiotic for one-thirtieth of the American price and have offered to ship large quantities
to the United States"); Buhmiller, supra note 260 ("Cipro is also expensive, costing nearly $350 a
month in the United States. A generic drug from reputable suppliers cost only $10 a month in
India"); McNeil, supra note 234 ("Alternatively, American consumers might become outraged to
learn that while Cipro has cost nearly $350 a month in the United States, a generic drug from
reputable suppliers costs only $10 a month in India"). Drugs similar to Cipro are made by more
than 80 companies in India and elsewhere. Id.
288. Pesta & Pearl, supra note 274.
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Reporters have stated that, "One [sixty]-day supply of Cipro costs just
under $700 in the United States, while a [sixty]-day supply of generic
ciprofloxacin - not allowed until [Dec. 9] 2003 in the United States -
costs about $20 in other countries ... 289
If one defines the relevant market as "antibiotics," Bayer did not
have a pure monopoly (because there are many other manufacturers sell-
ing antibiotics). Nevertheless, Bayer had substantial market power -
Bayer charged $4.67 a tablet when its marginal cost likely was below
$0.40. Thus, Bayer appears to have charged a price more than ten times
higher than its marginal cost, and Bayer sold substantial quantities of
Cipro. In connection with a proposed six-month extension on the term
of various patented drugs, including Cipro,29 ° it was reported that
Bayer's sales of Cipro every day is almost $2 million.2z '
B. Market Power of Brand-Name Drug Manufacturers of
Anti-AIDS Drugs
Several different large brand-name drug companies have patented
anti-AIDS drugs that are referred to as the "three-drug cocktail therapy."
While each patentee (drug company) has an "exclusive" on its particular
patented product or process, if the relevant market is the market for the
three-drug cocktail to fight AIDS, the market likely would be considered
more of an oligopoly than a pure monopoly (because there are multiple
producers selling differentiated products). Actions in connection with
an Executive Order by President Clinton to help make anti-AIDS drugs
available in sub-Saharan Africa revealed that as in the case of Cipro, the
anti-AIDS drugs are commonly sold at a price in excess of the marginal
cost of production.
1. MARKET FOR ANTI-AIDS DRUGS IN THE U.S.
The market for anti-AIDS drugs differs significantly depending on
the country involved, and can differ for various consumer markets inside
one country. In the United States, there are three very distinct ways in
which anti-AIDS drugs are supplied, and the pharmaceutical industry
has found a way to effectively "price discriminate" among the three U.S.
consumer markets. 292 First, in the market in which the patient (and/or
289. Julie Rovner & April Fulton, Senate Panel Approves Bill on Generic Drug Availability,
NAT'L J. CONG. DAILY, Oct. 28, 2001 (quoted in Lee, supra note 49, at 175 n.2).
290. The proposal would have granted a six-month extension on the patent term if the drug
company tested the product for safety for children. New Bill Would Extend 100 Drug Patents
Consumer Group Says, ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. REP., Dec. 11, 2001.
291. Id. ("Public Citizen's study reports that Bayer would garner an extra $358 million in sales
of Cipro due to the drug's patent extension"). See also Wayne & Petersen, supra note 272.
292. For a discussion of price discrimination, see supra note 139.
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his or her insurance company) pays a "market" price for the anti-AIDS
drugs, estimates for one year's supply of the three-drug cocktail therapy
are in the range of $15,000 to $17,000.293 Second, Medicaid and other
government programs cover the cost of anti-AIDS drugs for some
patients.2 94 In this market, the government may establish or negotiate
the price (which may be based on a percentage of the wholesale price, or
may be set at the lowest price offered to any other consumer).29 5 Third,
some patients qualify to receive anti-AIDS drugs for free.296
2. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S EXECUTIVE ORDER THAT THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT WILL NOT TAKE INTERNATIONAL TRADE ACTIONS
AGAINST SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES FOR CERTAIN ACTIVITIES
REGARDING ANTI-AIDS DRUGS THAT WOULD INFRINGE THE PATENT
RIGHTS OF U.S. DRUG COMPANIES
On May 10, 2000, President Clinton issued Executive Order
293. McNeil, supra note 12 ("Drug treatments used in the United States, most commonly the
triple-therapy 'cocktails' that suppress the replication of HIV can cost up to $15,000 a year"); id.
("There are still some people in the United States who cannot get the drugs they need because the
price is prohibitive. It costs $15,000 to $17,000 a year just for HIV drugs"); see also, Politicians
and Drug Firms Playing with Lives in Cynical Squabble Over AIDS, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Mar. 10, 2001, at 20 (A report by Doctors Without Borders "showed that anti-retroviral drugs,
which attack HIV itself, . . . cost up to . . . $1,000 a month in the United States .....
Apparently, the $12,000 price is for a two-drug cocktail. Id.
294. McNeil, supra note 12 ("Medicaid generally covers the cost of such drugs").
295. In regard to AIDS drugs,
A United States unit of the German pharmaceutical giant Bayer A.G. has
tentatively agreed to pay federal and state governments $14 million to resolve
accusations that it tied about the wholesale prices of certain drugs, including those
to treat AIDS.
The settlement requires the company to give state regulators more accurate
price information and to cooperate in the ongoing investigation, Bayer A.G. said
yesterday. The states will be able to use the information to determine whether
changes in reimbursement are appropriate.
The investigation began in the mid-1990s after a lawsuit was filed by the Ven-
A-Care pharmacy in Key West, Fla. which administers intravenous drugs to patients
in their homes. The suit asserted that drug makers were reporting high wholesale
prices to make their drugs more attractive to doctors receiving Medicaid
reimbursements.
Bayer to Pay $14 Million in Pricing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2000, at C6; see also Melody
Petersen, AstraZeneca Pleads Guilty In Cancer Medicine Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2003, at
BI ("Bayer [was assessed a] . . . $257 million penalty . . . [as a result of] helping Kaiser
Permanente, a health care provider, re-label bottles of Cipro, an antibiotic, to hide the low prices it
was charging Kaiser. By law, drug companies must sell to Medicaid at the lowest price").
296. McNeil, supra note 12 ("Low-income people who do not qualify for Medicaid may be
able to obtain drug therapy through AIDS drug assistance programs run by the states with
substantial federal money. In addition, drug manufacturers have programs to provide drugs free,
as a last resort, to patients who have no health insurance").
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13155,297 which briefly described the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa,
discussed various other measures that should be taken to respond to the
crisis, 298 and then stated:
This order prohibits the United States Government from taking action
pursuant to section 301(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to
any law or policy in beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries that
promotes access to HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medical technolo-
gies and that provides adequate and effective intellectual property
protection consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.299
The TRIPS Agreement is a World Trade Organization treaty requir-
ing that its member countries grant certain intellectual property rights (in
August 2003, there were 146 WTO member countries). 300 The TRIPS
Agreement permits a member nation to issue a compulsory license in the
case of a national emergency without the patent holder's authoriza-
tion.30 1 Executive Order 13155 authorized African nations to declare
the AIDS pandemic a national emergency, and hire local manufacturers
to produce anti-AIDS drugs without fear of U.S. trade sanctions. In
August of 2003, the World Trade Organization adopted a resolution that
would allow developing countries to import life-saving drugs in emer-
gency situations, subject to certain restrictions.30 2 Presumably the reso-
lution will allow sub-Saharan African countries to import the anti-AIDS
drugs from countries in which generic manufacturers produce and sell
the drugs for a fraction of the price charged by brand-name drug compa-
297. 65 Fed. Reg. 30521 (May 10, 2000). The Executive Order marked a shift in U.S. policy.
"[I]n 1997, when South Africa sought to legislate its way around drug patents, it found its way
blocked not only by the pharmaceutical firms' lawyers but also by threats from the U.S. and
Europe to impose sanctions if their firms' intellectual property rights were breached." Politicians
and Drug Firms Playing with Lives in Cynical Squabble Over AIDS, supra note 292.
298. 65 Fed. Reg. 30521 (May 10, 2000). The additional measures include providing
incentives to develop new drugs, improving public education, encouraging practices that will
prevent further transmission and infection, and improving health care infrastructure to promote
improved access to quality health care. Id.
299. Id. See also Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Issues Order to Ease Availability of AIDS Drugs in
Africa, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2000, at A7 ("The order issued by President Clinton essentially
extended to most of Africa a special arrangement provided last year to South Africa").
300. TRIPS Agreement, Art. 27.1, reprinted in GOLDSTEIN, supra note 32, at 14 (generally
requiring member nations to make "patents ... available for any inventions .... "); Becker, supra
note 32 (the WTO has 146 members).
301. TRIPS Agreement Art. 31(b), reprinted in GOLDSTEIN, supra note 32, at 15.
302. Elizabeth Becker, Poor Nations Can Purchase Cheap Drugs Under Accord, N.Y. TIMES,
August 31, 2003, at Al ("Under the accord, poor countries will be able to import generic versions
of expensive patented medicines, buying them from countries like India and Brazil without
running afoul of trade laws protecting patent rights"). Scott Miller, WTO Drug Pact Lifts Trade
Talks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2003 ("the WTO statement in the drug agreement [provides] that
countries could override patents only 'in good faith to protect public health . . . not [as] an
instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives' ").
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nies in developed nations. 30 3
Despite speculation to the contrary, President Bush has not reversed
Executive Order 13155.304
3. RESPONSE BY BRAND-NAME DRUG COMPANIES TO EXECUTIVE
ORDER - 80%+ DROP IN PRICE THE NEXT DAY
Although U.S. drug company officials initially criticized the Execu-
tive Order,30 5 the day after Executive Order 13155 was issued, five of
the world's largest pharmaceutical companies 30 6 announced that they
would negotiate with the World Health Organization and other interna-
tional agencies to sell their anti-AIDS drugs to sub-Saharan countries at
steep discounts.30 7 Initially, only Glaxo Wellcome announced the
amount of the discount - 80%3°8 - but subsequent reports confirmed
that all five companies were offering similar discounts.309 Before the
303. Id. However, a spokesperson for Doctors Without Borders stated, "[the accord] offers
little comfort for poor patients. Global patent rules will continue to drive up the price of
medicines." Miller, supra note 301.
304. Naftali Bendavid, Bush Reluctant to Undo Clinton Edicts, CHI. TRIa., Feb. 22, 2001, at
IN (discussing "a low-profile announcement that the administration would not overturn a policy
allowing easier access to AIDS drugs overseas ...."); Merck: Lowers AIDS Drug Prices for
Africa, supra note 15. After Merck lowered prices on certain of its AIDS drugs sold to Africa,
one commentator stated:
Merck's decision for a second round of price cuts stemmed from President Bush's
decision not to overturn former President Clinton's executive order supporting the
use of generic drugs in emergency situations .... Prior to that, the industry felt
they had the U.S. government behind them on the issue of intellectual-property
rights. Now the industry has found itself without strong allies . . . .Merck's
decision was that it was better to placate the enemy rather than wait to be
annihilated."
Id. (quoting health-care analyst Ira Loss); see also Collins, supra note 15.
305. In response to Executive Order 13155, industry comments included, "[The President's
action] set an undesirable and inappropriate precedent, by adopting a discriminatory approach to
intellectual property laws, and focusing exclusively on pharmaceuticals." Halbert, supra note 19,
at 275 (statement from Alan F. Homer, President of the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA")); see also Susan Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines
Campaign, 20 Wis. INT'L. L.J. 481, 509 (2002) (also quoting Mr. Holmer).
Industry officials said that they believed it was wrong to carve out an exception for one disease
and one region. "If Africa today, why not Asia tomorrow or even the United States," one official
said. Lewis, supra note 299.
306. The drug companies involved were Glaxo Wellcome (a British company), Boehringer
Ingelheim (a German company), Bristol-Myers Squibb (a U.S. company), Merck & Company (a
U.S. company), and Hoffmann-La Roche (a Swiss company). McNeil, supra note 12.
307. Id.
308. Id. ("Ben Plumley, an official of Glaxo Wellcome, said the company would sell its
Combivir, a blend of AZT and 3TC that sells at a global average price of $16, for $2 in poor
countries").
309. Joseph Kahn, U.S. Offers Africa $1 Billion a Year for Fighting AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, July
19, 2000, at Al ("Even at 90 percent discounts a typical cocktail of AIDS suppressing drugs might
cost $2000 a year for [a] single patient in Africa, more than four times the average per capita
income in many of the worst-afflicted countries"); Park, supra note 206, at 138-39 ("The
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discount, U.S. brand-name drugs companies charged approximately
$15,000 to $17,000 per year for a one-year supply of the three-drug
cocktail. 310 With the discount, the price would drop to $2000311 (or less)
in sub-Saharan Africa. While each of the five brand-name drug compa-
nies would negotiate separately with the World Health Organization and
other international agencies 312 (apparently in order to reduce concerns
about antitrust or similar problems), it should be noted that all five of the
large brand-name drug producers announced a similar reduction in price
at the same time. This is consistent with an oligopoly situation.31 3 As
discussed above, the producers in an oligopoly are faced with a down-
ward sloping demand curve, and can charge prices in excess of marginal
cost, and generally each producer is reluctant to charge a price that is
significantly different from the other producers in the market.314
international organization Doctors Without Borders found that in most cases, even if brand-name
prices were reduced eighty-five percent, the prices would still not drop as low as generic copies").
Id. at 149 ("Triple drug therapy would still cost $2,000 per year, and considering the per capita
income in Africa is less than [$500] dollars per month, that is a price beyond the reach of most
South Africans"); Politicians and Drug Firms Playing with Lives in Cynical Squabble Over AIDS,
supra note 292; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Africa's AIDS War, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 10, 2001, at Al
("Nancy Pekarek, a spokeswoman for GlaxoSmithKline, said her company had offered discounts
as high as 90 percent to roughly a dozen African nations, as well as employers there. Glaxo
makes a two-drug combination, Combivir, that costs $17 a day in the United States; in Africa the
price is $2").
310. McNeil, supra note 12. See infra note 315.
311. Kahn, supra note 308.
312. McNeil, supra note 12 ("The ... negotiations [are] to be held with the World Health
Organization and other international aid groups . . . Officials said the companies negotiated
separately to avoid falling afoul of American price-fixing laws. The five companies will work
with five international agencies, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, UNAIDS, the
United Nations Children's Fund and the United Nations Population Fund").
313. The tendency of producers in an oligopoly to move in coordination when setting price is




4. CHART ON MARKET POWER OF BRAND-NAME DRUG COMPANIES IN
THE MARKET FOR THE THREE-DRUG COCKTAIL
3 15
SITUATION PRICE Comparison to Price
(for a Charged by U.S.
one- Brand-Name Drug
year Companies to U.S.
supply) Consumers & Insurers
Price Charged by U.S. Drug Companies to Individuals $15,000 100%
(and/or their insurers)
3 16
Estimated Price at Which Brand Name Drug $2,000 13%
Companies Would Sell to Sub-Saharan African
Countries Based on the Arrangement Announced the
Day After Executive Order 13155 (May 11, 2000)317
Reported Price Charged by U.S. Brand-Name Drug $1,168 10%
Companies to 318 South African Consumers in January
of 2002
Price Offered by Glaxo to African Governments 3 19 in $730 5%
March, 2001
315. There may be several other medicines that AIDS sufferers require. "In addition to the
combination of antiretrovirals necessary to fight the infection and reduce the transfer of the
disease, there are AIDS medications that are also necessary - drugs required in order to reduce
the impact of opportunistic infections and deal with pain." Halbert, supra note 15, at 260. Also,
one can argue about which drugs should be in the three-drug cocktail, and that different drugs may
be more appropriate than others. See Mark Warner, Panel I: AIDS Drugs and the Developing
World: The Role of Patents in the Access of Medicines, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
Er. L.J. 683, 732 (2002).
316. McNeil, supra note 12 ("Drug treatments used in the United States, most commonly the
triple-therapy 'cocktails' that suppress the replication of H.I.V. can cost up to $15,000 a year"); id.
("There are still some people in the United States who cannot get the drugs they need because the
price is prohibitive. It costs $15,000 to $17,000 a year just for H.I.V. drugs"). See also
Politicians and Drug Firms Playing with Lives in Cynical Squabble Over AIDS, supra note 292
(A report by Doctors Without Borders "showed that anti-retroviral drugs, which attack HIV itself,
... cost up to U.S. $1,000 a month in the United States .... "). The $1,000 a month figure
apparently is the cost of a two-drug cocktail, rather than a three-drug cocktail. Id. Because of the
high cost of these drugs in the United States, compared with significantly lower costs in Mexico
and Canada, Congress has considered allowing imports from Canada and/or Mexico. See Halbert,
supra note 15, at 269 (discussing the Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000); Shoell,
supra note 236, at 164. In June 2003, the Senate passed a similar Bill, "[b]ut the proposal is
contingent on a finding that the imports would pose no risk to public health, and the Bush
administration has made it clear that it will not issue such a finding." Robert Pear, Senate Votes
Again to Allow Importing of Prescription Drugs From Canada, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2003, at
A13.
317. Kahn, supra note 308 ("Even at 90 percent discounts, a typical cocktail of AIDS-
suppressing drugs might cost $2,000 a year for a single patient in Africa, more than four times the
average per capita income in many of the worst-afflicted countries").
318. South Africa: AIDS Drug Trial, N.Y. TLias, Jan. 30, 2002, at A6 ("Pharmaceutical
companies have drastically reduced the prices of AIDS drugs, but a daily supply of each still costs
$3.20 in South Africa").
319. Collins, supra note 15 (a "spokeswoman for GlaxoSmithKline, the world's largest
manufacturer of AIDS medications, said her company's current offer of $2 a day for the drug AZT
is comparable to the price offered by the Indian generic drugmakers"); Merck: Lowers AIDS Drug
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Price Offered by Cipla, an Indian Generic $600 4%
Manufacturer, to African Governments in March,
2001320
Price Charged by Brazilian Generic Manufacturers 32 1  $565 4%
to Doctors Without Borders for Distribution to South
African Consumers in January of 2002
Price Charged by Cipla, an Indian Generic $350 2%
Manufacturer, to Doctors Without Borders
322
Prices for Africa, supra note 15 ("In May, Glaxo offered to cut the price of Combivir by 90% to
$2 per day, but offered that price only to governments").
320. Collins, supra note 15 ("One of the Indian firms, Cipla, Ltd. has offered a combination of
three anti-AIDS medicines which don't include a protease inhibitor like Crixiuan - for $600 a
year for governments and $350 a year for Doctors Without Borders"); Merck: Lowers AIDS Drug
Prices for Africa, supra note 15 ("Cipla added more fuel to the fire by asking the South African
government to permit it to sell eight AIDS drugs currently available only at high prices from the
patent-holding multinational manufacturers ... Cipla requested compulsory licensing to offer the
drugs and their combinations at $600 per patient per year, a move that would give the generic drug
maker 'the upper hand' in the African market").
The Cipla offer of $600 appears to involve a combination of drugs resembling the
one priced at about $1,008 in Senegal. The higher price quoted to Senegal includes
a powerful protease-inhibitor drug, such as Crixivan, sold by Merck. Cipla's offer
involves three anti-AIDS medicines, but doesn't include a protease inhibitor.
Moreover, the Cipla offer carries numerous qualifications. Cipla is offering to sell
just three of the roughly 10 drugs commonly combined to form the so-called AIDS
cocktail therapy. Those drugs are Zerit, from Bristol-Myers, Glaxo's 3TC, and the
German company Boehringer-Ingelheim Gmbh's Viramune. Spokespersons at
several of the large drug makers said their offer of price discounts involves more
drugs and therefore provides doctors the ability to prescribe different combinations
for different patients.
Rachel Zimmerman & Jesse Pesta, Cipla AIDS-Drug Offer Changes Outlook, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8,
2001, at B13.
321. South Africa: AIDS Drug Trial, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 30, 2002, at A6 ("Frustrated at South
Africa's refusal to legalize cheap copies of patented AIDS drugs, the relief group Doctors Without
Borders announced that it would import generic versions of the three AIDS medicines, which it
began buying from Brazilian companies in December. It plans to distribute them to a small
number of AIDS patients in a pilot project in [a] Cape Town suburb .... Generic versions like
those provided in the trial cost $1.55").
322. Collins, supra note 15. In regard to the offer to sell for $350 a year, one commentator has
stated,
[Cipla] agreed to sell it to [Doctors Without Borders] for $350 per year. A dollar a
day had good symbolic value. [Doctors Without Borders] was immediately
swamped by requests for the drugs. The February 7, 2001 announcement of these
drug prices, featured on the front page of The New York Times, "shocked the
world, and completely transformed the global debate on treatment for HIV in
Africa. At this price it was clear that many would die needlessly if steps were not
taken to remove barriers to access to medicines."
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., New List of Safe AIDS Drugs, Despite Industry Lobby, N.Y. TImES, Mar.
21, 2002, at A3 ("Cipla, Ltd., the generic drug maker based in Bombay, India,... was the first to
try breaking Western patent monopolies in February 2001 by offering AIDS therapy for $350 a
year to charities .... "). Susan Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis. INT'L
L.J. 481, 510 (2002). See also Collins, supra note 15. One commentator has stated, "In some
cases the standard United States price for a drug may be discounted by as much as [98%] in other
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Price Charged by Hetero Drugs, an Indian3 2 3 Generic $347 2%
Manufacturer, Generally in Africa
Price Charged by Ranbaxy Laboratories, an Indian $295 2%
Generic Manufacturer, to Customers with 5,000 or
More AIDS Patients
3 24
Price Charged by Cipla (Indian Generic 3 2 5  $245 2%
Manufacturer) for an Experimental Version in Africa
in 2002
Estimate of the Cost of Manufacturing a Three- Drug $233 2%
Cocktail by a Thai Generic Drug Company in 2000326
While some of these prices may not apply to precisely the same
three-drug cocktail, 327 it seems that brand-name drug manufacturers
have substantial market power in the U.S. market for the three-drug
cocktail. The brand-name drug manufacturers are able to sell to U.S.
consumers at a price in the range of $15,000 to $17,000 a year,328 while
it appears that the marginal cost of production in the U.S. may be below
$500. In effect, brand-name drug manufacturers are able to sell in the
United States at a price that is perhaps 30 times greater than marginal
cost. Thus, even though these brand-name drug companies do not have
countries." Park, supra note 206, at 129. Doctors Without Borders is an international nonprofit
organization that provides medical services in the developing world. Zimmerman & Pesta, supra
note 319. Doctors Without Borders won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999 for its work in war-tom
and impoverished areas. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Indian Company Offers to Supply AIDS
Drugs at Low Cost in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at Al.
323. Merck: Lowers AIDS Drug Prices for Africa, supra note 15 ("a second Indian generic
drug manufacturer, Hetero Drugs Ltd., has announced that it will sell the same drugs for only
$347 per patient per year").
324. McNeil, supra note 321 ("Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd .... makes a three-antiretroviral
combination that it offers for as little as $295 a year to customers with 5,000 or more AIDS
patients"). However, Ranbaxy's drugs did not make the World Health Organization's first list of
manufacturers of safe AIDS drugs. Id.
325. James Love, Panel 1: AIDS Drugs and the Developing World: The Role of Patents in the
Access of Medicines, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 683, 701 (2002) ("This is the
cheapest possible three-drug cocktail to manufacture in Africa. You can buy it in one pill form
taken twice a day. There is a copy of it from Cipla, an Indian manufacturer, for $0.67 a day. I can
buy this for $0.67 a day in bulk, and I believe if you had competition the price would fall more").
A spokesperson for the brand-name pharmaceutical industry has argued that the $245 price
offered by Cipla is not relevant because the drug has not been adequately tested. Susan Finston,
Panel I: AIDS Drugs and the Developing World: The Role of Patents in the Access of Medicines,
12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 683, 728 (2002) ("the Cipla product.., as far as I
am aware, has not been through bioequivalence. It is, in a sense, a clinical study on the people of
Africa. That is unacceptable to [Pharmacy Research and Manufacturers of America] members").
326. Sell, supra note 321, at 510 (the head of the Thai government's Research and
Development Institute "estimated that an HIV/AIDS three drug cocktail could be manufactured
for 64 cents a day, or 21 cents per product").
327. See Warner, supra note 314, at 732 (At a conference, the moderator stated "I do not know
how many people here are really technicians where we can get into a debate about what is in the
cocktail or what is not in the cocktail. Frankly, I do not know. It is an important issue ....
328. See supra note 315.
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a monopoly,329 the relevant market likely is an oligopoly in which the
producers face a downward-sloping demand curve, and can charge a
price in excess of marginal cost.
C. Additional Signs of a Brand-Name Drug Manufacturer's
Market Power
While brand-name drug manufacturers are able to charge a price
above marginal cost for Cipro and the three-drug cocktail, 330 one might
ask whether this is the case in the market for other brand-name drugs.
By 2011, brand-name drugs with more than $40 billion in annual
sales are expected to go off patent; they can then be sold by generic
drug makers at prices of, say, 70 percent less... [T]o prevent huge
drops in revenue, drug makers need to hold on to their patent protec-
tion for as long as possible - or even extend them further .... Drug
makers depend on patents to help them recoup their research and test-
ing costs, but once those costs are recovered, the high prices they
charge for patented drugs give them operating margins that are
among the highest in corporate America.3 3 1
A legislative proposal that would have extended the patent term for
a drug by six-months if the patent holder tested the safety of the drug for
children332 placed the spotlight on the market power available to brand-
name drug manufacturers.
Consumer groups say the bill would require the drug companies to do
little new research but would cost consumers $14 billion over what
generic equivalents would cost .... Fighting the hardest is Bristol-
Myers, which is also seeking a three-year extension on the use of
Glucophage, a diabetes medicine, based on studies on the use of the
drug by children. Analysts estimate that the company could reap an
329. As there are several producers selling differentiated products, the market likely can be
described as an oligopoly. See supra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 274 - 87 and accompanying text (regarding Cipro); see supra notes 315-
25 and accompanying text (regarding the three-drug cocktail).
331. Wayne & Petersen, supra note 272 (emphasis added). See also Halbert, supra note 15, at
267 ("there is significant evidence that when generic drugs are available, or other mechanisms are
in place to provide competition, drug prices fall") (citing Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange
TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry's Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules,
and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L. ECON. L. 1069, 1116-17 (1996) (arguing that the evidence overwhelmingly supports the
position that competition equals cheaper drugs)); Miao, supra note 15, at Cl1 (Surveys have
indicated that brand-name drug manufacturers sell at lower prices in markets where generic drugs
are available. "These results show that Glaxo Wellcome reduced the price of AZT in markets
where competition exists"). Another source states that "drug prices typically drop 25% the first
year a brand-name prescription gains generic competition." Cipro Saga Exposes How
Drugmakers Protect Profits, supra note 232.
332. See New Bill Would Extend 100 Drug Patents, Consumer Group Says, ANDREWS INTELL.
PRop. LrrG. REP., Dec. 11, 2001.
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additional $1 billion in sales for every six month the patent is
extended.3 33
Another report states:
Public Citizen [a consumer watchdog group] said the patent exten-
sion legislation is based on the premise that if drug companies test
their products for safety in children, they should receive a six-month
patent extension. [A]s a result of the extension, patent-holding drug
companies will recognize added sales of $29.6 billion, a return 40
times the industry's projected investment in pediatric tests, the group
contends.3 34
In regard to Glucophage, manufactured by Bristol-Myers, appar-
ently the patent protection allows Bristol-Myers to sell an additional
$5.5 million of the drug per day. Assuming that Bristol-Myers is able to
charge at least three times its marginal cost,335 Bristol-Myers is earning
an extra $3.6 million in profit per day during the term of the patent.336
When the patent expires, that profit disappears.
It has also been reported that
In 1998 . . . Abbot Laboratories paid generic maker Geneva
Pharmaceuticals $4.5 million a month [or $54 million per year] to
drop its patent challenge to a hypertension drug. All Geneva had to
do was agree not to compete. Geneva held to the bargain, despite
favorable court rulings on its challenge. The cost to consumers from
lost competition was $100 million a year. After the FTC filed a com-
plaint about the arrangement, the companies finally agreed to aban-
don it.
3 3 7
Apparently because of the high profits available for each day of
patent protection, the following "tricks" 338 have been developed that
might extend patent protection:
Citizen's petitions. Under the law, anyone has the right to challenge
generic competition for a drug, but such petitions are often submitted
not by the public, but by the patent-holding drug firms themselves.
Filed just before a patent is due to expire, the petition triggers a Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) review. The petitions almost never
333. Wayne & Petersen, supra note 272.
334. New Bill Would Extend 100 Drug Patents, supra note 331.
335. See id. (estimating that generics sell for 70% less). If the price of the generic drug is
discounted 70% from the patented drug, the brand name drug would be selling for approximately
three times the price of the generic. For example, if the brand name sells for $100, and the generic
is sold at a discounted price of $30, the brand-name drug sells at over three times the price of the
generic [3 x $30 = $90].
336. If the total additional sales per day are $5.5 million, and the profit percentage on every
sale is 67%, the profit per day is $3.685 million.
337. Cipro Saga Exposes How Drugmakers Protect Profits, supra note 232.
338. Id.
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succeed, but until the review is finished, generics can't come in and
compete.
Last-minute patents. Another trick is for the drug company to file an
entirely new patent on a drug just before a generic is about to be
approved. Under law, that triggers a 30-month delay, while disputes
over the new patent are settled. Bristol-Myers Squibb, for instance,
won a new patent on its anti-depressant BuSpar in 2000, the day
before generics were to start shipping, claiming control over an ingre-
dient created as the drug is digested.
Lobbying. When all else fails, drug firms have tried, usually unsuc-
cessfully, to convince lawmakers to grant patent extensions. Scher-
ing-Plough has been trying for years to get Congress to approve an
extension on its big-selling allergy drug, Claritin.3 39
D. Damage Awards Indicating the Extent of a Patent Holder's
Market Power
When a party "infringes" a patent, the patent holder has been
deprived of the right to exclude another from making, using or selling
the patented process or product.340 In addition to obtaining an injunction
to prevent further infringement,3 41 a patent holder can obtain money
damages.342 It could be argued that the damages awarded in a patent
case compensate for the market power that the patent holder would have
enjoyed in the absence of competition from the infringer. In calculating
damages from infringement, some courts expressly exclude "ordinary
profits," and only award damages to the extent that the patent holder's
profits would have been greater than ordinary profits.34 3 Thus, the dam-
ages awarded in patent infringement cases may be viewed as a rough
estimate of the economic market power that the patent provides. Com-
mentators have stated, "[I]n modem-day patent infringement cases,
339. Id. (recently Claritin became available without a prescription).
340. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent").
341. Id. § 283 (2000) ("The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right
secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable").
342. Id. § 284 (2000) ("Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed
by the court").
343. TWM Mfg. Co., v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (under "the so-called
'analytical approach,' ... [the court subtracts] the infringer's usual or acceptable net profits from
its anticipated net profit realized from sales of the infringing devices." In the TWM case, the court
concluded that the infringer's anticipated net profits from the sale of the infringing items were in
the range of 37% to 42%; the court then subtracted the "industry's standard net profit of 6.56% to
12.5%," and as a result the court based the damages on a 30% reasonable royalty rate).
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multi-million dollar damage awards have become commonplace .... ,,344
There are two general approaches to awarding damages in patent
infringement cases - the "lost profits" approach, and the "reasonable
royalty" approach. The patent statute provides:
Upon finding for the [patent holder] the court shall award the [patent
holder] damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in
no event less than a reasonably royalty for the use made of the inven-
tion by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the
court.
34 5
1. LOST PROFITS APPROACH
In general, patent holders will attempt to recover damages under a
"lost profits" approach rather than a "reasonable royalty" approach
because the recovery can be greater.346 In order to obtain damages
under the "lost profits" approach, the patent holder must satisfy four
conditions:
To obtain as damages the profits on sales he would have made absent
the infringement, i.e., the sales made by the infringer, a patent owner
must prove: (1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of
acceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) his manufacturing and mar-
keting capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of the
profit he would have made.347
In order to meet the second requirement - the absence of acceptable
noninfringing substitutes - the patent holder must prove "either that (1)
the purchasers in the marketplace generally were willing to buy the pat-
ented product for its advantages, or (2) the specific purchasers of the
infringing product purchased on that basis." '348 It has been stated that
the vagueness of this requirement, "accounts for more appellate litiga-
tion ...than any other aspect of patent damages law. 349 In regard to
the fourth element - the amount of profit that the patent holder would
have made - "the additional units sold by the infringer may be proven
from the infringer's records . . . any inaccuracy or omission in the
infringer's records is resolved in favor of the patentee. This burden on
344. CHISUM Er At., supra note 26, at 1223.
345. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). In addition, the court has discretion to "increase the damages up
to three times the amount found or assessed" if the infringement was "willful," id. § 284, and may
award reasonable attorney fees in "exceptional cases." Id. § 285.
346. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 1252 ("Lost profits are usually the first choice of the
patent owner because they provide the possibility of greater recovery ....").
347. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978).
348. Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
349. Paul M. Janicke, Contemporary Issues in Patent Damages, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 691, 701
(1993) (quoted in CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 1230).
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the infringer extends to any uncertainly regarding the amount of approx-
imate marginal profit for each individual unit. 35°
In regard to calculating lost profits, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has indicated that only incremental costs may be
deducted from lost revenue - in effect, this approach (called the "incre-
mental cost" approach) ignores fixed costs.
The incremental income approach to the computation of lost profits is
well established in the law relating to patent damages. The approach
recognizes that it does not cost as much to produce unit N + 1 if the
first N (or fewer) units produced already have paid the fixed costs.
Thus, fixed costs - those costs which do not vary with increases in
production, such as management salaries, property taxes, and insur-
ance - are excluded when determining profits."'




92% Pfizer Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp.
3 5 3
83% Kalman v. Berlyn Corp.
3 54
45% Kerwit Medical Prods. v. N & H Instruments
355
Also, in several patent infringement cases, the total amount of lost prof-




$873,158,971 Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co.
3 5 7
$211,499,731 Haworth Inc. v. Steelcase Inc.358
$204,809,349 Smith Int'l. Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co. 3
59
350. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 1233.
351. Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 22 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(emphasis added). In regard to the burden of proof, the patent holder has the burden to establish a
reasonable view of the incremental costs, and then the alleged infringer has the burden to show
that the patentee's proofs are unreasonable. See also John 0. Butler Co. v. Block Drug Co., 620
F.Supp. 771, 778-79 (N.D. I11. 1985) (cited in CHISUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 1234).
352. These cases are discussed in CHIsUM ET AL., supra note 26, at 1234.
353. 218 U.S.P.Q. 586, 598 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
354. 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1191, 1194-98 (D. Mass. 1988).
355. 224 U.S.P.Q. 679, 689-90 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
356. These cases are listed and discussed in Jennifer L. Knabb & Michael J. Jeffords, Trends in
Patent Infringement Damages, ABA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW NEWSLETrER 22 (Spring,
2003).
357. 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1711 (D. Mass. 1991) (awarding lost profits, royalties, and interest). Over
$400 million of the award was interest. Knabb & Jeffords, supra note 355, at 25.
358. 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1223 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
359. 229 U.S.P.Q. 81 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
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$178,000,000 Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc. 360
$128,700,000 Fonor Corp. and Dr. Raymond V. Damadian v. General
Electric Co.
36 1
$116,797,696 3M v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopedics
362
$98,100,000 BJ Servs. Co. v. Halliburton Energy Servs. Co.
3 6 3
$85,000,000 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Amoco Chem. Co.
3 6 4
$72,750,704 Stryker Corp. and Osteonics Corp. v. Intermedics
Orthopedics Inc.365
$70,600,000 Odetics Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp.366
$61,000,000 Harris Corp. v. L.M. Ericson Tel. CO.
3 6 7
$46,000,000 Honeywell Int'l., Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstand
368
*In many cases, these amounts include interest.
2. REASONABLE ROYALTY APPROACH
If the patent holder cannot meet the burden for proving lost profits,
she can recover a reasonable royalty as a result of the infringement.369
In determining a reasonable royalty rate, a court may consider many
factors, including
the established profitability of the product made under the patent, its
commercial success, its current popularity, . . . [t]he utility and
advantage of the patent ... over the old modes or devices, if any, that
had been used for working out similar results ..... [t]he portion of
the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particu-
lar business or in comparable businesses ..... [and] the portion of the
realizable profits that should be credited to the invention as distin-
guished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, bus-
iness risks, or significant features or improvements added by the
360. 989 F. Supp. 547 (D. Del 1997).
361. 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1088 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
362. See Knabb & Jeffords, supra note 356, at 24.
363. No. H-00-0948 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (involving techniques for increasing the yield of oil
wells) (cited in Knabb & Jeffords, supra note 356, at 29 n.7); see also B.J. Servs. Co. v.
Halliburton Energy Servs., 338 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
364. 915 F. Supp. 1333 (D. Del. 1994); see also Knabb & Jeffords, supra note 356, at 24.
365. 891 F. Supp. 751 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 96 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (earlier stage of
litigation in which the court concluded that evidence supported an award of $26,348,984 in lost
profit damages); see also Knabb & Jeffords, supra note 356, at 24 (reporting a total award of
$72,750,704).
366. 185 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (reporting an award of $70.6 million in damages)
(discussed in Knabb & Jeffords, supra note 356, at 24).
367. No. 98 CV-2903 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (involving cell phones) (cited in Knabb & Jeffords,
supra note 356, at 29 n.8).
368. 166 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (D. Del. 2001) (involving aircraft technology).
369. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) ("Upon finding for the [patent holder] the court shall award the
[patent holder] damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use of the invention by the infringer .... ") (emphasis added).
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infringer.37°
In determining the amount of a reasonable royalty, courts have rec-
ognized that the "licensee" [or in an infringement case, the infringer]
would make a reasonable profit.371 As a result, the amount of the roy-
alty paid to the licensor (or in an infringement case, the patent holder) is
reduced by the amount necessary to allow the licensee [the infringer] to
make a reasonable profit. As a result, it can be argued that the reasona-
ble royalty represents the value of the patent holder's market power.
In reviewing awards from 1982-2002, commentators have stated:
Overall, of the cases in which a reasonable royalty was awarded,
approximately 60% had reasonable royalty rates in the range of 5% to
19.9%. The remaining 40% of the cases were split evenly between
reasonable royalty rates less than 5% and ... greater than or equal to
20%.372
In several cases, patent holders have received "reasonable royal-





70% Hartness Int'l., Inc. v. Simplimatic Eng'g
37 5
35% Williams v. Skid Recycling, Inc.37 6
30% General Surgical Innovations, Inc. v. Origin Medsystems,
Inc.
37 7
30% TP Orthodontics v. Prof I Positioners
378
30% Trans-World Mfg. Co. Inc., v. Dure Corp. and Kiddie, Inc.37 9
25% Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata,
Inc.
3 80
370. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D. N.Y.
1970) (discussing 15 factors).
371. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971);
TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (under the "analytical approach,"
the "infringer's usual or acceptable net profit" is deducted from "the anticipated net profit realized
from sales of the infringing devices").
372. Knabb & Jeffords, supra note 356, at 27.
373. For a general discussion of reasonable royalty rates awarded in patent infringement cases,
see id. at 27-28.
374. See also Knabb & Jeffords, supra note 356.
375. 819 F.2d 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
376. See Knabb & Jeffords, supra note 356, at 28.
377. Id.
378. 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1497 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (regarding the damage phase of the patent
infringemenet suit), afftd, 980 F.2d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Knabb & Jeffords, supra note
356, at 28 (stating the 30% royalty amount).
379. See Knabb & Jeffords, supra note 356, at 28.
380. 96 F.3d 1390 (Fed. Cir. 996) (stating that a 25% royalty would be charged for prior sales
and a 50% royalty would apply to future sales); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v.
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25% Joy Tech. Inc. v. Flekt Inc.381
25% Pentech Int'l Inc. v. Leon Hayduchok
382
25% Smithkline Diagnostics v. Helena Labs.3 83
IX, SPECIALIZATION, ECONOMIES OF SCALE, AND THE ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS WITH INEFFICIENT PRODUCERS
Based on the analysis set forth above, while most patents create no
market power,384 it seems likely that a patent holder who would be able
to sell his or her patent for a substantial amount would have market
power. These patent holders face a downward sloping demand curve,
which can result in economic inefficiencies. Most important, the price
for the product will be higher than in a competitive market (the price
will be above marginal cost), and the quantity consumed will be smaller
than in a competitive market. As explained below, this Article recom-
mends a change in the tax law to encourage corporate inventors to sell
patents to efficient producers.385 This recommendation can have three
major benefits. First, if the patented product is produced by an efficient
producer, this should reduce the price and increase the quantity con-
sumed (thereby improving economic efficiency). Second, it will provide
the corporate inventor with the opportunity to specialize in research and
development, thus stimulating greater invention. Third, the sale of a pat-
ent by a research and development firm may provide the firm with addi-
tional capital that can be used for additional inventive activity. Before
turning to the specific recommendation, this Article will discuss the eco-
nomic benefits of specialization and efficient production.
A. The Division of Labor and Individuals
As stated above, the efficiency of an economic system can be mea-
sured by its ability to maximize production, and maximize consumer
satisfaction.386 The division of labor, also called specialization, is rec-
ognized as a key element of maximizing production.387 Specialization
Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (considering injunctive relief); see also Knabb &
Jeffords, supra note 356, at 28 (stating the 25% royalty amount).
381. See Knabb & Jeffords, supra note 356, at 28.
382. 931 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussed in Knabb & Jeffords, supra note 356, at
28).
383. Smithkline Diagnostics v. Helena Laboratories, 926 F.2d 1161, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(25% royalty) (listed in Knabb & Jeffords, supra note 356, at 28).
384. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
385. See infra notes 479-501 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
387. STIGLrrz, supra note 9, at 52 ("That production is greater with specialization than with
self-sufficiency is one of the most fundamental principles in economics"). See also id. at 53
(Adam Smith begins his classic book, The Wealth of Nations (1776), with a long study of the
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occurs when people concentrate their efforts on a particular, sometimes
narrow, set of tasks. "Specialization permits each person and region to
use to best advantage any particular differences in skills and
resources."
388
The present-day economy is characterized by an elaborate degree of
specialization and an intricate division of labor.
One of the major differences between a modem economy and that of
frontier days is found in the extensive division of labor and speciali-
zation of the modem work force. Our standards of living today are
vastly higher than those of an earlier age because of the economics of
mass production, which is in turn made possible by specialization.389
Specialization also allows an individual to improve her skills (at the par-
ticular tasks) by continually performing the same tasks - in other
words, a specialist will be more productive than a jack-of-all-trades.390
B. Specialization by Corporations
While specialization by individual workers is the norm, the extent
to which corporations specialize varies from industry-to-industry, and
can vary among the corporations in an industry. 39' There are several
functions that a corporation might perform in connection with producing
a product. Typical functions include research, development, testing,
engineering, manufacturing, marketing, wholesale distribution and retail
distribution. With respect to any particular product, there can be many
other functions and sub-functions. 392 A specialized corporation would
have one function that it might apply in connection with many products
and geographic regions. For example, a corporation with expertise in
producing steel might manufacture steel for use in many different prod-
ucts sold by many different corporations - it would focus on its core
business of producing steel, and sell its steel as a raw material (or com-
ponent part) to other corporations that specialize in producing particular
products. In effect, the steel manufacturer chooses to make steel, rather
than trying to make the steel and then manufacture a myriad of products
made of steel. Similarly, a research firm might stick to its specialty of
performing research and selling the fruits of its research to many corpo-
division of labor, pointing out that one unskilled worker engaged in pin-making by himself likely
would make fewer than twenty pins in one day, but in a small factory employing the division of
labor, production could exceed 4,800 pins per worker per day!).
388. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 65, at 48.
389. Id.
390. STIGLrrz, supra note 9, at 52.
391. HYMAN, supra note 143, at 178.
392. For example, depending on the product involved, different functions might include the
production of raw materials, acquisition of component parts, transportation, and assembly.
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rations for use in a wide variety of products, rather than trying to manu-
facture and sell products based on the inventions it makes.
Under the division of labor theory, a corporation will be a low-cost
or efficient producer when performing its specialty, and based on the
principle of the learning curve, 393 when a corporation attempts to per-
form a different function, it will tend to be less efficient than other firms
which specialize in that function (for at least some period of time). Nev-
ertheless, many corporations do not stick to their specialty.
C. Vertical Integration (the Opposite of Specialization)
The opposite of specialization by a corporation is referred to as
vertical integration. Vertical integration describes a corporation's
expansion into other functions (in which it may have no expertise) relat-
ing to one product. 39
4
There are many examples of vertically integrated businesses that
perform nearly all the tasks related to a particular product. For example,
the auto industry spends substantial amounts on research and develop-
ment, engineering, manufacturing, marketing and distribution, and fre-
quently maintains various controls over the ultimate sellers - the car
dealers.3 95 Also,
Holiday Inns, in rapidly expanding its number of inns, diversified
into carpeting, candies, furniture items, food-stuffs, and a school of
motel management - all of which complemented its main product
and serve to supply its 1000-plus inns with basic support services. 3 9 6
393. See STIGLrrz, supra note 9, at 417 ("As firms gain experience from production, their costs
fall. This kind of technological change is called learning by doing. This systematic relationship
between cumulative experience and costs [is] often called the learning curve .
394. THOMPSON, supra note 190, at 428-29.
395. In regard to methods for conducting the distribution function, one commentator has
stated:
[F]or reasons of security and uncertainty reduction, firms with mass production
capability may be motivated to integrate forward and develop their own distribution
outlets. Access to product markets must be dependable. Where ownership of
distribution channels is impractical, the large corporation may employ such strategic
devices as franchise systems, leasing provisions, and exclusive-dealing
arrangements to give it a stronger foothold in dealing with wholesale and retail
outlets. For instance, while most gasoline service stations are independently
operated, the facilities may be leased to the operator by the brand-name refiner
under terms which permit the refiner to maintain a watchful eye over operating
procedures and merchandising policies. In a similar vein, a large manufacturer
often grants a wholesaler or a retailer an exclusive franchise to handle its product in
a specified geographic area; in return, the franchisee agrees to conform to certain
prices, terms of credit, customer service policies, and product guarantees and
warranties. Exclusive dealerships are commonly found in tires, automobiles, fast-
food firms, articles of clothing, sporting goods, appliances, and paints.
Id. at 430-31.
396. Id. at 430.
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In addition, vertical integration is common in the oil industry, with
refiner-marketer firms tending to integrate backward to be involved in
exploration and drilling, and crude-oil producers tending to integrate for-
ward into refining and retail distribution.397 Also, major brand-name
pharmaceutical firms do not restrict their activities to research and
development; instead, they spend substantial amounts on manufacturing,
marketing, and distribution.398
However, there are industries in which different corporations spe-
cialize in different parts of the supply function. For example, in the
building trade, frequently a building will be designated by an architec-
tural firm; a different firm will act as the general contractor for the
building, and a great variety of corporations may be involved as subcon-
tractors - one corporation may perform the steel or concrete work; a
separate corporation may do the electric; a separate corporation may do
the plumbing; a separate corporation may do the heating and air condi-
tioning; and a separate corporation may do the doors and windows.
Similarly, it has been noted that many of the firms that sell personal
computers are assemblers.399 "They buy circuit boards, cases, monitors,
and keyboards in bulk, assemble the parts into personal computers, and
sell them."'"
Why doesn't the architectural firm expand into general contracting
and the various subcontracting functions (electrical, plumbing, etc.) so
that they can control the entire project from start to finish? Why doesn't
a company that makes component parts for personal computers form a
new division and assemble personal computers? Why doesn't the firm
that assembles the computer parts form new divisions to produce the
computer parts? These are questions that every business considers, and
the answers help determine the size of the corporation.401
397. Id. at 428-29.
398. See, e.g., PFIZER, INc., 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 31 (2003) (For 2002, research and
development (R&D) expenses were 16% of sales; cost of sales (C of S) expenses (presumably
manufacturing costs) were 12.5% of sales; and selling, informational and administrative expenses
(SIA) were 33.5% of sales; for 2001, R&D expenses were 16.5% of sales; C of S expenses were
13.2% of sales; and SIA expenses were 33.5% of expenses; and for 2000, R&D expenses were
16.8% of sales; C of S were 14.4% of sales; and SIA expenses were 36.7% of expenses).
399. STIGLITZ, supra note 9, at 499.
400. Id. ("In the case of the personal computer market, there is a great deal of decentralization.
Companies make extensive use of the market").
401. Id. at 500.
At one time, U.S. Steel owned its own iron ore mines and its own fleet of vessels to
transport the iron ore. It not only produced the pig iron, it also used the pig iron to
make refinished steel products, such as the beams used in construction. Ford Motor




D. Economies of Scale, Transaction Costs, and Other
Considerations in Deciding Whether to Specialize or
Vertically Integrate
When a firm attempts to vertically integrate, it sacrifices a degree
of specialization - in effect, the corporation becomes more of a "jack-
of-all-trades" rather than a specialist.
[V]ertical integration of various stages of production isn't always
successful in increasing profits. In many cases companies give up the
advantages of specialization and large scale production when they try
to become their own supplier. Before a firm can assess the impact of
vertical integration on profits, it must carefully weigh the gains from
lower transaction costs against possible increases in costs for
diseconomies.4 °2
A firm that attempts to perform a new function (in order to vertically
integrate) likely will be less efficient at performing that function (at least
for some time) than the firm that specializes in that function. "As firms
gain experience from production, their costs fall. This kind of techno-
logical change is called learning by doing. This systematic relationship
between cumulative experience and costs [is] often called the learning
curve .... "403
A key factor when a corporation considers whether to perform a
particular function or not is the transaction costs of using an outside
supplier or service provider.404 If a corporation uses an outside supplier
or service provider, the corporation will have to pay for the materials or
services provided by the outsider. In addition, there will be costs associ-
ated with choosing among the various vendors, negotiating a contract or
other arrangement with the chosen vendor, arranging the transaction,4 °5
and maintaining the relationship. The corporation will need to weigh
these transaction costs against all the costs that will be incurred if the
corporation makes the materials or provides the services itself (for
example, through a separate division of the corporation). The transac-
tion costs for a research corporation would include the income tax liabil-
ity if the research corporation sells its invention.
402. HYMAN, supra note 143, at 178 (emphasis added).
403. STIGLITZ, supra note 9, at 417 (emphasis added); see also supra note 378.
404. HYMAN, supra note 143, at 177 ("A key factor in determining the degree of vertical
integration of a firm is the transaction costs involved in contracting with other firms to provide
services needed for the production or marketing of the firm's output. Firms try to keep their
transaction costs, as well as production costs, as low as possible to earn a higher profit")
(emphasis added); STIGLrrz, supra note 9, at 500-01 ("Ronald Coase of the University of
California at Los Angeles was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1991 partly for his work in identifying
the role of transaction costs in determining the 'boundaries' of the firm - what activities occur
within a firm and what activities occur between firms").
405. HYMAN, supra note 143, at 178.
2004] 1127
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1045
There are several reasons why a corporation might prefer to be ver-
tically integrated.406  First, if the corporation relies on an outside sup-
plier, the corporation needs to consider the reliability and responsiveness
of the supplier. For example, will the supplier respond to problems and
scheduling constraints? A division within the same corporation may be
much more responsive when problems arise.4 0 7
Second, if the corporation relies on an outsider, the outsider's busi-
ness risks become business risks for the corporation. For example, if the
outside supplier shuts down production because of a labor strike or
problems with the firm's machinery, the corporation may not be able to
obtain the materials or services that it needs. "[Vertical] integration
internalizes such problems as labor disputes, rising production costs,
production breakdowns, and delays in scheduled deliveries. '40 8  Thus,
relying on outsiders creates uncertainty for the corporation.40 9
Third, since there are outside firms ready to provide the products or
services, presumably a profit can be made in providing the product or
service (and the price paid by the corporation to the outsider includes a
406. It should be noted that there are varying degrees and approaches to vertical integration. In
most cases the corporation will simply establish another division that will perform the new
function. However, in the case of the distribution function, it is common to establish relationships
with outsiders - such as franchisees, lessees, or dealers - which provide the corporation with a
limited degree of control over the distribution function. See supra note 395. In regard to other
creative approaches to vertical integration, see HYMAN, supra note 143, at 178 (discussing Toyota
Motor Corporation's relationship with approximately 230 corporations which supply about 60%
of Toyota's component parts, and which are called the Kyohokai, which means "Toyota
Corporation Association").
Directors of Toyota usually serve as directors of the Kyohokai companies and Toyota usually
owns a good proportion of the corporate stock of these suppliers.
Although Toyota deals with companies other than those of the Kyohokai, its unique
relationship with these companies allows it to coordinate planing and other
considerations to reduce transaction costs. It also helps Toyota achieve the goals of
its . . . system ... so as to reduce inventory storage costs. The detailed planning
with its affiliated companies allows Toyota to synchronize delivery of supplies and
get the components from affiliated companies "just in time." This system of quasi-
vertical integration through control and planning rather than full ownership of
suppliers, has significantly reduced costs for the company.
Id. at 178.
407. THOMPSON, supra note 304, at 430 (vertical integration allows the corporation "to escape
the disruptive influence of unreliable suppliers ...."); HYMAN, supra note 143, at 177 ("By
controlling its own production, a manufacturer can reduce or eliminate delays that might prevent it
from shipping its orders on time").
408. THOMPSON, supra note 190, at 427 ("A firm is better able to control daily operating
problems when they fall within the purview of its own management as opposed to when they are
the problems of other managements").
409. Id. at 427 ("vertical integration spares a firm the uncertainty of being dependent on
suppliers for crucial inputs, as well as what price must be paid for the inputs"). Id. at 430 ("To the
extent that firms are integrated, they are insulated in part from demand-supply changes at each of
the processing stages .... ").
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profit margin). Although the corporation may have no expertise in cre-
ating the component (or providing the service), if the corporation can
eventually develop the same level of expertise and efficiency as the
outside supplier, presumably the corporation will be able to capture that
profit.41°
Fourth, it may be possible for a division of the corporation to pro-
duce a higher quality product than an outsider.
Many managers believe that integrating their advertising operations
rather than purchasing services from another firm results in higher-
quality advertising. This is because the firm can keep its own adver-
tising people informed about the development of new products at a
lower cost than would be possible if the firm used an outside adver-
411tising agency.
On the other hand, there are factors that may lead a corporation to
specialize, rather than vertically integrate. First, by focusing on its
"core" business, the corporation may achieve economies of scale and be
a more efficient producer. By focusing on one task in the production
chain and performing a high volume of the task, the corporation can
become extremely efficient at that one task.4" 2
Second, by being involved in the supply function for a number of
products, a corporation avoids "putting all of its eggs in one basket.
413
For example, if a company is vertically integrated in the personal com-
puter market (making the parts, assembling the parts, marketing the
computers, and distributing the computers) and is not involved in any
other market, a downturn in the personal computer market would have
very serious consequences for the corporation. In contrast, a corporation
that makes circuit boards used in a variety of products might not experi-
ence financial difficulties if there is a downturn in the personal computer
market if at the same time the demand increases for other products using
its circuit boards.
One commentator gives the following example in describing a cor-
poration's decision to perform an additional function itself (thereby
increasing vertical integration) or specializing on its core function and
relying upon an outsider to perform other functions.
Consider, for instance, the problem of a large manufacturing com-
pany that offers health insurance to its employees. The company
410. Id.
411. HYMAN, supra note 143, at 177.
412. STIGLrrz, supra note 9, at 500 ("The circuit board manufacturers have a much larger
market than just personal computers so they can achieve economics of scale they would not enjoy
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could continue to pay premiums to an outside insurance company that
would then be liable for any claims. Because of its large work force,
however, the option of paying its employees' medical bills directly
has become economically viable. The company could set up a divi-
sion to run its health insurance [program], but then it will face...
managerial . . . problems . . . . Although this company is good at
manufacturing, it has no comparative advantage at running a health
insurance company, and its managerial talent is scarce. Accordingly,
the firm may find it cheaper, once these transaction costs are taken
into account, to continue with the outside health insurance company.
[In this case, it may be] more efficient to make use of the market in
obtaining health insurance services.4 14
"The advantages of vertical integration are likely to differ from
industry to industry and from firm to firm."'41 5 Historically, there are
examples of research firms.4 1 6 However, today many firms that conduct
extensive research (that lead to valuable patents) retain the patents and
manufacture the patented products (and/or use the patented processes).
For example, large brand-name drug companies that patent new drugs
frequently manufacture and sell those new drugs themselves.417 While
these established firms in established industries now may have devel-
oped, to a greater or lesser extent, expertise in all phases relating to their
particular product - research, manufacturing, marketing, and distribu-
tion - presumably the original start-up corporation that developed the
new technology at one time was not an efficient manufacturer, marketer,
or distributor. As described below,418 if a patented product is manufac-
tured, marketed, or distributed by a firm that is inefficient at those func-
tions, the price of the patented product will be even higher, and the
quantity consumed will be even smaller, than if those functions were
performed by a corporation that specializes in that particular function.
In the absence of artificial restraints that discourage the sale of pat-
ents,4 19 a corporate inventor might find it profitable to specialize in per-
forming research, and selling the resulting patents.
414. Id. at 501.
415. HYMAN, supra note 143, at 178.
416. For example, Thomas Edison established the Menlo Park laboratory complex twenty-five
miles from New York. See LARSEN, supra note 7, at 73.
417. See supra note 398.
418. See infra notes 422-26 and accompanying text.
419. The artificial restraint considered in this Article is an excessively high income tax burden




E. Economic Problems Are Exacerbated by an Inefficient Producer
As described above,4 20 a patent holder may have market power,
which may cause economic inefficiencies.42' If the patented product is
made by an inefficient producer, the economic problems are exacer-
bated. Figure #17 shows a demand curve for a patented product (in
which the patent holder has market power),422 a supply curve (identified
as Si-Si) assuming the product is produced by an efficient producer,
and a supply curve (identified as S2-S2) assuming the product is pro-
duced by an inefficient producer.
Figure #17423 depicts a shift in the supply curve from the Si-Si
curve to the S2-S2 curve. As discussed above,4 24 a shift in the supply
curve can be caused by many different factors.425 In Figure #17, the
shift is caused by an increase in the costs of production. Figure #17
demonstrates that if it costs more to produce an item, at every price, the
producer will produce a smaller quantity.42 6 In Figure #17, the quantity
drops from Qi to Q2. In addition, the leftward shift of the supply curve
will cause the price of the product to increase. In Figure #17, the price
increases from P1 to P2. Thus, the economic inefficiencies of the
monopoly, oligopoly or monopolistic competition situation are
exacerbated.
420. See supra notes 202-368 and accompanying text.
421. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (describing economic efficiency).
422. The demand curve is downward-sloping because the market can be characterized as a
monopoly, oligopoly or monopolistic competition situation. See supra notes 134-41 and
accompanying text.
423. Figure #17 is based on Figure 4-8(ii) in LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 82.
424. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
425. A shift in the supply curve is caused by a change in any factor other than a change in the
price of the good. LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 78. A change in quantity supplied caused by a
change in the market price for the product is referred to as a move along the supply curve, rather
than a shift of the supply curve. See SAMUaSON & NoRuHAUS, supra note 65, at 61.
426. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 65, at 64 ("any leftward shift of the [supply] curve
... raises prices, and by the law of downward-sloping demand, lowers quantity demanded"), see
also LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 82 ("A fall in supply causes an increase in the equilibrium price and
a decrease in the equilibrium quantity exchanged)."
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FIGURE #17
SHIFT IN THE SUPPLY CURVE CAUSED BY INEFFICIENT






D - D = Demand curve
MR - MR = Marginal Revenue curve
PI = original price
P2 = new price (with an inefficient producer)
Qi = original quantity
Q2 = new quantity (with an inefficient producer)
S1 - S1 = original supply curve
S2 - S2 = new supply curve (with an inefficient producer)
The intuitive reasoning ... is as follows:
A reduction in supply creates a shortage at the initial equilibrium
price that causes the price to be bid up. This increase in price reduces
the quantity demanded, and the new equilibrium is at a higher price
and a lower quantity exchanged.427
Thus, if patented products are manufactured, marketed and distrib-
uted by a firm which is inefficient at performing such functions (for
example, a corporation with expertise in research but no expertise in
manufacturing, marketing or distribution), the price of the product will
be even higher, and the quantity consumed will be even smaller.
427. LIPSEY, supra note 67, at 83.
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X. RECOMMENDATION: REDUCING THE EFFECTIVE INCOME TAX
RATE ON A CORPORATE INVENTOR'S SALE OF A PATENT
This Article recommends that the effective income tax rate on the
gain from the sale of a patent (or a patentable invention) by a corporate
inventor be reduced to the tax rate applicable when an individual inven-
tor sells a patent (or a patentable invention).
A. Under Current Law, a Corporate Inventor Will Incur a
Substantial Income Tax Liability on the Sale of a Patent.
For income tax purposes, the gain on the sale of an asset equals the
amount realized by the seller, minus the seller's tax basis in the prop-
erty.428 The amount realized by the seller is any cash paid at closing
along with the fair market value of any other property received (such as
a promissory note).429
1. A CORPORATE INVENTOR USUALLY WILL HAVE NO TAX BASIS IN
THE PATENT
Normally, when a taxpayer develops or purchases an asset that will
generate revenue for many years in the future, the taxpayer will not be
permitted to deduct the entire amount paid in the taxable year the asset is
developed or purchased.430 Instead, the taxpayer will be required to
treat the amount paid as a capital expenditure, and the amount spent will
be deducted over the useful life of the asset (in the form of depreciation
or amortization deductions).4 3  The theory is that since the asset will
generate revenue over many years, in order to accurately reflect net
income, the related expenses should be deducted over the years that the
asset will generate income.4 32 This approach allocates expenses to the
428. I.R.C. § 1001(a).
429. Id. § 1001(b).
430. BORIS I. BrrrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 1 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTS 20.4.1, at 20-70 (3d ed. 1999) ("A cost that would otherwise be deductible under § 162 or
§ 212 cannot be deducted immediately if it is a capital expenditure. Very generally, a capital
expenditure is a cost that will yield benefits in future years in the taxpayer's business or income-
producing activities. Obvious examples are the costs of buildings and equipment"). I.R.C.
§ 263(a) ("No deduction shall be allowed for - any amount paid out for new buildings or for
permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate").
But see I.R.C. § 179 (basically permitting a taxpayer engaged in a trade or business to elect to
deduct up to $25,000 of business equipment acquired each year) (the amount has been increased
to $100,000 for property placed in service in tax years after 2002 as a result of the Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 202(a)(1)); BrnrrER &
LOKKEN, supra, J 23.9.1, at 32-127 (discussing I.R.C. § 179).
431. Depreciation and amortization deductions are claimed under I.R.C. §§ 167, 168.
432. One commentator has stated:
The capitalization principle also derives from the broader "matching" principle of
accounting, which seeks to match, over time, expenditures with the income that the
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taxable years in which the expenses help generate revenue, thereby
"matching" expenses with the revenue created by the expenses.
However, an inventor receives a great tax benefit when it pays
"research and experimental" expenses to develop an invention. Section
174(a) of the I.R.C. provides that a taxpayer that incurs research or
experimental expenditures433 in the course of its trade of business will
not be required to treat those expenses as capital expenditures, and
instead, the inventor can claim an immediate income tax deduction for
research or experimental expenditures.434 An inventor is even permitted
to immediately deduct the cost of obtaining a patent (including attorney
fees) 435 even though the term of a patent ends twenty years from the date
the patent application is filed.43 6 Thus, although a patent may generate
revenue for up to 20 years, the inventor is permitted to deduct all
research or experimentation expenses that contribute to obtaining the
patent immediately as the expenses are paid.43 7
This is a tremendous tax advantage for inventors. In effect, I.R.C.
§ 174(a) allows inventors to "front-load" the deduction for research or
experimental expenditures. This will reduce the inventor's income tax
expenditures "create." Thus, the purchase of rental property should not be debited
to Expense, because the expenditure for the property is what creates the rental
income to be received in future years. The matching idea then posits depreciation
... as the appropriate means of allocating the purchase price of the rental property
against future rental income by means of periodic debits to Depreciation Expense.
In general, the accounting concept of "matching" mandates capitalization whenever
a rational and systematic method can be devised for allocating the costs to future
revenue and periods.
JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX: FEDERAL INCOME TAX THEORY AND PRACTICE 164 (1989).
433. The applicable regulations describe "research or experimental expenditures" as follows:
The term research or experimental expenditures ... means expenditures incurred in
connection with the taxpayer's trade or business which represent research and
development costs in the experimental or laboratory sense. The term generally
includes all such costs incident to the development or improvement of a product
.... Expenditures represent research and development costs in the experimental or
laboratory sense if they are for activities intended to discover information that
would eliminate uncertainty concerning the development or improvement of a
product. Uncertainty exists if the information available to the taxpayer does not
establish the capability or method for developing or improving the product or the
appropriate design of the product. Whether expenditures quality as research or
experimental expenditures depends on the nature of the activity to which the
expenditures relate, not the nature of the product or improvement being developed
or the level of technological advancement the product or improvement represents.
Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) (1980).
434. I.R.C. § 174(a). However, in the case of a C corporation subject to the alternative
minimum tax, research or experimental expenses are amortized over 10 years. See infra note 439.
435. Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(2) (1980).
436. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).




liability in the early years (when the research or experimental expendi-
tures are incurred). Although depreciation deductions will not be availa-
ble in future years (for the expenses that have already been deducted), it
should be noted that the deferral of an income tax liability is a great
benefit. As one commentator has stated, "A tax shelter is any technique
that allows a person or company to eliminate, reduce or delay paying
taxes on income .... A tax paid in the future costs less than one due
today, and a 30-year deferral is the equivalent of not paying any tax. 4 3 8
A taxpayer may elect to amortize research or experimental expenses
over a period of not less than sixty months.4 39 However, based on the
time value of money,44 ° it likely is advantageous for most corporations
to immediately claim an income tax deduction for all research or experi-
mental expenses.
For purposes of determining the gain on the sale of an asset, the
"tax basis" of the property is deducted from the amount received. 441
The tax basis of an asset is the cost of the asset,442 with adjustments. 443
One of the adjustments is that the cost must be reduced for any amount
deducted under I.R.C. § 174 as a research or experimental expense.'
Thus, an inventor likely will have a zero tax basis in its invention
(because it will have deducted all of its expenses relating to the inven-
tion immediately under I.R.C. § 174). 4 As a result, in most cases, the
entire amount received from the sale of a patent will be a taxable gain
subject to income tax.
438. David Cay Johnston, A Shelter Can Be Simple, or Ornate, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, at
C1 (emphasis added).
439. I.R.C. § 174(b). It should be noted that if a corporation is subject to the alternative
minimum tax, research or experimental expenses may not be deducted immediately, and instead
must be amortized over 10 years. I.R.C. § 56(b)(2)(A) ("The amount allowable as a deduction
under section ... 174(a) in computing the regular tax for amounts paid or incurred after December
31, 1986, shall be capitalized and ... shall be amortized ratably over the 10-year period beginning
with the taxable year in which the expenditures were made [for alternative minimum tax
purposes]"). Generally, a corporation will be subject to the alternative minimum tax if its annual
gross receipts exceed $7.5 million, I.R.C. § 55(e)(1)(A), and its alternative minimum tax liability
would exceed its regular tax liability. Id. § 55(a).
440. Also, in most cases the corporation's effective tax rate will be the same every year. The
corporate income tax rate on taxable income between $75,000 and $10 million is 34%; the rate on
corporate taxable income over $10 million is 35%. I.R.C. §1 l(b)(l)(C) & (D).
441. Id. § 1001(a).
442. Id. § 1012.
443. Id. § 1016.
444. See id. § 1016(14) (relating to amounts amortized under I.R.C. § 174(b)).
445. One commentator has noted, "[ln many cases.., the taxpayer will have little or no basis
in [the] patent. This is due to the expensing of most research and experimental expenditures under
§ 174." Falk, supra note 59, at A-20.
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2. THE CORPORATE INVENTOR'S GAIN ON THE SALE OF A PATENT
WILL BE TAXED AT ORDINARY INCOME TAX RATES
In contrast to an individual," 6 a corporation is subject to the same
income tax rate on capital gains and ordinary income." 7 As a result, a
corporation will pay the same rate of income tax whether the gain is
ordinary income or capital gain." 8 The federal corporate income tax
rates for 2003 are as follows:" 9
TAXABLE INCOME TAX RATE
$0 to $50,000 15%
Over $50,000 to $75,000 25%
Over $75,000 to $10 million 34%
Over $10 million 35%
In addition to the federal income tax, the gain may be subject to
state corporate income tax. The rates charged by the different states
vary greatly. Some states with particularly high corporate income tax
rates are: Iowa 12%; North Dakota 10.5%; Pennsylvania 9.99%; and
Minnesota 9.8%.450 The maximum corporate income tax rate for Cali-
fornia is 8.84%.' 51 Thus if a corporate inventor sells a patent in a high
income tax state, the corporation may need to pay more than 40% of the
total sales price in income tax in the year of sale. This tax may be
avoided by not selling the patent. As a result, under current law, corpo-
rate inventors may be motivated to retain the patent (and exploit the
invention itself) rather than selling the patent.
446. In the case of an individual, capital gains are taxed at lower income tax rates. For 2003,
with respect to ordinary income, the maximum tax rate on individuals is 35%. See I.R.C. § 1(a) -
(d), as amended by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
27, § 105(a) (applicable for tax years beginning after December 31, 2002). This 35% rate will
apply to: (i) married individuals filing joint returns, surviving spouses, heads of households, and
unmarried individuals, with taxable income in excess of $250,000; and (ii) married individuals
filing separately with taxable income in excess of $125,000. In contrast, net long-term capital
gains generally will be taxed at a maximum rate of 15%. I.R.C. § 1(h), as amended by the Jobs
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 301(a)(2)(A).
447. See I.R.C. § 1201(a) (imposing an "alternative" maximum tax on corporate net long-term
capital gains of 35% - this provision has no impact since the maximum tax rate on corporations
under I.R.C. § 11 is 35%). Prior to 1987, the alternative corporate tax rate on capital gains could
have an impact. See BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 430, 1 42.2.5, at 46-17, 46-18.
448. However, the characterization of a gain for a corporation as ordinary income or capital
gain is still relevant. Id. 46.3.2, at 46-20 ("A corporation's capital losses are only deductible
against capital gains. Unlike individuals, corporations are wholly prohibited from using capital
losses to reduce ordinary income").
449. I.R.C. § ll(b)(1).




3. "LOCK-IN" EFFECT OF A HIGH INCOME TAX ON A SALE
In the case of an individual, a primary reason for allowing a lower
tax rate on long-term capital gains is to avoid the "lock-in" effect.452
The lock-in effect can be illustrated by the case of an individual holding
a highly appreciated publicly traded security.
EXAMPLE #4. Professor Joel has done extremely well in the stock
market. He was able to buy-in early and secure a substantial stock
position in Rhodes, Inc. many years ago for $100,000. Today, Pro-
fessor Joel's Rhodes shares are worth $1 million. If the gain on the
Professor's sale would be subject to tax as ordinary income, assum-
ing the Professor is subject to the 35% federal income tax rate and a
5% State income tax rate, on a sale of the Rhodes stock, Professor
Joel would need to pay income taxes of approximately $360,000. 453
As a result, after the sale for $1 million, he would be left with only
approximately $640,000 after-tax. Professor Joel believes that
Rhodes, Inc. has seen its best days, and all other things being equal
he would prefer to sell the Rhodes stock and buy stock of Admiralty,
Inc., which has a dynamic business plan. However, Professor Joel
may feel that he is "locked-in" by the potential income tax that would
be incurred on a sale of the Rhodes stock. Basically, the high tax
means that the Professor will only sell the Rhodes stock if he is
extremely confident about Admiralty, Inc. (and/or extremely pessi-
mistic about Rhodes, Inc.). The Professor will not make the sale if he
believes that he will ultimately end up with more money if he has $1
million invested in Rhodes than if he has $640,000 invested in Admi-
ralty, Inc.
The "lock-in" effect is economically inefficient.454 Investors
should move their money to the company that has the best potential for
452. Commentators have stated:
A high rate of tax on capital gains may impede economic efficiency by deterring the
taxpayer from making economically desirable sales and reinvestments....
A capital gain preference can be justified as an attempt to reduce this locking-in
effect by mitigating the tax burden imposed on realized gains. The preference
promotes economic efficiency by reducing the disincentive to investors of making
those switches in investments that they would make in the absence of taxes.
ALAN GUNN & LARRY D. WARD, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 622 (3d ed. 1992). See DODGE,
supra note 432, at 315 ("The realization principle ... interferes with the mobility of capital...
[t]his tendency of the tax system to 'lock-in' appreciating investments is aggravated by the
[I.R.C.] § 1014 basis rule, which forgives unrealized appreciation at death").
453. The gain on the sale would be $900,000. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (the amount realized of $1
million minus his tax basis of $100,000). At a 40% tax rate, the tax would be $360,000 (which is
40% of $900,000). This example ignores any federal deduction for the state income tax paid and
ignores any state income tax deduction for the federal income tax paid.
454. See GUNN & WARD, supra note 452, at 622 ("the capital gain preference promotes
economic efficiency by reducing the disincentive to investors of making those switches in
investments that they would make in the absence of taxes").
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economic growth. Otherwise, a new start-up company with great plans
may not be able to obtain sufficient capital to implement its strategy. As
a result, the economy will tend to stagnate, with capital trapped inside
companies that have performed well in the past, but are not using their
capital effectively today.
In light of the lock-in effect (and other policy objectives),455 gener-
ally individuals have been taxed at a lower income tax rate on net long-
term capital gains. 456  The lower rate improves economic growth
because it allows capital to flow more freely.
In the case of a patent held by a corporate inventor, if the corpora-
tion will have to pay approximately 40% of the total sale proceeds in
income tax, the corporate inventor may conclude that its economic value
is "locked-in" - that the patent should not be sold, even if another firm
could more effectively manufacture, market, and sell the patented
product.
EXAMPLE #5. The Reverend Praiseworthy has been working on an
"automatic pilot" feature for use in passenger automobiles. Because
of the potential liability involved, the Reverend and his followers
have formed Traveler's Angel, Inc., which is taxed under Subchapter
C of the Internal Revenue Code. Traveler's Angel, Inc. is subject to
the 35% federal income tax rate, and an 8% state income tax rate.
After a miracle breakthrough, Traveler's Angel, Inc. obtains a patent
on the automatic pilot technology. The product will be called the
"Path-Finder," and the slogan will be, "It's almost like getting there
by faith alone!" While Traveler's Angel, Inc. has discovered how to
make the device work, substantial design, engineering, manufactur-
ing, marketing and selling work will need to done before the Path-
Finder can be purchased by consumers. Neither Reverend Praisewor-
thy nor any of his followers have any expertise or experience in the
type of design and engineering work that will need to be done, and
they have no expertise or experience in manufacturing, marketing, or
selling. Wrong Way Pioneers, Inc. offers Traveler's Agent, Inc. $10
million for the invention. However, if Traveler's Angel, Inc. accepts
the offer, it will need to pay 43%457 of the total sales proceeds for
455. See id. at 621-23 (other policy considerations include (i) that a lower tax rate is
appropriate because the gain from a sale "bunches" the taxable income into one year even though
the increase in value may have occurred over many years; (ii) the lower capital gain rate
encourages capital formation; and (iii) a significant part of the gain on the sale may be caused by
inflation, so the amount of the gain may not reflect a true increase in economic wealth).
456. For 2003, the maximum individual income tax rate is 35%, and the maximum long-term
capital gain rate generally is 15%. See I.R.C. § l(a)-(d) (35% rate); Id. § 1(h)(1)(C) (15% rate).
457. This example ignores any state deduction that may be available for federal taxes paid, and
ignores any federal deduction that may be available for state taxes paid.
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income taxes,458 and will have only $5.7 million remaining. Alterna-
tively, Traveler's Angel, Inc. can retain the patent (worth $10 mil-
lion), and attempt to perform the necessary engineering, design,
manufacturing, marketing, and selling work. Although Traveler's
Angel, Inc. will be inefficient at these functions, and the Path-Finder
will have to be sold at a higher price, Traveler's Angel, Inc. may
conclude that their after-tax return will still be higher if they retain
the patent and perform these functions inefficiently, than if they sell
the patent and pay the tax.
B. Contrast to Sales by Individuals, Partnerships, and Limited
Liability Companies
While corporations are not entitled to a reduced -income tax rate on
the sale of a long-term capital asset,459 individuals are subject to lower
tax rates on net long-term capital gains. For individuals, the maximum
federal income tax rate on ordinary income is 35% (for 2003).46 0 As a
result of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, for
sales made by individuals after May 6, 2003, the gain on the sale of a
long-term capital asset will generally be subject to a maximum federal
income tax rate of 15%.461 For individuals in the top marginal income
tax bracket (on ordinary income), this represents a 20% savings.
1. TAXATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHO SELLS A PATENT - 15%
MAXIMUM TAX RATE
Prior to 1954, there were disputes regarding whether an individ-
ual's sale of a patent qualified for the lower long-term capital gain
rates.4 62 In 1954, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 1235, which allows an indi-
458. This example assumes that Traveler's Angel, Inc. deducted all research and experimental
expenditures immediately when those amounts were paid. I.R.C. § 174(a).
459. See supra note 447 and accompanying text.
460. I.R.C. § l(a)-(d).
461. Id. § 1(h)(1)(C), as amended by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003, P. L. No. 108-27, § 301(a)(2)(A).
462. There were at least three reasons for these disputes. First, long-term capital gain
treatment generally is not available for the sale of inventory sold in the regular course of a
taxpayer's trade or business. Thus, disputes could arise over whether an inventor was in the
"trade or business" of selling inventions. The House Report for the Revenue Act of 1950 would
have eliminated patents from the definition of "capital assets" and thereby would have prevented
the gain from the sale of a patent from being taxed at the favorable long-term capital gain rates.
H.R. REP. No. 2319, at 420-21 (1950); reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 380, 420-21.
Second, it could be argued that the gain from the sale of a patent derives from the inventor's
personal efforts, and as a result the gain should be taxed in the same way as wages. Id.
Third, prior to the enactment of section 1235, the IRS announced that it would consider a
payment to be a royalty (taxable as ordinary income) "if [the] payment is measured by the
production, sale or use of the property transferred or if it is payable periodically over a period
generally coterminous with the transferee's use of the patent." See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
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vidual inventor to qualify for a lower income tax rate on the sale of a
patent (or a patentable invention). I.R.C. § 1235(a) provides:
A transfer (other than by gift, inheritance, or devise) of property con-
sisting of all substantial rights to a patent, or an undivided interest
therein which includes a part of all such rights, by any holder shall be
considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than
1 year, regardless of whether or not payments in consideration of
such transfer are -
(1) payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with the
transferee's use of the patent, or
(2) contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the property
transferred.463
The term "holder" is defined as "any individual whose efforts cre-
ated such property. . .,4 Since the term "holder" is specifically defined
as an "individual," "[c]orporations, including S corporations, cannot
qualify as holder under any circumstances,' 4 65 and therefore cannot ben-
efit from I.R.C. § 1235.
2. SALES BY PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
Although I.R.C. § 1235(b) defines a "holder" as an "individual,"
the regulations indicate that individuals doing business as a partnership
may benefit from I.R.C. § 1235.
Although a partnership cannot be a holder, each member of a partner-
ship who is an individual may qualify as a holder as to his share of a
patent owned by the partnership. For example, if an inventor who is
a member of a partnership composed solely of individuals uses part-
nership property in the development of his invention with the under-
standing that the patent when issued will become partnership
property, each of the inventor's partners during this period would
qualify as a holder. If, in this example, the partnership were not com-
posed solely of individuals, nevertheless, each of the individual part-
ner's distributive share of income attributable to the transfer of all
2d Sess., at 438, 439; Falk, supra note 59, at B-301 (discussing Service Mimeograph 6409 (1950-
1 C.B. 9)). Congress noted that several courts had concluded that the inventor's gain could be
taxed as long-term capital gain even if the payments were measured by the success of the patent,
and were payable over the remaining life of the patent. Id.
463. I.R.C. § 1235(a) (emphasis added).
464. Id. § 1235(b)(1). The term "holder" also includes "any other individual who has acquired
his interest in such property in exchange for consideration in money or money's worth paid to
such creator prior to actual reduction to practice ... [other than the creator's employer, or a person
who is related to the creator]").
465. Falk, supra note 59, at A-17; but see JAMES S. EuSTICE & JOEL D. Kur'rrz, FEDERAL
INCoME TAXATION OF S CORPORATIONS, 1 7.04[l], at 7-25 n.138 (arguing that S corporation




substantial rights to the patent or an undivided interest therein, would
be considered proceeds from the sale or exchange of a capital asset
held for more than 1 year .... 466
In addition, the IRS has ruled that if a limited liability company (LLC)
which is taxed as a partnership sells a patent, the individual members of
the LLC will qualify for the lower income tax rate as provided in I.R.C.
§ 1235.467
3. POLICY BEHIND I.R.C. § 1235
While I.R.C. § 1235 was enacted in 1954, a key battle over the
ordinary income v. long-term capital gain issue was held in 1950. The
House Report for the Revenue Act of 1950 proposed that an inventor
selling a patent (or an author or artist selling a copyright) should be
taxed at ordinary income rates on any gain from the sale of her creation.
When a person is in the profession of inventing, or writing books, or
creating other artistic works, his income from the sale of the products
of his work is taxed as ordinary income. This is true whether he
receives royalties from the use of his products or sells them outright,
since the products of his work are held by him "primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business" and are,
therefore, not treated as capital assets.
If an amateur receives royalties on his invention or book or other
artistic work, [that income is taxed] as ordinary income, but if he
holds his invention or book or other artistic work for 6 months [cur-
rently, under I.R.C. § 1222(3), long-term capital gain treatment is
available only if the asset is held more than one year] and then sells it
outright he can avail himself of a loophole which treats such a sale as
the sale of a capital asset, not held primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or business. As a result
the taxpayer receives long-term capital gain treatment on the product
of his personal effort.
Section 290(a) of your committee's bill provides that when any per-
son sells an invention or a book or other artistic work which is the
product of his personal effort his income from the sale is taxed as
ordinary income.4 68
In response to the 1950 House Bill, the Senate proposed a revised
Bill under which the gain from a sale of a patent could continue to be
taxed as a capital gain.4 69 During the Conference Committee debate
466. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(2) (1980).
467. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-35-015 (May 31, 2001); see Falk, supra note 59, at A-18 (discussing
the IRS letter ruling).
468. H.R. REP. No. 219, at 420-21 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 380, 420-21.
469. S. REP. No. 81-2375 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 483, 484, 543-44.
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(which eventually adopted the Senate approach),47° the following testi-
mony was given which focused on the inventive activities of individuals
(but not on the inventive activities of corporations):
Our patent system is responsible, to a large degree, for the tremen-
dous and rapid growth of the industrial phase of our economy.
Although the individual inventor has never been properly rewarded
for his advanced thinking, vision, and personal efforts, he deserves
the major part of the credit for this great progress. His type of think-
ing should be encouraged rather than discouraged ....
The inventor flourishes and brings forth fruit when he feels that he is
being nurtured in an atmosphere of freedom and a soil rich in
opportunity. 0
The experts who wrote this provision call it plugging up a loophole.
Permitting an inventor to get some reward for his invention is not my
idea of a loophole. As for "plugging up," it will certainly effectively
plug up the inventor's desire to create new and better things for our
people to enjoy....
If patents produce their proportionate share [of tax revenue], it will
amount to a couple of hundred thousand dollar [sic]. For this com-
paratively picayune sum we would discourage our individual inventor
by putting a ceiling over his opportunities, thus inhibiting his desire
to create by depriving him of the major part of the reward, which is
already pitifully small. So the end result will be to deny the economy
of this Nation many inventions potentially worth millions of dollars,
to say nothing of the loss of patent stimuli to our industrial
development.4 7 1
The legislative history of the 1954 tax act provides that section
1235 was enacted "to provide an incentive to inventors to contribute to
the welfare of the Nation. '472 Thus, while Congress chose to grant
favorable tax treatment to individuals on the sale of a patent because
inventions stimulate economic growth,4 7 3 similar relief was not extended
to corporate inventors.
470. H.R. REP. No. 81-3124 (1950), reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 580, 585 (amendments 77 & 78).
471. Hearings on H.R. 8920 Before the Senate Comm. on Fin.: An Act to Reduce Excise
Taxes and for Other Purposes, at 601-05 (1950) (Statement of C.E. Earle, Secretary-Treasurer of
the Council for Independent Business and President of Beco Manufacturing Company) (emphasis
added); see also Madelyn Shoheu Cantor, Tax Policy: Copyrights and Patents, 31 VILL. L. REV.
931, 980-81 (1986).
472. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess, 439 (1954), reprinted in Falk, supra note 59, at B-
301.
473. The authors and artists entitled to copyrights were not granted favorable treatment on a
sale. A copyright is excluded from the definition of a "capital asset," I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3), so the




A fundamental principle of taxation is that taxpayers in similar situ-
ations should be taxed in a similar fashion.474  This principle is fre-
quently referred to as "horizontal equity." It could be argued that I.R.C.
§ 1235 creates a distinction between similarly situated taxpayers - cor-
porate inventors and individual inventors. The clearest example would
involve a Subchapter S corporation 75 with individuals as shareholders.
If the S corporation sells a patent, the gain will be taxed at ordinary
income tax rates.476 In contrast, if a limited liability company taxed as a
partnership sells a patent, the individual members of the LLC will be
eligible to be taxed at the lower long-term capital gain rates under I.R.C.
§ 1235(a).477
EXAMPLE #6. The Reverend Praiseworthy and his siblings (Sister
Wholesome, Sister Prudence, and Brother Fortitude) plan to develop
another sensational invention - a Remote Control for the Path-
Finder. (See Example #5 for a description of the Path-Finder.) With
the Remote Control, the user can punch in his or her current location,
and the car will drive itself to your current location. A possible com-
mercial name for the remote control is the "Personal Valet which
Never Gets a Tip." Since there may be substantial liabilities involved
during research and testing, the group visits attorney Tax Clueless.
The group follows Clueless' recommendation to form a Subchapter S
corporation. After developing the Remote Control and obtaining the
patent, the S corporation sells the patent for $10 million. If a 40%
marginal individual income tax rate (federal and State combined)
applies, the individual members of the group will collectively pay $4
million in tax. If they had formed an LLC (taxed as a partnership)
instead of an S corporation, the income tax would have been approxi-
mately $2 million.478
474. DODGE, supra note 432, at 88 ("horizontal equity: persons in the same position should
bear the same tax burden"); JOSEPH H. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5 (4th ed. 1983)
(horizontal equity aims to "distribute the cost of government fairly . . . among people in
approximately the same economic circumstances .... ").
475. The taxation of a Subchapter S corporation is primarily governed by I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379.
In general, a Subchapter S corporation does not pay a corporate level tax, but instead the net
income of the Subchapter S corporation flows through and is taxed to the shareholders. See
generally EUSTICE & Kurrz, supra note 465, 7.01 - 7.13.
476. As discussed above, a corporation cannot be a holder under I.R.C. § 1235. See supra
notes 449-50 and accompanying text. The gain would be recorded at the S corporation level, but
the S corporation generally would not pay a corporate level tax. Instead, the gain will "flow-
through" to the shareholders of the S corporation and will be taxed to the shareholders at ordinary
income tax rates. See generally supra note 475.
477. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(2) (1980); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-35-015 (May 31, 2001).
478. As discussed above, the individual members of an LLC can be taxed at the favorable
long-term capital gain rates applicable to individuals on the gain from the LLC's sale of the
patents. See supra note 467 and accompanying text. In the example, the LLC has a gain of $2
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Based on the principle of horizontal equity, it could be argued that
all inventors, including corporations, should pay a similar rate of tax on
the sale of a patent.
C. Proposal - A Deduction or Exclusion to Reduce a Corporate
Inventor's Federal Income Tax Rate on the Sale of a Patent for a
Fixed Purchase Price
As discussed below, if a corporate inventor sells a patent to a firm
that would be more efficient at manufacturing, marketing, and selling
the patented product, the price of the patented product will be lower, and
the quantity that consumers will acquire will be greater.4 79 Thus, the
economic inefficiencies associated with a monopoly, oligopoly, or
monopolistic competition situation would be reduced. A corporate
inventor will be more likely to sell a patent to an efficient producer if the
tax rate on the gain from a sale is lower. The tax rate could be lowered
either by (i) creating a new deduction; or (ii) providing for an exclusion
from gross income.
1. CORPORATIONS PAY THE SAME TAX RATE ON ORDINARY INCOME
AND LONG-TERM CAPITAL GAIN
As described above, a corporation pays the same rate of federal
income tax whether a gain is ordinary income or long-term capital
gain.480 As a result, there will be no tax benefit for corporations if sec-
tion 1235 is merely amended to include corporations within the defini-
tion of holders.
2. PRECEDENT FOR A DEDUCTION TO REDUCE THE EFFECTIVE TAX
RATE ON A SALE
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, I.R.C. § 1202 created a
deduction that effectively reduced the tax rate on long-term capital gains
for individuals. Section 1202(a) provided, "If for any taxable year a
taxpayer other than a corporation has a net capital gain, 60 percent of the
amount of the net capital gain shall be a deduction from gross income."
The application of former Section 1202(a) can be illustrated with the
following example:
EXAMPLE #7. Texas Hank struck it rich as a result of purchasing
million which "passes through" and is taxed to the individual members. In the example, the total
gain of $10 million multiplied by a 20% tax rate (15% federal long-term capital gain rate, and 5%
state tax rate), results in an income tax liability of approximately $2 million. This example
ignores the potential federal tax deduction for state taxes paid, and ignores the potential state tax
deduction for federal taxes paid.
479. See infra notes 502-03 and accompanying text.
480. See I.R.C. § 1201(a).
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stock of ABC Oil Co. Hank purchascd the stock in June of 1984 for
$100, and sold it in December of 1985 for $10,100. In 1985, Hank
was subject to the highest marginal rate of federal income tax on
ordinary income, which was 50% (Texas has no state income tax).4 81
Hank's gain on the sale was $10,000.482 Thanks to I.R.C. § 1202,
Hank claimed a tax deduction for 60 percent of the amount of the
gain, and as a result only $4,000 of the gain was subject to federal
income tax. At a 50 percent marginal income tax rate, Hank paid
$2,000 of federal income tax on the gain. As a result, Hank paid a 20
483percent tax on the gain.
In order to reduce a corporate inventor's effective tax rate on the
sale of a patent to match the long-term capital gain tax rate generally
applicable to an individual (which is 15%), the corporate inventor would
need to be able to claim a deduction equal to approximately 57% of the
gain from the sale of the patent.
EXAMPLE #8. Sister Wholesome (a sibling of Reverend Praisewor-
thy) has formed a corporation that has developed a great new inven-
tion. The corporation has no tax basis in the invention,4 84 and sells
the invention for $100,000, payable in a lump sum. Under current
law, the federal income tax on the sale will be $35,000 (assuming a
35% federal income tax rate).4 85 If the corporation were allowed a
federal income tax deduction equal to 57% of the gain, the federal
income tax on the sale would be $15,050.486 If Sister Wholesome
had developed and sold the invention as an individual, the federal
income tax on the sale would be $15,000 (based on the 15% federal
long-term capital gain tax rate).487 Thus, a 57% deduction would
create horizontal equity - the tax liability on a sale of the patent
would be approximately the same whether the sale is by an individual
inventor or a corporate inventor.
481. State Tax Guide - All States (CCH), 1 15-100, at 3513-10.
482. The taxable gain is the amount realized on the sale ($10,100) minus Hank's tax basis in
the stock ($100). I.R.C. § 1001(a).
483. The tax of $2,000, divided by the $10,000 gain, is 20%.
484. The corporation has no tax basis in the invention because it deducted all of its research or
experimental expenses under I.R.C. § 174(a)(1). See supra notes 430-45 and accompanying text.
485. The federal corporate income tax rate on taxable income from $75,000 to $10 million is
34%; the rate for taxable income over $10 million is 35%. I.R.C. § I I(b)(l)(C) & (D). This
example ignores any deduction that may be available for state income taxes paid on the gain.
486. The gain on the sale is $100,000. I.R.C. § 1001(a). The proposed deduction would be
$57,000 [$100,000 x 57% = $57,000]. At a 35% rate, the tax on the remaining $43,000 would be
$15,050 [$43,000 x 35% = $15,050].
487. Under I.R.C. § 1235(a), an individual inventor's gain on the sale of a patent will be taxed
as a long-term capital gain. At a 15% rate, the tax liability would be $15,000. See supra note 63
(regarding the 15% rate for 2003).
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3. ENACTING AN EXCLUSION, RATHER THAN A DEDUCTION
An alternative to enacting a new deduction would be to exclude
from gross income part of a corporate inventor's gain from the sale of an
invention. The amount of the exclusion would be the same as the
amount of the deduction proposed above, namely 57%.
EXAMPLE #9. Professor Joel has formed a new corporation, which
develops a great new invention. The corporation has no tax basis in
the invention,488 and sells the invention for $100,000. Under current
law the federal income tax on the sale by the corporation will be
$35,000 (assuming a 35% federal income tax rate).489 If the corpora-
tion were allowed to exclude 57% of the gain from taxable income,
the federal income tax on the gain from the sale would be $15,05o.
4 9 0
If Professor Joel had developed and sold the invention as an individ-
ual, the income tax on the sale would be $15,000 (based on the 15%
federal long-term capital gain tax rate).491
An example of an "exclusion" from gross income can be found in
current I.R.C. § 1202, which allows an exclusion for part of the gain
from the sale of certain small business stock.
4. ONLY SALES FOR A FIXED PURCHASE PRICE WOULD QUALIFY FOR
THE NEW DEDUCTION (OR EXCLUSION)
Prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 1235, the courts and the IRS
considered whether a transfer of a patent (or a patentable invention) in
return for a promise to make payments based upon the transferee's use
of the property was really a sale or a license.492 If the arrangement was
characterized as a sale, the inventor might be eligible to use the lower
long-term capital gain rates.4 93 In contrast, if the transaction was not a
sale (and instead was a license), then all amounts received would be
488. The corporation deducted all of its research or experimental expenses under I.R.C.
§ 174(a).
489. This example ignores any deduction that may be available for state income taxes paid on
the gain.
490. The gain on the sale would be $100,000 [$100,000 - $0 = $100,000]. I.R.C. § 1001(a). If
57% of the gain is excluded, only $43,000 would be subject to federal income tax. The federal
income tax liability on the sale would be $15,050 [$43,000 x 35% = $15,050].
491. Under I.R.C. § 1235(a), the gain on the sale of a patent by an individual inventor would
be taxed as a long-term capital gain. At a 15% rate, the tax liability would be $15,000. See supra
note 63 (regarding the 15% rate).
492. Falk, supra note 59, at A-27. I.R.C. § 1235 eliminates this distinction for purposes of
characterizing the gain - as long as all or substantially all rights to the patent are transferred (and
the other requirements are satisfied), the gain will be taxed at long-term capital gain rates.
493. Prior to the enactment of I.R.C. § 1235, the inventor would need to prove that the




taxable as royalties subject to ordinary income tax rates.4 94 After several
courts had rejected the IRS's attempt to characterize payments based on
the use or productivity of the invention as royalties,495 the IRS issued an
administrative pronouncement 496 providing that if payments are mea-
sured by the production, sale or use of the property transferred (or if the
payments are for a period of time that is coterminous with the trans-
feree's use of the patent), such payments will be considered royalties
taxable as ordinary income.49 7 The IRS administrative pronouncement
was effectively reversed by the enactment of I.R.C. § 1235(a) in
1954.498
The new deduction (or exclusion) proposed in this Article would
only be available if the sale price of the invention is not contingent on
the "productivity or use" of the invention, because of the potential eco-
nomic consequences. As discussed earlier, the marginal cost of a pro-
ducer does not include fixed costs,4 99 and the price and quantity are
determined (or impacted) by the intersection of the marginal cost curve
and the marginal revenue curve.5° If a patent is sold to an efficient
producer, but the efficient producer is required to pay a higher purchase
price for the invention for every unit sold (in other words, a royalty
based on use or productivity), this increased payment for the invention
would become part of the efficient producer's marginal cost (because it
would be incurred as a result of selling an additional unit). An increase
in marginal cost will cause the supply curve to shift to the left,50 leading
to a higher price and a smaller quantity. This was illustrated in Figure
494. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(6) ("Except as otherwise provided ... gross income means all income
from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items: . . . Royalties
....1).
495. See Falk, supra note 59, at A-26 (citing Comm'r v. Hopkinson, 126 F.2d 406 (2d Cir.
1942); Carroll Pressure Roller Corp. v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 1288 (1957); Coplan v. Comm'r, 28 T.C.
1189 (1957); Marco v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 544 (1955); Myers v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 258 (1946)).
496. Mimeograph 6490, 1950-1 C.B. 9.
497. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 439 (1954) (quoted in Falk, supra note
59, at A-20).
498. I.R.C. § 1235(a) provides that:
A transfer ... of property consisting of all substantial rights to a patent .... shall be
considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year,
regardless of whether or not payments in consideration of such transfer are - (1)
payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with the transferee's use
of the patent, or (2) contingent on the productivity, use or disposition of the property
transferred.
I.R.C. § 1235(a) (emphasis added)
499. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
500. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
501. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. When the producer's marginal cost increases,
the producer supplies a smaller quantity at each price - thus, causing a leftward shift of the
supply curve.
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#17, supra. Thus, a sale of a patent with the purchase price contingent
on the use or productivity of the invention might increase the economic
inefficiencies associated with the patent - specifically, one would need
to compare the royalty rate per unit with the savings to manufacture,
market and sell each unit; if the royalty rate is higher, the licensee would
have a higher marginal cost.
In contrast, if the invention is sold for a fixed purchase price (even
if it payable over time), that purchase price will be a fixed cost and
should not impact marginal cost, and therefore should not impact the
price charged or the quantity supplied. As a result, the deduction (or
exclusion) proposed in this Article would only be available when the
purchase price would not be contingent on the use or productivity of the
invention.
D. Impact of Proposal
If adopted, the proposal could have at least three positive conse-
quences - improving economic efficiency, encouraging innovation by
allowing the R&D corporation to focus on its core business, and making
more capital available to the R&D corporation for research.
1. SHIFTING THE SUPPLY CURVE TO THE RIGHT TO IMPROVE
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
As discussed earlier,5 °2 a decrease in production costs (specifically,
a decline in the producer's marginal cost) will cause a rightward shift of
the supply curve. For a variety of reasons, the corporate inventor that
obtains a patent may not be able to manufacture, market, and sell the
patented product efficiently. For example, the corporate inventor may
specialize in research and have no experience or expertise in performing
the other necessary business functions. If the corporate inventor sells
the patent to a more efficient producer, the marginal cost of supplying
the patented product will decrease, which will result in a rightward shift
of the supply curve.
In order to maximize profit, the producer will produce the quantity
indicated by the intersection of the marginal cost curve and the marginal
revenue curve. 3 Due to the rightward shift of the supply curve (in
other words, the decrease in marginal cost), the intersection of marginal
revenue and marginal cost will now occur at a higher quantity. This is
reflected in Figure #18. Before the shift in the supply curve, the quan-
tity produced was 10 (indicted in Figure #18 as Q1). When the supply
502. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
503. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
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curve shifts (to S2-S2), the quantity produced increases to 12 (indicated
in Figure #18 as Q2). In addition, the price decreases from $4 to $3
(indicated in Figure #18 as the shift from P1 to P2). Thus, a rightward
shift of the supply curve improves economic efficiency.
FIGURE #18
A RIGHTWARD SHIFT OF THE SUPPLY CURVE CAUSED BY A
















= Marginal Revenue curve
= original price
= new price (with an efficient producer)
= original quantity
= new quantity (with an efficient producer)
= original supply curve
= new supply curve (with an efficient producer)
2. POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED CAPITAL TO THE
INVENTIVE CORPORATION
A sale to an efficient producer may provide the corporate inventor
with additional capital that can be used for new research and develop-
ment for two reasons. First, after the corporate inventor pays the income
tax on the gain from the sale of the patent (or patentable invention), 5 4
504. Under the proposal, the deduction or exclusion would be available on the sale of a patent,
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the corporate inventor can plow the after-tax proceeds from the sale into
new research and development. If the purchase price is payable in
installments over time, that capital will only become available to the
corporate inventor as it is paid (unless the corporate inventor sells the
installment note). Second, if the corporate inventor had not sold the
patent (or patentable invention) and instead attempted to exploit the
invention itself, the corporate inventor might need to spend substantial
capital to perform the various business functions necessary (manufactur-
ing, marketing, selling, etc.). One commentator has stated, "Even in the
case of an innovation patented in fully commercial form - as is the
case with many relatively trivial patents - the firm must make signifi-
cant investments to simply distribute and market the invention ....
"1505[M]arketing is a major cost in innovation .....
By selling the invention to an efficient producer, the corporate
inventor will not need to incur those additional expenses, and instead
can continue to focus on research and development.
3. ALLOWING A CORPORATE INVENTOR THE FLEXIBILITY TO FOCUS
PRIMARILY ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The corporation with a great new invention has at least three
choices - it can sell the invention; it can retain the invention and manu-
facture, market and sell the patented product itself; or it can license the
invention to another firm that will manufacture, market and sell the
or upon the sale of a patentable invention (even if no patent application has been prepared or filed
before the sale). Favorable tax treatment is available under I.R.C. § 1235(a) even if no patent
application has been prepared, as long as the invention is patentable. I.R.C. § 1235 does not
define the term "patent," but the applicable regulations provide:
The term patent means a patent granted under the provisions of title 35 of the United
Stated Code, or any foreign patent granting rights generally similar to those under a
United States patent. It is not necessary that the patent or patent application for the
invention be in existence if the requirements of section 1235 are otherwise met.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(a) (as amended in 1980) (emphasis added). The legislative history
provides,
The section does not apply to a property right in an invention differing from the
monopoly rights evidenced by a patent. However, since the inventor possesses an
exclusive inchoate right to obtain a patent, he may transfer his interest, whatever it
may be, in any subsequently issued patent before its issuance and before as well as
after he has made application for such patent.
Report of the Senate Comm. on Fin. to Accompany H.R. 8300, S. REP. No. 83-1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess., at 439 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5082. See also William A.
Drennan, A Method of Analysis for the Unlikely Asked to Perform the Amazing: Determining
"Patentability" Without a Patent Application Under Section 1235, 22 VA. TAX REV. 443, 453-55
(2003).
505. Kitch, supra note 52, at 277; See also Kitch, supra note 48, at 1731 (In the case of
pioneer-patents - patents with broad claims issued in a new field - "in order to achieve
commercialization, much more work remains to be done before a commercial product can be
placed on the market").
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invention. If the corporation retains the invention (and does not license
the invention), it can avoid the income tax from a sale, but it will need to
exploit the invention itself - performing a variety of functions other
than research and development. 50 6 The corporation will need to become
involved in manufacturing, marketing, selling, and other business func-
tions. In that case, the corporate inventor becomes a jack-of-all-
trades.5 °7 Alternatively, the corporation can sell the invention, and focus
its efforts on new research and development activities. If the effective
tax rate on a sale of the patent is reduced, a sale could be attractive to
those corporations that wish to specialize in research and development.
The corporate inventor's research activities may be more productive
(because of economies of scale) if the corporate inventor specializes,
than if it attempts to be a jack-of-all-trades. 0 8 One commentator has
stated:
It is clear that the ability of the owners of intellectual property rights
to transfer these rights in whole or in part to others is an important
feature of the system. The rights can easily arise in the hands of
persons or firms who are not in the best position to exploit them. In
order to involve others in the full exploitation of the economic poten-
tial of the right, the owners must be able to enter into a wide range of
arrangements with other firms.50 9
As discussed in detail below, another option is for the corporate
inventor to retain the patent and license an efficient producer to manu-
facture, market and sell the patented product.510
E. Response to Some Potential Objections to the Proposal
1. LOSS IN TAX REVENUE - PROVIDING INVENTORS WITH ANOTHER
TAX BENEFIT
It may be argued that inventors already receive several tax benefits
which over-stimulate inventive activity. As discussed above, inventors
can immediately deduct all their research or experimental expenses.51
Also, inventors that increase their research or experimental expenses can
be entitled to a tax credit.51 2 In addition to these tax benefits, as dis-
506. See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
507. See supra notes 402-03 and accompanying text.
508. Id.
509. Kitch, supra note 48, at 1740.
510. See infra notes 506-16 and accompanying text.
511. I.R.C. § 174(a). See supra notes 433-37 and accompanying text.
512. I.R.C. § 41. For a discussion of the research credit, see generally Falk, supra note 63, at
A-5 & A-6 ("A significant change was made for years after 1989 relating to the interplay of
[I.R.C.] § 174 and [I.R.C.] § 41. For years after 1989, the credit under [I.R.C.] § 41 reduces the
[I.R.C.] § 174 deduction for qualified research costs and basic research payments") (citing I.R.C.
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cussed above, in a monopoly, oligopoly, or monopolistic competition
situation, the producer enjoys an excess profit (by eliminating consum-
ers' surplus).5 13 In response, it is sometimes proposed that government
should "tax away" the monopolist's excess profit.514 The proposal set
forth in this Article will reduce a corporate inventor's tax burden on the
sale of an invention, so that less tax will be collected by the IRS on a
sale. Thus, it may be argued that the proposal in this Article will reduce
the total tax revenue received by the U.S. government, and will provide
another tax subsidy to the corporate inventors.
In regard to the total tax revenue received by the U.S. government,
it could be argued that this proposal might actually increase the income
tax revenues raised on the sale of patents. As discussed above in con-
nection with the "lock-in" effect,515 in light of the high income tax rate
facing a corporate inventor on the sale of a patent, there may be fewer
sales than if the tax rate were more reasonable. Thus, lowering the tax
rate may increase the number of sales, and increase the total tax revenue
raised on invention sales (even though less tax may be paid on each
sale). In addition, since the sale of the invention to an efficient producer
will increase the quantity that consumers purchase, 5 6 more tax revenue
may be raised from the sale of those additional products. In regard to
whether the proposal in this Article will provide an excessive subsidy to
corporate inventors, the U.S. government certainly could adopt other
measures to impose "fixed costs" on a patent holder.517
2. CORPORATIONS AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR THEORY
It might be argued that while the division of labor is well-docu-
mented in the case of individual workers,518 the benefits of specializa-
tion by a corporation are not as clear. As discussed above, different
corporations take different approaches in regard to specialization.519
Many corporations find it beneficial to vertically integrate, expanding
into a variety of business functions all related to one product.5 20 This
can be beneficial in controlling risks and avoiding transaction costs.
In contrast, other corporations prefer to perform one function with
respect to a variety of products. This allows the corporation to achieve
§ 280C(c)); Paul W. Oosterhuis & John S. Stanton, Research and Development Expenditures, 42-
3d TAX MGM'T (BNA) (1987).
513. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
514. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 498.
515. See supra note 452 and accompanying text.
516. See supra notes 502-03 and accompanying text.
517. SAMUELSON, supra note 1 (regarding the imposition of a flat tax).
518. See supra notes 387-90 and accompanying text.
519. See supra notes 391-419 and accompanying text.
520. See supra notes 406-11 and accompanying text.
1152 [Vol. 58:1045
CHANGING INVENTION ECONOMICS
greater economies of scale. By specializing in its key function, the cor-
poration may improve efficiency. In addition, this business model
allows the corporation to avoid "placing all its eggs in one basket." In
contrast to the vertically integrated business, which will be in serious
trouble if sales of its one product decline, the specialized firm may sup-
ply products or resources for a variety of products in different industries.
This proposal will provide a corporate inventor with greater flexibility in
deciding its degree of specialization (or vertical integration).
3. WHY DOESN'T LICENSING ADDRESS THESE CONCERNS?
Another objection may be that a corporate inventor could simply
license the invention to an efficient producer.52' A license is normally
an agreement to pay royalties based on the sales of the patented product.
For example, royalties may be based on a percentage of gross revenue
from sales, or on a fixed dollar amount per unit sold. Licensing can
allow the corporate inventor to specialize on research and development,
and can allow the patented product to be manufactured, marketed, and
sold by an efficient producer. Also, licensing allows the corporate
inventor to avoid devoting substantial amounts of capital to perform
other business functions.
Although a licensee may be able to manufacture, market, and sell
more efficiently then the inventor, a licensee may or may not have a
lower marginal cost of production than the inventor. The marginal cost
is crucial, because as discussed above, if the producer or producers in a
pure monopoly, an oligopoly, or monopolistic competitive market have
a lower marginal cost of production, they will produce a greater quantity
and will sell at a lower price.52 2 If they have a higher marginal cost of
production, the quantity produced and consumed will be smaller and the
price charged will be higher. Since economic efficiency is improved by
increasing production and increasing consumer satisfaction, greater eco-
nomic efficiency is obtained if the marginal cost is lower. This was
reflected in Figure #18 above. In Figure #18, the supply curve shifted to
the right (from Sl-S1 to $2-$2), causing quantity to increase from 10
units to 12 units, and causing price to drop from $4 to $3.
In order to demonstrate the importance of marginal cost, Figure #19
below assumes the same marginal revenue for three situations (shown in
521. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) ("Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the
attributes of personal property .... The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives
may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive fight under his application for patent, or
patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States"); Eisenberg, supra note 109, at
1021-22 ("Patent holders need not exploit their exclusive rights themselves, but may sell or
license them to others in exchange for royalties .... ).
522. See supra notes 502-03 and accompanying text.
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column (2) of Figure #19), but with different marginal costs. In Situa-
tion #1, the inventor retains the patent and manufactures, markets, and
sells the patented product. Because any producer will continue to pro-
duce as long as its marginal revenue from making and selling another
unit exceeds its cost of producing that one unit, in Situation #1 the
inventor will produce a quantity of 3x.523 In Situation #2 the inventor
licenses the patent to an efficient producer, but the efficient producer is
required to pay a royalty on every unit sold. In Situation #2, it is
assumed that at each quantity, the efficient licensee can produce the
product for $10 less per unit than the inventor, but is required to pay a
royalty of $15 per unit. Thus, in Situation #2, the licensee's marginal
cost is $5 higher at each quantity.52 4 Although the efficient producer
can manufacture, market, and sell the patent at a lower cost than the
inventor, when the cost of the royalty is added to the licensee's marginal
cost, in this example the licensee's marginal cost is higher. As any pro-
ducer will produce the quantity indicated by the intersection of the mar-
ginal revenue and marginal cost curves,525 the efficient licensee in
Situation #2 will only produce 2X526 (whereas the inventor would have
produced 3x). Also, the efficient licensee will charge a higher price per
unit because of the resulting shortage - simply stated, the inventor will
need to charge a lower price to sell 3x than the licensee will need to
charge to sell 2x. 527
In Situation #3, the inventor sells the patent to an efficient producer
for a fixed sum. The purchase price of the patent is not included in
marginal cost because the purchase price for the patent does not change
regardless of how many units the purchaser manufactures and sells. In
Situation #3 it is assumed that the purchaser can produce the product
$10 per unit cheaper than the inventor. Because the purchaser is a more
efficient producer than the inventor (by $10 per unit), the purchaser's
523. In Figure #19, it will cost the inventor $95 to increase production from 2x to 3x (see
column (3) in Figure #19), and the inventor will receive an extra $98 in revenue (see column (2) in
Figure #19) by increasing sales from 2x to 3x. Thus, the profit maximizing inventor will increase
production from 2x to 3x. However, if the inventor increases production from 3x to 4x, it will
cost the inventor $100, and the inventor will only receive an additional $97 in revenue. Thus, the
profit-maximizing inventor will increase production from 2x to 3x, but will not increase
production from 3x to 4x (because marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue).
524. Compare column (3) and column (4) in Figure #19.
525. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
526. The efficient licensee will only produce 2x, and will not increase production to 3x,
because its cost of increasing production from 2x to 3x will be $100 (see column (4) in Figure
#19), and the efficient licensee will only receive additional revenue of $98 (see column (2) in
Figure #19) as a result of selling 3x rather than 2x.
527. As discussed above, this is because the demand curve is downward sloping. See supra
notes 134-35 (monopoly), 182 (oligopoly), 195 (monopolistic corporation), and accompanying
text.
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marginal cost is lower than the inventor's marginal cost would have
been.5 8 As a result the efficient purchaser will produce and sell 4x529
- in contrast to the efficient license who would only produce 2x, and
the inventor who would only produce 3x. In order to sell 4x, the effi-
cient purchaser will sell at a lower cost than either the inventor or the
licensee would have charged (because the inventor would only need to
sell 3x, and the licensee would only need to sell 2x).53 °
FIGURE #19
MARGINAL COST AND MARGINAL REVENUE IN THREE SITUATIONS
(THE INVENTOR, THE EFFICIENT LICENSEE, AND THE
EFFICIENT PURCHASER)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantity Marginal Situation #1 Situation #2 Situation #3
Revenue Marginal Cost* Marginal Cost Marginal Cost
(Inventor) (Licensee) (Purchaser)
(3) +$5 (3) - $10
1x 100 85 90 75
2x 99 90 95 80
3x 98 95 100 85
4x 97 100 105 90
5x 96 110 115 100
6x 95 125 130 115
7x 94 150 155 140
* The marginal cost figures reflect the "Law of Diminishing Returns," that was
discussed earlier. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. As columns (3), (4),
and (5) each indicate, as production increases, at some point, it becomes more and more
expensive to produce each unit.
The demand curve (D - D), marginal revenue curve (MR - MR),
and the three marginal cost curves can be plotted as follows:
528. Compare column (3) and column (5) in Figure #19.
529. The efficient purchaser will be willing to increase production from 3x to 4x because its
cost of increasing production from 3x to 4x will be $90 (see column (5) in Figure #19), and the
efficient producer will receive additional revenue of $97 (see column (2) of Figure #19) as a result
of selling 4x rather than 3x.
530. As discussed above, price is determined by the [ltersecuon or the demand curve and the
marginal cost curve. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. If the demand curve is
constant and marginal costs decrease (a rightward shift of the supply curve), the price drops. See
supra notes 502-03 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE #20
DEMAND CURVE, MARGINAL REVENUE CURVE, AND











2x 3x 4x Quantity
Demand Curve
Marginal Cost Curve for the Inventor
Marginal Cost Curve for the Efficient Licensee
Marginal Cost Curve for the Efficient Purchaser
Marginal Revenue Curve
Thus, depending on the particular facts of the situation, licensing
may actually increase the producer's marginal cost, thereby increasing
the price of the patented product, and further restricting the supply. As a
result, licensing can increase the economic inefficiencies associated with
a patent.53'
4. IMPACT ON ESTABLISHED INDUSTRIES
Another issue is whether this proposal would have any impact on
established industries. It might be argued that in established industries
(such as the pharmaceutical industry), the corporate inventors have
already gained experience and expertise in a variety of business func-
tions. As a result, the corporate inventors in an established industry may
be efficient producers, and no other entity could produce the patented
product at a lower marginal cost.
531. It should be noted that if the cost savings per unit exceeds the royalty per unit, the
efficient licensee would have a lower marginal cost than the inventor, and would produce more,






If the marginal cost of the corporate inventor is lower than the mar-
ginal cost that any other producer could achieve, then a sale of the
invention would not reduce marginal cost, and would not reduce price or
increase quantity. However, even if corporate inventors in an industry
have experience in various business functions, it does not necessarily
follow that they can produce at the lowest marginal cost. For example,
generic drug manufacturers have captured a significant share of the drug
market even though the brand-name drug companies had great experi-
ence in various business functions. 32 Presumably the generic drug
companies captured a significant share of the market for drugs (for
which the patents had expired) by producing at a lower marginal cost
(which allowed the generic drug companies to decrease price and
increase supply). This is not totally surprising because, as discussed
above, brand-name pharmaceutical companies perform a variety of busi-
ness functions (such as research, development, testing, engineering,
manufacturing, marketing, distribution, selling, etc.).5 33 In contrast, a
generic drug manufacturer performs fewer functions. Thus, the generic
drug manufacturer is more of a specialist, while the brand-name drug
company is more of a jack-of-all-trades.
In addition, this proposal could impact new corporations and new
industries that will develop to meet consumer desires that cannot even
be identified at this time. In new industries, allowing corporate inven-
tors to sell their patents at a reasonable tax cost to efficient producers
can avoid the economic inefficiencies associated with a research and
development corporation attempting to expand into other business func-
tions that they cannot perform efficiently.5 34
XI. CONCLUSION
The patent system (or another type of incentive system) is needed
to encourage invention.535 In the words of the U.S. Constitution, patents
"promote the progress of Science and the Useful Arts." '536 Inventions
stimulate economic growth and improve the quality of life.5 37
A patent grants the inventor the power to prevent others from mak-
ing, using, or selling the patented product. 38 In effect, a patent can
create a barrier that prevents potential competitors from entering the
532. See McNeil, supra note 321 (quoting William F. Hadad, "a generics maker who helped
create the cheaper off-brand industry in the United States in the 1980's").
533. See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
534. STIGLrrz, supra note 393 (regarding the learning curve).
535. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
536. U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
537. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
538. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
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market for the patented product unless the potential competitor can
"design around" the patent - create a product that performs the same
function without infringing the patent. Without competition, various
economic inefficiencies arise.
While a patent grants a pure monopoly in the market for the pat-
ented product, that may not be the relevant market.539 The relevant mar-
ket is the market for products that satisfies the particular consumer need
or desire. There may be other producers who sell products that a con-
sumer could substitute for the patented product - in that case, the rele-
vant market would be the market for all products that satisfy the
particular consumer need or desire. In that market, the patent holder and
all other producers who sell products that meet that need or desire will
compete.
Nevertheless, even when there are some producers who sell substi-
tute goods (and the market is better characterized as an oligopoly or a
monopolistic competition situation rather than a pure monopoly), the
producers in the relevant market will face a downward-sloping demand
curve, will set price above marginal cost, and will produce a smaller
quantity than in a competitive market.54 °
An economic system is efficient if it maximizes production and
optimizes consumer satisfaction. A monopoly, oligopoly, or monopolis-
tic competition situation is an economically inefficient arrangement
because the price is higher, and the quantity is smaller, than in a compet-
itive market - production is not maximized, and consumer satisfaction
is not optimized.
Whether patents tend to create monopolies, oligopolies, monopolis-
tic competition situations, or provide the patent holder with no market
power, is an empirical question.54 ' In most cases, a patent will not pro-
vide the patent holder with any market power.542 However, patents that
can be sold for a significant price may provide the patent holder with
market power.543
539. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
540. See supra notes 176-90 and accompanying text (regarding an oligopoly); supra notes 191-
98 and accompanying text (regarding monopolistic competition). The price will be higher than in
a competitive market, and the quantity consumed will be less than in a competitive market.
541. See Kitch, supra note 48, at 1731 ("Whether a particular [patent] ... confers an economic
monopoly is an empirical question").
542. Most patents likely do not result in a commercially viable product or process. See supra
note 52 and accompanying text.
543. There may be circumstances in which the patent has economic value because its holder
may be able to use the patented product or process to create a further invention that will have
commercial applications. In that case the current invention would not provide the current patent
holder with market power in the market for a particular product, because the current patent does
not directly result in a new product.
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Empirical information on market power is difficult to obtain,544 but
two events provided substantial information indicating the degree of
market power in two particular markets. When President Clinton issued
Executive Order 13155 (May 10, 2000)51 5 regarding anti-AIDS drugs
for sub-Saharan African countries, a great deal of information was
reported regarding the sale of the three-drug cocktail therapy. While the
market for anti-AIDS drugs likely is an oligopoly rather than a pure
monopoly (because there are multiple producers), the reports indicate
that the brand-name drug companies are able to charge approximately
thirty times their marginal cost of production.546 Similarly, in connec-
tion with the anthrax threat, reports indicated that Bayer was charging
U.S. consumers a price that likely was ten times higher than the price
that would be charged in a competitive market.547 In addition, the mag-
nitude of the damages awarded in patent infringement cases supports the
view that a patent holder can exercise substantial market power. These
results are consistent with the economic principles discussed in this Arti-
cle - a patent may create a monopoly, oligopoly, or monopolistic com-
petition situation, in which case the patent holder faces a downward-
sloping demand curve, will charge a price in excess of marginal cost,
and will produce fewer products (than in a competitive market). As a
result, fewer consumers will be able to obtain the product (than in a
competitive market).
In order to improve economic efficiency, this Article recommends
reducing a corporate inventor's income tax liability on the sale of a pat-
ent for a fixed price. This may encourage corporate inventors to sell
their patents to efficient producers. According to economic principles, if
the purchaser of the patent is more efficient, the supply curve will shift
to the right, causing a decrease in price and an increase in quantity sup-
plied. This will result in greater economic efficiency - higher produc-
tion and greater consumer satisfaction. While a sale to an efficient
producer at a fixed price can improve economic efficiency, a license to
an efficient producer may create greater economic inefficiencies. 548
Under current law, corporate inventors are not encouraged to sell a
patent. If a corporate inventor sells a patent, it may need to promptly
544. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
545. 65 Fed. Reg. 30521 (May 10, 2000).
546. See supra notes 315-25 and accompanying text (indicating that the price charged to U.S.
consumers can be $15,000 to $17,000 per year, while generic manufacturers in foreign countries
may charge as little as $245).
547. See supra notes 274-87 and accompanying text (Bayer charged U.S. consumer $4.67 per
tablet for Cipro, while U.S. generic manufacturers estimated that they would charge 40 cents per
tablet).
548. See supra notes 521-31 and accompanying text.
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pay more than 40% of the total sales proceeds as income taxes, and may
have less than 60% of the total sales proceeds left. As a result, a corpo-
ration with a great invention may be effectively compelled, for tax rea-
sons, to expand into a variety of other functions (such as manufacturing,
marketing, and selling) in order to exploit the invention, even if the cor-
porate inventor has no expertise or experience in these other business
functions. The recommendation in this Article may provide corporate
inventors with the opportunity to sell the patent (or patentable inven-
tion), obtain the purchase price, and then use that purchase price to
finance new research and development. This proposal may permit a
research and development corporation to focus on its "core business."
As a result, this recommendation may spur greater invention, while
reducing the economic inefficiencies associated with patents.
At age 22, the famous inventor Thomas Alva Edison developed a
major improvement on a "ticker" machine, which was a "private tele-
graph network which gave bankers and stockbrokers the latest share and
gold prices from Wall Street.154 9 At that point, young Mr. Edison had
two choices: (i) he could sell the improved "ticker" invention and use
the sale proceeds to engage in new research; or (ii) he could keep the
improved ticker invention, form a corporation or partnership, and enter
the business of manufacturing, marketing, and selling improved tickers.
Edison sold the ticker innovation for $40,000 (an enormous sum of
money in 1869),"0 created the Menlo Park research complex, and
became one of the most prolific inventors of all times."' Edison's later
inventions included the light bulb, the phonograph, motion pictures, and
many other useful inventions that have been a great benefit to society. 2
Perhaps if the tax rate on the sale of a patent had been too high in
1869,111 Mr. Edison's only important invention would have been an
improved ticker machine.
549. LARsE N, supra note 7, at 73.
550. Id.
551. Id. at 72 ("He was no doubt the greatest ... of the professional inventors; when he died in
1931, at the age of [84], he had taken out altogether 2,500 patents, American and foreign").
552. Id. However, not all of Edison's inventions were a success.
Edison's first invention was a "Voting Apparatus" for the House of Representatives,
with "Yes" and "No" buttons for each Member and an automatic counting device.
He was told that this was a most undesirable invention, for "the most effective
weapon of a Parliamentary minority in preventing the passage of a bad Bill is the
challenging of the vote," which would be impossible with a reliable apparatus.
Id. at 169-70.
553. The Sixteenth Amendment authorizing the imposition of an income tax was not adopted
until 1913. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and
without regard to any census or enumeration").
1160 [Vol. 58:1045
